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Broken Codes

There is an ironic term for a piece of cinema that combines weighty themes with an imposing style: un grand film. Several recent Palme d’Or winners merit the appellation: Ken Loach’s I, Daniel Blake (2019), Bong Joon-ho’s Parasite (2020), Ruben Östlund’s Triangle of Sadness (2022). These are works that strive for ‘relevance’, often at the expense of psychological depth or aesthetic subtlety. Justine Triet’s Anatomy of a Fall – the latest film to be awarded the prize – adheres to the same criteria. Triet, however, is less interested in mounting a schematic critique of inequality than her confères. Her subject is the cosmopolitan European family, and beyond it, other institutions of bourgeois life.

The film unfolds as follows: Sandra (Sandra Hüller), a German writer, her French husband Samuel (Samuel Theis) and their visually impaired son Daniel (Milo Machado Graner) live near Samuel’s hometown in the Alps. Returning from a walk with his guide dog, Daniel stumbles upon Samuel’s body outside their house. It is unclear whether Daniel has happened upon a murder, suicide or accident. Sandra is charged, and a courtroom drama begins. Evidence is sparse; attention turns to Sandra’s infidelities, Samuel’s jealousies. Her work is highly acclaimed, while he is struggling with his first novel. On the day he died, she was being interviewed in their living room; he was upstairs blasting music to disrupt the meeting. Samuel was additionally paralysed by guilt, blaming himself for the accident that blinded Daniel. Sandra, for her part, regretted leaving their life in London. These resentments erupted in a screaming match the day before Samuel’s death, later found to have been recorded on his phone.

The result is a two-hour-long exercise in haute vulgarisation, in which art-house tropes and trappings are combined with those more familiar from the made-for-TV movie. Triet has said she drew inspiration from the case of Amanda Knox, accused of murdering her roommate Meredith Kercher in Italy in 2007 – already the subject of a TV movie as well as a Netflix documentary. The conventions of the whodunnit – a bird’s-eye view of the corpse in the snow, the arrival of police, the painstaking reconstruction of the incident – are mobilized to full effect. In this regard, Anatomy of a Fall is only superficially distinct from the better products of the recent true-crime boom, where viewers are invited to pass judgement on real-life mysteries. Triet, though, has loftier conceptual ambitions. Samuel’s fall metonymizes the fall of the modern male; the court case probes the contemporary status of the family and the law, as well as – more obliquely – the novel and the cinema.

In the film’s diagnosis, these institutions have fallen into a state of disorder. Reconstruction of the truth is conspicuously absent from the trial; questions of legal guilt appear casually relative. The rise of trial-by-media and its pas de deux with the true crime format appear to have produced a qualitative change: the purpose of true crime, after all, is not to uncover what happened, but to relish in the process itself. Triet’s court has a purely mediatic function, presenting wife and husband as sleazy characters rather than legal subjects.

The nuclear family is afflicted by a parallel breakdown. The free-spirited middle class to which the protagonists belong has rejected conventional marital roles, yet this is not depicted as progress: the scrambling of domestic codes has instead resulted in turmoil. Samuel struggles to share his life with a successful woman, Sandra to tolerate her husband’s closer relationship with their son. And while the great bourgeois form, the novel, was once capable – in Hegel’s words – of neutralizing the ‘conflict between the poetry of the heart and the opposing prose of circumstances’, Sandra’s experimental, interior, achronological novels do no such thing. The prosecution claims to find incriminating details in her work, at one point citing a character who expresses the desire to get rid of their spouse. A nucleus of ‘truth’ is sought in her slippery autofiction but proves stubbornly elusive. The novel is now a world unto itself, and can no longer shed light on our own.

Anatomy of a Fall thus depicts a society that claims to have moved beyond shared codes – generating new and unstable ones in the process. As viewer, we are placed in a position where we are expected to resolve such disorder ­– if only we could ascertain if Sandra did it. But all the while Triet conveys the impossibility of this task. For the authority of the cinema is also under threat, its engulfment by the streaming industry embodied in the film’s very form. At its conclusion, Daniel, like a blind Tiresias, tells the court that he has just remembered a conversation he had with his father some months earlier, in which Samuel seemed to confess that he was preparing to take his own life. This, we are led to assume, is an expedient fiction. Only such an act of symbolic patricide can bring the chaos of rival narratives to an end.

A gentrified television film, though, cannot easily transcend the bounds of its genre. If its true subject is bourgeois polycrisis, the film’s reliance on received ideas means this cannot be dealt with effectively. Ultimately, its depiction of gender relations is a tissue of conservative cliches – the sapphic feminist, the splenetic macho. An egalitarian marriage is apparently unworkable due to some ‘repressed’ male essence. Triet insists on raising social ‘issues’, but the result is still an upmarket family film.

Read on: Emilie Bickerton, ‘What’s Your Place?’, NLR 136.

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Master and Servant

The Israeli massacre in Gaza is a catastrophe, and not just for the city’s tortured inmates, languishing for decades under a merciless occupation. The United States in particular, but also Germany, will forever be closely associated with this unrelenting slaughter of thousands of innocent men, women and children, a slaughter that both countries continue to underwrite materially and diplomatically. Two-and-a-half months into the mass killing, the US vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have restored some hope of survival to those Gazans still remaining after the hell of continual bombing and shelling. By that time, following the Hamas breakout and the murderous attack on kibbutzim close to the Gaza wall, more than 20,000 Gazans had been killed, 8,700 of them children and 4,400 women, and 50,000 wounded, compared to 121 dead Israeli soldiers, one fifth of them victims of friendly fire or traffic accidents. Since the beginning of the war, the Israeli air force claims to have bombed 22,000 ‘terrorist’ targets: more than 300 a day, every day, in an area the size of Munich.

As the year draws to an end, 90% of the roughly 2.3 million inhabitants of the Gaza strip have been made homeless, chased by the Israeli military from the north to the south of the Gaza Strip and back, told to shelter in allegedly safe zones which are subsequently bombed. There is hunger verging on starvation, scant medical care, no fuel, no regular electricity supply, and no indication that the slaughter will end any time soon. The reason given by the US for vetoing the Security Council resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire was that this would be ‘unrealistic’. Meanwhile the German government, led by its feminist foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, demands ‘humanitarian pauses’ as an alternative to peace, after which the killings are to continue until ‘Hamas’, prepared for death by a free UNRWA meal, will finally be ‘rooted out’.

What is eerie is that in the unending stream of reports and commentary on the Gaza war it is hardly ever mentioned that Israel is a nuclear power, and by no means a minor one. For a small country Israel is heavily armed, and not just conventionally. All in all, Israel spends more than 4.5% of its GDP on its military (as of 2022), which probably doesn’t include a good deal of free military assistance provided by the US and Germany. Before the latest assault on Gaza, Israel was estimated to have at least 90 nuclear warheads and fissile material stockpiles of more than 200. Even more importantly, Israel has at its disposal the complete range of means of nuclear delivery, the so-called tripod: land-based, air-based, and sea-based. Israel’s land-based nuclear missiles are allegedly kept in silos deep enough to withstand a nuclear attack, making them suitable not just for a first but also for a second strike. For nuclear delivery by air, the IDF maintains a fleet of at least 36 out of a total of 224 fighter planes with an extensive capacity for refuelling. Israel also has six submarines – of the so-called Dolphin class – which, experts believe, can fire nuclear-armed cruise missiles. The missiles have an estimated reach of 1,500 kilometers, providing Israel with an almost invulnerable platform for nuclear defence, or as the case may be, attack. Generally, one can assume that Israel commands the full spectrum of nuclear capabilities, from tactical battlefield arms to the aerial bombardment of military staging areas, to the bombing of cities like Tehran.

It is not known exactly how Israel became a nuclear power, most likely little by little, small step by small step. Certainly, there is no lack of nuclear science in Israel. The US may have helped, some administrations more than others, along with American friends of Israel deep inside the US military-industrial complex. Like other out-of-the-closet nuclear powers, the US is dedicated to non-proliferation, and indeed has a strong national interest in it, as do Russia and China. Espionage may however have been a factor; remember Jonathan Pollard, a US defense analyst and Israeli spy who after his discovery in 1985 only narrowly escaped a death sentence? In spite of relentless Israeli efforts to get him extradited, Pollard had to serve 28 years in prison until he was pardoned by the outgoing Obama administration, against the wishes of the US military establishment.

There also seems to be a German component, and it has to do above all with those Israeli submarines. Merkel’s mysterious claim in 2008 that Israel’s security was Germany’s raison d’etat, enthusiastically received by the Israeli government and now parroted literally every day by the German government and its staatstreue media, might have to be read in this context. As mentioned, six submarines were delivered between 1999 and 2023. Of the first three, Germany paid for two of them while the cost of the third was shared, supposedly as penance for what the US alleged was the participation of German firms in the development of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction – which, of course, turned out to have never existed. (For the next three submarines, Germany agreed to pay €600 million.)

If the German-built Israeli submarines are fitted for nuclear missiles, not just the manufacturer ThyssenKrupp but also the German government would know. This also holds for the US, which would have turned a blind eye to Germany breaching its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. From 2016 until a few months before the Gaza war, the prospect of three more German-built submarines, also to be subsidized by the German state, was discussed by the two governments. But this time there were doubts in Israel over whether they were in fact needed. There was also an unfolding corruption scandal on the Israeli side, which among other things involved ThyssenKrupp hiring a cousin of Netanyahu as a lawyer. As the matter was investigated by Israeli public prosecutors, it was drawn into the constitutional conflict between the Netanyahu government and the judiciary. In 2017, the German side found itself forced to postpone a final decision until the Israeli corruption charges were settled. Then, in January 2022, the contract for the three submarines was signed. Of the estimated price of €3 billion, Germany will be paying at least €540 million.

Israel has never officially admitted that is has nuclear arms; some of its leaders, however, often retired prime ministers, have occasionally dropped hints to this effect, and probably not by accident. Leaving it an open question means no inspections and no pressure from the IAEA. Keeping potential adversaries in the dark about the size and exact purpose, or indeed the very existence, of its nuclear capacity may also offer strategic advantages (nothing is known for certain about Israel’s nuclear doctrine, for example). What can be assumed is that Israel is determined to remain the only nuclear power in the region – as indicated by its occasional bombing of nuclear reactors in Syria and its overtures to the US to stop Iran acquiring nuclear bombs, not by treaty à la Obama but by military intervention. It can also be assumed that Israel, unlike other nuclear powers, does not preclude first use of its nuclear arms, given it is surrounded by several nations with which it finds itself in a state of enmity. This should hold especially in a situation where the Israeli government considers the survival of the Israeli state at risk, although what exactly survival means remains open, unless one adopts the definition of both the right-wing extremist government of Netanyahu and the government of Germany, for whom the right of Israel to exist includes the right of Israel to define its borders at will.

As the Gaza war continues, the uncertainty surrounding Israel’s nuclear force increasingly seems to govern events on both battlefields, diplomatic and military. Protected by its veil of unpredictability, the Israeli government seems to believe it can inflict on Gaza, and soon perhaps on the West Bank as well, whatever punishment it chooses, without having to fear external interference from anyone. In recent weeks, Netanyahu has acted as though he could tell Washington, in particular, that its support for Israel must be unconditional – since, if pressed, Israel could defend itself on its own, relying on its nuclear tripod. The Gaza massacre risks turning Israel into one of the most hated countries in the world, together with Germany – which unlike the US is solidly united behind the Netanyahu government; yet there seems to be an established view on the part of the Israeli high command that this doesn’t matter, since no government near nor far will dare give in to domestic pressure to come to Gaza’s support.

There is another angle to this, and one that is perhaps even more frightening. In October 1973, during the Yom Kippur war, what later became known as the Watergate tapes recorded a conversation between Richard Nixon, then still President, and his closest aide, Bob Haldeman. When Haldeman informed Nixon that the situation in the Middle East was becoming critical, Nixon ordered him to have American nuclear forces worldwide put on high alert. Haldeman, stunned: Mr. President, the Soviets will think you are mad. Nixon, in response: That is exactly what I want them to believe. In a nuclear strategic environment, credible madness can be an effective weapon, especially for a government led by someone like Netanyahu. As noted, Israel does not have an official nuclear doctrine, and cannot have one as it does not admit to being a nuclear power. But it seems likely that if the existence of Israel was threatened in the eyes of its government, it would not hesitate to make use of all of its arms, including nuclear ones. This makes it relevant that Israel’s present governing coalition includes people who consider the Bible to be a sort of land registry. For many of them, the myth of the Masada mass suicide in 73 CE, after the first Jewish-Roman war was lost, is a powerful source of political inspiration, a fact that cannot be unknown to whatever intelligence is still at the disposal of the US government.

In fact, there is an even more ancient model of Israeli heroism, the myth of Samson, which seems to be no less popular among at least some of the nuclear strategists in and around the IDF command. Samson was a ruler of Israel – a ‘judge’ – in biblical times, during the war between the Israelites and the Philistines in the 13th or 12th century BCE. Like Heracles, Samson was endowed with superhuman physical strength, enabling him to kill an entire army of Philistines, reportedly one thousand strong, by striking them dead with the jaw bone of a donkey. After being betrayed and falling into the hands of the enemy, he was kept prisoner in the main temple of the Philistines. When he could no longer hope to escape, he used his remaining strength to pull down the two mighty columns that supported the roof of the building. All the Philistines died, together with him.

Nuclear weapons are sometimes claimed by radical pro-Israeli commentators to have given the country a ‘Samson option’ – to ensure that if Israel has to go down, its enemies will go down with it. Again, when that option might be exercised depends on what the sitting Israeli government would consider a threat to Israel’s existence, which for some might include the imposition of a two-state solution by the UN Security Council. Myths can be a source of power; a credible threat of extended suicide can open a lot of strategic space – enough perhaps to allow Israel to cleanse the Gaza strip of its Hamas-infested population by making it forever uninhabitable. If it is believed to be mad enough to die for a strip of land, or for not having to make concessions to an enemy like Hamas, a country like Israel may, long in advance of actually exercising its nuclear option, manage to deter countries like Iran, or hostile armies like Hezbollah, from heeding popular calls for ending mass eradication by military means.

Has the US lost control over its protégé, servant turned into master, master into servant? It is not inconceivable that the public disagreements between the two hitherto inseparable brothers-in-arms are simply theatre, artfully concocted to protect the US from responsibility for the slaughter of Gaza. But this is far from certain, given that the divergence between the two countries’ public statements on the legitimate aims of the Gaza special military operation has deepened almost by the day. Is the US, blackmailed by the threat of a Middle Eastern Armageddon, now forced to allow Israel to pursue ‘victory’ at any price? Does Israel’s capacity for nuclear war bestow on the Israeli radical right a sense of invincibility, as well as a confidence that they can dictate the terms of peace with or without the Americans, and certainly without the Palestinians? The political costs incurred by the US for not ending the killing – either not wanting or not being able to do so – are likely to be gigantic, both morally, although there may not be much to lose in that regard, and strategically: the ‘indispensable nation’ paraded before the world, helpless in the face of brazen disobedience on the part of its closest international ally. For its place in the emerging new global order after the end of the end of history this cannot bode well for the United States.

Read on: Alexander Zevin, ‘Gaza and New York’, NLR 144.

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Sovereign Virtues?

After eighteen years, Die Linke is no longer a presence in the German Bundestag. When Sahra Wagenknecht and nine other MPs quit the party last October, the remaining deputies lost their status as a parliamentary group. The defectors are now planning to contest the upcoming European elections along with three state elections in eastern Germany. Initial polls put support for their new outfit, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance – for Reason and Justice (BSW), at an impressive 12%. For many commentators, including Joshua Rahtz in a recent article for Sidecar, this is a hopeful development. Wagenknecht, he writes, directly addresses the material concerns of the German public: the ruling-class attack on living standards, the retrenchment of the social state, and the subordination of the national interest to that of Washington. He views her programme, focused on redistribution and opposition to NATO, as a serious response to the Repräsentationslücke – or representation gap – in the electoral system, where nearly half of the population does not identify with any party. To assess whether Rahtz’s optimism is warranted, we need to take a closer look at the character of the BSW. How radical are its policies? And, beyond them, does it have an intellectual or philosophical orientation towards the left?

Back in the 1990s, Sarah Wagenknecht was still a colourful Stalinoid communist who defended the legacy of Walter Ulbricht and served on the National Committee of the Party of Democratic Socialism. Her political transformation began in the 2010s, when, as Die Linke’s vice president and economic spokesperson, she embraced the ordoliberal vision of a ‘social market economy’. Since then, she has talked a lot about Schumpeterian innovation and little about socialism. She now describes her politics as ‘left-conservative’, holding up the family entrepreneur as the model citizen. She speaks to a supposedly traditionalist section of the working class which has seen its social position decline in recent decades, but which has been insulated from the worst predations of the neoliberal era. For Wagenknecht, protecting such workers from further hardship is a zero-sum game in which migrants pose a potential threat. ‘Cultural issues’ such as gender are at best a distraction, and current climate mitigation efforts – such as carbon pricing or phasing out combustion engines – are untenable. Instead, the aim should be to create decent jobs and develop ‘future technologies’ by reviving Germany’s industrial base.

To its supporters, the Wagenknecht phenomenon combines social democracy, Peronist populism and working-class common sense (or ‘reason’). Rahtz appears to agree with her that the starting point for the twenty-first-century left is a resovereigntization of the nation, which seeks to reclaim the political system, the welfare state and international relations from elites. This approach correctly identifies the defects in contemporary European democracies: the cartelization of party politics, the erosion of the social settlement and the forcible imposition of austerity, along with Atlanticist foreign policies. It has provided a consistent opposition to the Zeitenwende and to the often paternalist lockdown and vaccination policies rolled out during the pandemic. Yet it also suffers from a number of incurable problems.

Most notably, by juxtaposing ‘globalist’ institutions to national ones, Wagenknecht’s counter-programme offers nothing more than an improbable return to capitalism’s Golden Age. Rahtz, to his credit, acknowledges the ‘difficulties of attempting to increase German manufacturing competitiveness . . . in the context of a chronically weakened global economy’. But for him, these difficulties are practical rather than ideological. He does not ask whether ‘sovereignty’ or ‘industrial competition’ should be priorities for socialists in the first place. Both concepts, which feature heavily in the work of sociologists like Wolfgang Streeck and Anthony Giddens, are dubious from a Marxist point of view, since they substitute internationalism with national-Keynesianism, cooperation with capitalist rivalry. Moreover, if reverting to an embedded national welfare state is difficult in a world where capital flows and productive relations have become transnational, the likelihood is that this project will simply end up producing a regressive form of politics.

Wagenknecht exemplifies this danger. Her singular focus on resovereigntization has supplanted a politics of class with one of the nation. It is not true that, as Rahtz claims, the significance of immigration to her platform is ‘often exaggerated’, and that ‘the issue is given minimal emphasis in her public addresses’. In fact, Wagenknecht is constantly scapegoating migrants – slamming Merkel’s ‘uncontrolled opening of borders’, demanding more deportations, crackdowns on smugglers, strict limits on new arrivals and welfare caps for asylum seekers. The launch of the BSW was one of the few moments when she refrained from placing this issue front and centre. When state and federal leaders held a summit on migration in Berlin last month, however, she attacked them forcefully from the right: ‘Today the message to the world should have been: Germany is overwhelmed, Germany has no more room, Germany is no longer prepared to be the number one destination.’

Wagenknecht’s supporters assume that this rhetoric will help the BSW to win back the constituency that defected from the left to the AfD. But this narrative is not supported by the data. Although Die Linke lost 400,000 voters to the AfD in 2017, that was the year in which it achieved its second-best electoral result in history (9.2%). Since then the situation has changed. In 2021, when Die Linke received only 4.8% of the vote, it lost only 90,000 voters to the AfD and more than a million to the Greens and SPD. Most authoritative studies show that, in the years ahead, Die Linke will be primarily in competition with the latter two parties, while the BSW is more likely to compete with the AfD and, to some extent, with the CDU and SPD.

Rather than drawing its strength from former leftists, the AfD has picked up most of its support from right-wing parties, as well as mobilizing large numbers of abstentionists. If Wagenknecht is encroaching on the AfD’s territory, this is not because she is winning them over to the left, but because she is recycling the talking points of the nationalist right. Although her approach appeals to a small segment of the electorate that favours redistribution but opposes diversity, it is more popular among the demographic that opposes both. As one study put it, Wagenknecht performs well among ‘those who tend to position themselves as more socio-culturally right-leaning and more market-oriented, and those who support a more restrictive migration policy, ceteris paribus’.

One of the most comprehensive recent surveys on the German class structure and public opinion, by Steffen Mau, Linus Westheuser and Thomas Lux, shows that manufacturing workers are on average more critical of migration than the rest of the population. Yet it also finds that this group is characterized by significant ‘intra-class dissent’, with more than a third having no xenophobic attitudes at all, and the others being more equivocal than Wagenknecht’s talk of a socially conservative working class would suggest. This applies particularly to questions of gender and sexuality, where there is a clear progressive majority. Wagenknecht neglects these simple facts. She rejects contemporary feminism, queer politics and anti-racism as the faddish preserves of a ‘lifestyle left’, whom she dismisses as ‘self-righteous’ – waging a culture war whose only beneficiary is the right.

On certain issues, such as militarism and Covid, Wagenknecht has indeed resisted elite groupthink and sounded a dissenting note. Yet her positions must be placed in the context of her general political outlook. Her refusal to toe the line on NATO is not motivated by a principled anti-imperialism. It is based on an assessment that a stronger orientation towards Russia would bolster Germany’s energy security and aid its reindustrialization. It is parochialist, not internationalist. This was evident in the anti-NATO rallies that Wagenknecht has helped to organize, where those close to her – particularly her husband, the former SPD leader Oskar Lafontaine – were unconcerned by the participation of AfD supporters.

Likewise, Wagenknecht’s opposition to the government’s pandemic policies is more than just a defence of ‘civil liberties’. It also reflects a sceptical attitude towards science itself, which often strays into conspiracism – talking up the risks of vaccine side-effects and so on. Her criticism of lockdowns, whether one agrees or not, relies on a reified middle-class concept of ‘freedom’ which frames it as an individual right rather than a social project. It employs the tropes of right-wing populism rather than the discourse of solidarity.

Finally, Wagenknecht not only lacks ‘an active social movement’, as Rahtz puts it. She has no allies whatsoever in the trade unions, including the most active left-wing ones. Other social-democratic leaders in the Euro-Atlantic sphere, from Corbyn to Sanders to Iglesias, all sought to forge ties with the labour movement, with varying degrees of success. But though she claims to care about workers’ pay and conditions, Wagenknecht has little interest in the institutions that are fighting to improve them – perhaps because forming alliances with such collective organizations would be at odds with her top-down personalist style. The unfortunate truth is that, shorn of these commitments, Wagenknechtism is simply a new form of Bonapartism, seeking to represent the passive and reactionary sections of the lower and middle classes.

Read on: Joachim Jachnow, ‘What’s Become of the German Greens?’, NLR 81.

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Selling Citizenship

Aux armes, citoyens! So begins the refrain of ‘La Marseillaise’, adopted as the French national anthem by the Revolutionary Convention of 1795. No longer serfs, nor subjects, nor vassals, but equals. Citizen: a political category that had vanished with the ancient world (cives romanus sum) re-emerged to encapsulate the rights won by the Revolution and bind together the imagined community of the nation-state. The rights of citizenship would be augmented over time (the right to education, right to health, right to work…) along with their corresponding duties (conscription, jury duty, tax impositions…). Herein lies a key distinction with contemporary human rights: the aim to give positive content to an equality that is otherwise formal and theoretical, as expressed in the principle of ‘one person, one vote’.

This conception of citizenship – and thus of the state – peaked in the 1960s, and then began to decline. It continues to be considered a form of belonging, one that can be conferred by birth (ius soli), by bloodline (ius sanguinis) or by an extended period of residence. Yet citizenship has ‘thinned’, as the expression goes. Rights were diminished (the demise of the welfare state) and duties shrank (easing the tax burden), when they were not abolished entirely (conscription). With the triumph of neoliberalism it was transformed into a commodity, that is, into something that can be bought and sold. There is now, as the American sociologist Kristin Surak writes in The Golden Passport, a ‘citizenship industry’ spanning the globe. The book contains a treasure trove of information, data, and first-hand accounts of the history of this industry’s first forty years.

Why would one need to buy citizenship? One covets another nationality because not all citizenships are equal. Our lives depend on a ‘birthright lottery’. As Surak reminds us, if you are born in Burundi you can hope to live an average of 57 years with $300 a year at your disposal; if you are born in Finland the figures are 80 years and $42,000. The great migrations we see today depend on this boundless geopolitical inequality. Borders (which I wrote about recently for Sidecar) serve to maintain this chasm: Turkey receives €6 billion a year from Brussels to keep Syrian, Afghan and other refugees from entering the EU; as of this year, Tunisia is receiving €1.1 billion euros to stem sub-Saharan migration. The tiny republic of Nauru (a 21-square-kilometre island with a population of 12,600) has earned half its gross domestic product over the past decade processing asylum seekers rejected by Australia.

Yet though citizenship is fiercely unequal, we are still routinely presented with the legal fiction that all states are equally sovereign – a notion stretching back to Emer de Vattel’s Le droit des gens (1758), which argues that if in the state of nature men are equal to each other, despite all their differences, then the same must apply to states. Of course, states are by no means equally sovereign. Nauru does not have sovereignty equal to a country like Germany, in spite of the fact that its vote has the same weighting at the UN, it can open embassies around the world, offer immunity to its diplomats and so on. It is in this respect that Surak quotes Stephen Krasner, from his book Sovereignty (1999): ‘What we find most often, when it comes to sovereignty, is organized hypocrisy’. The recasting of citizenship as a commodity is a result of this contradiction between formal equality and real inequality. As Thomas Humphrey Marshall put it in 1950, ‘Citizenship provides the foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality can be built’.

Many naturally want to escape from this inequality; in the vast majority of cases this occurs through migration. But for the few who can afford it, there is an elevator rather than a ladder up the ranks of citizenship. Citizenship is typically bought by the privileged classes from underprivileged states – those on the peripheries of global trade, subject to imperial sanctions, marked by political unrest, war or authoritarianism. The citizenship market arises, Surak explains, ‘from the confluence of interstate and intrastate inequalities’. The price of citizenship for oneself and one’s family ranges from a few hundred thousand dollars to a few million. Buyers tend to be multimillionaires, but they could be Palestinians seeking legal status, Iranian businessmen hit by sanctions, Chinese elites trying to protect themselves from expropriation by the party-state, or Russian oligarchs seeking refuge from Putin’s volatile rule and, now, the dangers of war. For a time, the biggest customers were Hong Kong residents nervous about Beijing’s encroachment. But they may also be high-level managers and executives – Indians, Pakistanis, Indonesians – working in the Gulf states, who are not legally entitled to stay there when they retire and do not wish to return to their home countries.

Precisely because the citizenship of some states is an exorbitant privilege, its existing holders are keen to protect it by erecting insurmountable barriers. So even for the extraordinarily wealthy, it is not easy to buy citizenship of states at the top of the geopolitical pyramid (although, there are exceptions: France naturalized Snapchat billionaire Evan Spiegel, New Zealand did the same with billionaire Paypal founder Peter Thiel). Another route is to buy a lower ranking citizenship that allows you to enter and reside in the top states – the hierarchy of states corresponds to a hierarchy of international mobility. Those with EU or Japanese passports can freely enter 191 countries; US passports 180; Turkish 110. In essence, Surak writes, while immigrants must live in the state they hope to join, for those buying citizenship only their money need reside there.

The first to capitalize on the citizenship trade were the Caricom nations: the fifteen Caribbean microstates with a combined population of 18.5 million. St. Kitts & Nevis broke precedent by enacting a 1984 law that granted citizenship to those who invested a certain amount. This became known as ‘Citizenship by Investment’ (CBI). For centuries the islands had thrived on sugar – producing 20% of global output in the eighteenth century – but by the 1970s had entered an economic crisis, exacerbated by the growth of the cruise industry. The CBI programme ended up generating 35% of GDP. They had the advantage of being part of the British Commonwealth, where common law applies, that is, where the law is based on previous judicial rulings: common law defines only what is prohibited, while civil law defines what is lawful and is therefore much more restrictive. Not surprisingly, Caribbean Commonwealth states such as Antigua, Grenada and St. Lucia followed their example. Next came Dominica, whose economy had been entirely based on bananas, which it exported primarily to Europe until in the 1990s WTO regulations allowed Chiquita to mount a successful legal challenge. As the ensuing ‘banana war’ brought the island to the brink, the CBI programme became its main asset; in order to match the benefits of its Commonwealth neighbours it offered citizenship at lower rates and other benefits (such as making it easier to change names). Since 2009, the passports of St. Kitts and Antigua have given their holders free access to the Schengen Area; since 2015, Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia have offered the same perk.

The desirability of a passport depends on the mobility it provides. In this sense, citizenship is different from residency. There are about fifty countries (Portugal, Spain, Australia and the US among them) that in exchange for investment offer residency but not citizenship. Mobility, though, depends not so much on the state that naturalizes you as the one that lets you in (in 2015, for example, St. Kitts lost free entry to Canada and its passport became devalued). That’s why as the citizenship industry has steadily moved out of its cottage phase, developing more rules and procedures, the big states have gained increasing influence over the granting of citizenship. To acquire citizenship of the Caribbean microstates now requires the United States (and, increasingly, the EU as well) to give their approval.

In the Mediterranean, the main sellers of citizenship have been Malta and Cyprus, for reasons related to their history. In Malta’s case, this is because of the English language, its location, and its membership of the European Union. The terms of its CBI programme were hotly contested by both the Maltese opposition parties and the European Parliament, which imposed a cap of 1,800 naturalizations; it was closed in 2020 but has since reopened with a cap of 400 naturalizations per year and 1,500 in total (at the modest price of a €700,000 investment, plus €50,000 per family member or employee). Cyprus also has the advantage of being in the EU, but it was additionally part of the nonaligned nations during the Cold War and had a strong Communist party. When the USSR collapsed, it still had a large population of Russian-speaking professionals, many in law and finance, with strong connections to Moscow. Before long it became a favourite destination for Russians because of its proximity, its sunshine, and its access to Europe. Its capital city was unofficially renamed ‘Limassolgrad,’ or ‘Sunny Moscow’, ‘with Russian schools, Russian stores, Russian clubs, Russian restaurants, Russian newspapers’, Surak informs us. With the 2013 Greek crisis however, the Troika imposed major levies (reaching up to 100%) on all uninsured bank deposits over €100,000, and several years later, Cyprus’s CBI programme was shut down, just as the pandemic increased demand for passports from those who wanted to escape draconian lockdowns imposed in China and elsewhere. Russians had to look for a new refuge.

They found it in Turkey, an unusual candidate among the sellers of citizenship. With a population of 80 million and a powerful military, it is one of the 20 strongest economies in the world. Yet today it welcomes more than half of the world’s citizenship buyers. It may not be an EU member, but it has other advantages. Unlike the Caribbean microstates or Vanuatu, or even Malta, Istanbul is a metropolis that is perfectly liveable for an affluent expat. At first, most applications came from Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Egypt. Then Dubai’s foreign residents got involved. With Covid-19, and then the war in Europe, Ukrainians and Pakistanis joined their ranks. For well-heeled Iranians, Turkey holds a special appeal – not only because it is a neighbouring country and one of the few that Iranians can enter without a visa, but also because the Turkish lira has undergone a sharp devaluation (in the last two years it has lost half its value against the dollar) due to high inflation (39% this year). Iranians are penalized less by their own devaluation and inflation buying real estate in Turkey than elsewhere: at present they are purchasing an average of 10,000 housing units per year. These are profitable assets, as housing prices are rising in Istanbul as all along the Mediterranean coast. As one agency for citizenship applications put it, ‘You can think of Turkey as a home, insurance and investment.’

Citizenship has in this way been financialized, transformed into a product akin to structured investment vehicles. Though compared to the worldwide flow of migrants (numbering around 200 million), naturalizations by investment are infinitesimal – about 50,000 a year – they reveal more about citizenship than we might suppose. For example, about how much citizenship affects out-of-state citizenship, since we always carry it on us and cannot divest ourselves of it. Visiting India, I was always amazed at the ability of locals to guess the nationality of European tourists. I realized that our nationality system is for them a kind of caste system, and that they are well trained in distinguishing among the many castes with which they have grown up (there are about 3,000 in total, with 25,000 sub-castes).

Perhaps the most curious phenomenon recounted by Surak is that of Americans seeking dual nationality. Many of them are foreign residents who do not want to continue paying taxes to the US (where the tax regime stipulates that you must cough up no matter wherever in the world you live or earn your income). Others seek a second nationality so they can travel. A great sociologist with dual nationality told me that since 9/11 she always travels with her European document. Others applied after Trump’s election. Who knows what they will do come November 5.

Read on: Marco D’Eramo, ‘Geographies of Ignorance’, NLR 108.

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Conjuring Trick

Addressing the neoconservative Hudson Institute on 20 October, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stressed the importance of ‘sheltering democracy’ – a nod to Ronald Reagan – from those who seek to destroy it. The twin crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, she said, ‘call on Europe and America to take a stand and to stand together . . . Vladimir Putin wants to wipe Ukraine from the map. Hamas, supported by Iran, wants to wipe Israel from the map’. The conflicts were, ‘in essence, the same’. Her remarks were in lockstep with Joe Biden’s speech the previous day, in which he claimed that Hamas and Putin ‘both want to annihilate a neighbouring democracy’. By tying together these two nemeses, von der Leyen and Biden hoped to conjure the same spirit of unity seen at the outset of the Ukraine war – when ‘Western values’ were supposedly engaged in an existential struggle with their opposite. As Oded Eran, the former Israeli ambassador to the EU, once put it, Europe is ‘the hinterland of Israel’, and Israel an outpost of Western Judeo-Christian civilization.

Yet recent weeks seem to have revealed a confounded disunity in Europe – one much remarked upon in the Western press. Each day brings a new round of conflicting official statements, briefings and counter-briefings. After von der Leyen’s visit to Israel on 13 October, during which she pledged Europe’s full support for Tel Aviv, she was criticized by EU colleagues who complained that she had failed to consult them about the trip and neglected to remind Netanyahu about the supposed salience of human rights. As Israel cut off water, food and fuel to Gaza, the Commission announced that it would freeze aid payments to Palestinians lest they fall into the hands of ‘terrorists’. Again, a chorus of EU foreign ministers objected, and the decision was reversed within a matter of hours. Similar tensions appeared to be on display on 27 October, when European delegates gathered for a UN vote on whether to call for ‘an urgent, durable, and permanent humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza’. Austria, Hungary, Czechia, and Croatia voted against; Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden abstained; and Belgium, Ireland, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain voted in favour.

Some European leaders have repeatedly contradicted their own positions on the war. In a thinly veiled attack on von der Leyen, EU foreign policy lead Josep Borrell asserted that ‘Israel has the right to defence, but this defence has to be developed in compliance with international law’. Shortly after, though, he appeared to give full backing to the Israeli war aims, insisting that Hamas must be eliminated ‘as a political and military force’ – heedless of the civilian cost. In an interview with Al-Jazeera, Borrell was asked whether the Hamas attack was a war crime, and replied unambiguously ‘yes’. When asked whether the ongoing Israeli assault on Gaza was one, he said ‘I’m not a lawyer’. 

Emmanuel Macron has also sent opposing signals since 7 October. He has wrung his hands over the mounting death toll and rejected the notion that ‘we want to fight terrorism by killing innocent people’. Speaking to the BBC, he lamented the growing number of children pulverized by Israeli air strikes and urged Netanyahu to halt the campaign – becoming the first G7 leader to call for a ceasefire. Yet after a furious response from Israeli officials he was forced to row back on his remarks. Alongside his pleas for peace, Macron has also proposed the creation of an international military coalition against Hamas – whom, he says, must be fought ‘without mercy’. His staffers rushed to clarify that this would not necessarily imply French boots on the ground. An anonymous French diplomat summarized Macron’s position as ‘one day pro-Israeli, the next pro-Palestinian’.

Among member states, Ireland has perhaps been most vocal in its criticism of Israel, with Leo Varadkar insisting that ‘Israel doesn’t have the right to do wrong’. In contrast to the Commission, his government has consistently advocated for a ceasefire and pledged to push for EU sanctions against West Bank settlers. But here the gap between rhetoric and policy is cavernous. When Sinn Féin and the Social Democrats introduced parliamentary motions calling for the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador, the imposition of sanctions and the referral of Israel to the ICC, Varadkar rejected each of them out of hand. Since then, evidence has emerged that the US may be using Dublin’s Shannon Airport to transfer arms to Israel. Records from the Department of Transport indicate that since October there has been an unusually high volume of civil munitions exemptions – the most since 2016, and an increase of 42% from the previous month. Yet the government refuses to address the issue, and it has voted down a motion to prohibit American troops from using the airport.

A similar dynamic is unfolding in Spain. Fresh from reelection, Prime Minister Sánchez has vowed to work towards the international recognition of a Palestinian state. He has cast doubt on Israel’s compliance with the laws of war and described its assault as ‘disproportionate’. In a speech to the European Parliament this week, he declared that ‘it is time to speak openly about what is happening in Israel and Palestine’. But when members of Sánchez’s cabinet ‘speak openly’, he takes a somewhat different approach. The Podemos leader Ione Belarra went further than any other Spanish politician in accusing Israel of ‘genocide’ and calling for Netanyahu’s indictment on war crimes charges. Soon after, she was sacked from her role as Social Rights Minister. Beneath Sánchez’s soundbites about protecting civilians, his government fully backs the extirpation of Hamas and the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza – presumably, on the bayonets of the IDF.

Germany, of course, remains unwilling to countenance any meaningful criticism of Israel. It has imposed stringent censorship on Palestinians and those supportive of their cause – using blunt force to repress peaceful solidarity marches in its major cities. Some Bundesländer are considering making ‘recognition of Israel’s right to exist’ a requirement for citizenship. This is hardly a surprise, given the country’s enduring Holocaust guilt as well as its ultra-Atlanticist orientation since the Zeitenwende. Green Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock can be relied on to parrot the White House position on both Ukraine and Palestine: full-scale militarized opposition to one occupation; unflinching material support for the other. She maintains that a ceasefire is unconscionable as it would only help Hamas. Yet even she has moderated her line in recent weeks: first suggesting that a little more humanitarian aid should be allowed to enter Gaza, then urging Israel to adapt its military strategy to reduce the impact on civilians.

What explains the EU’s flip-flopping incoherence in response to the horrors in the Middle East? It would be easy to see the divergent rhetoric between, say, Dublin and Berlin as a sign of real dissensus: the anti-colonial impulses of the first versus the Zionist sympathies of the second. But though such domestic political differences are a factor, they may also obscure a more fundamental unity.

Since the invasion of Ukraine, the EU has given up on its fantasies of ‘strategic autonomy’ and embraced its role as US vassal. Its states are content to be the defanged guard dogs of the American imperium. One might assume that such unblinking loyalty would simplify EU foreign policy decisions – since they need only mimic those of Washington. But it is not so easy to line up behind the White House when the latter itself is in a deeply ambivalent position. In recent weeks, Washington has found it hard to stick to a consistent strategy. It has reaffirmed its ‘solidarity’ with Israel, circumvented Congress to furnish it with 14,000 rounds of tank ammunition, vetoed calls for a ceasefire at the UN and made every effort to shield its ally from accountability. At the same time, it has gradually ratcheted up criticism of Israeli military tactics, imposed sanctions on its settlers and signalled that the war may not be able to continue for much longer.

Clearly, the Biden administration is caught between reflexive support for Israel’s war and uncertainty about its implications, which may include sparking a wider regional conflict, unravelling the Abraham Accords and permanently damaging the US’s standing in the Arab world. Its confused rhetoric – green-lighting Netanyahu’s massacres and then complaining about them afterward – reflects this precarious position. Now, in trying to follow the US’s lead, the EU has merely replicated its confusion. European states may be willing to chastise Tel Aviv to varying degrees. But, together, they are each seeking to channel the instincts of the hegemon. Their fumbling attempts show that this is not an easy task.

Read on: Alexander Zevin, ‘Gaza and New York’, NLR 144.

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Persona Grata

So the old bastard finally died.

Consigliere to Jared Kushner, Theranos board member, Google CEO co-author, ad-man for gold and The Economist on American network television, mass-producer of self-flattering prose, executive headhunter for US occupations in the Middle East, glorified telephone switchboard operator between Washington and Beijing: the industry of Henry Kissinger’s interminable twilight was only matched by its tawdriness. In this, as in much else, he was an unremarkable product of his country. The idea that abetting massacres from East Pakistan to East Timor was a quantum leap in the annals of American atrocity makes him almost too convenient a figure for his apologists and detractors alike: it elevates him to the status (long sought by himself) of the decisive US foreign policy mind of the post-war, while giving his nimbler defenders almost too generous an edifice of infamy to chip away at. Was it so unexpected that the country that had fire-bombed Japanese civilians to get Tokyo to the table also fire-bombed Cambodians in an attempt to get Hanoi to one as well? Was backing the massacre of Timorese an unusual follow-up to backing the mass-killing of Indonesian ‘communists’? Was it so shocking that the political class that had installed the Shah would also ease the way for Pinochet? Was Dr. Kissinger’s record in the Middle East really worse than that of his old nemesis Dr. Brzezinski? For what set the man apart, one may have to look elsewhere.

The presiding conceit of Kissinger’s career was that he was bringing geopolitical necessities (he never really warmed to the term ‘realism’) to the attention of a country enamoured with its own innocence, and hampered by its own idealism. (‘American idealism… had defeated itself with its own weapons’ is the sentiment repeated ad infinitum in his books and memoirs). The ironies here were multiple. The first was that a country led by hard-nosed statesmen running from Teddy Roosevelt to Dean Acheson to Richard Nixon was somehow beholden to pussy-footing idealists in need of a dose of German Realpolitik, as if America’s ruling class had never not been perfectly ruthless in pursuit of its interests. It was, in fact, widely admired for this in the alleged ‘realist’ heartland. ‘We Germans write fat volumes about Realpolitik but understand it no better than babies in a nursery’, the New Republic editor Walter Weyl recalled being told by a Berlin professor during the First World War. ‘You Americans understand it far too well to talk about it’. ‘As a German making remarks about American imperialism’, Carl Schmitt gushed, ‘I can only feel like a beggar in rags speaking about the riches and treasures of foreigners’. As Baudrillard once said of French Theory, German Realpolitik was like the Statue of Liberty: a gift from the Old Continent that the Americans neither wanted nor needed.

The second irony is that Kissinger himself was never really a ‘realist’ at all; at least not in the sense of a John Mearsheimer or a Hans Morgenthau. He believed from the very beginning that the US could only triumph with a maximal commitment to its own missionary ideology. ‘A capitalist society, or, what is more interesting to me, a free society, is a more revolutionary phenomenon than nineteenth-century socialism’, Kissinger said in 1958. ‘I think we should go on the spiritual offensive’. Even when he was operating in realist guise, many of his judgements seem to have been based on a drastic overestimation of communist power, neatly captured in his theory of ‘linkage’. The Vietnamese needed to be taught a lesson so that Castro didn’t get any ideas. Pinochet needed to be installed in order to drive fear into Italian Communists. It was a picture of the world in which every action was hot-wired to another one. Even his vaunted understanding of China was full of bizarre assessments, such as that it had been wholly worth China’s while for Deng Xiaoping to squander 40,000 troops in its adventure against Vietnam since, after all, it kept the Soviet Empire from extending down to Phnom Penh and Bangkok.

Kissinger discovered earlier than most of his peers that celebrity is the ultimate trump card in American life. His stature occasionally allowed him to speak with less euphemism than the rest of the establishment. Instead of simply denying the illegal bombing of Cambodia, Kissinger quite coolly laid out its rationale as a tit-for-tat for Hanoi’s use of the country for its supply routes, while claiming that it had accelerated the peace process. What Kissinger most admired in diplomacy was the unexpected lunge. Perhaps his favourite gambit in the history of European diplomacy was the marital negotiations of Bismarck – whom Kissinger admired far more than Metternich – for the hand of Johanna von Puttkamer. Dealing with a prospective Pietist father-in-law who looked unkindly on the rakish young man, Bismarck seized Johanna in front of her father and planted a kiss, making their nuptials a fait accompli.

Yet for all of the surprise moves that Kissinger would celebrate in his own career (the ‘castling’ of China and the Soviet Union was Nixon’s idea), he was more notable for his absolute conventionality on virtually all foreign policy questions. He never appeared at a jagged angle like Kennan. His trademark method was to find ulterior reasons for what the state was doing already: Bosnia; the Iraq War (on the basis of Saddam Hussein’s violation of the no-fly zone rather than weapons of mass destruction); earlier this year, in a typical reversal, he even endorsed Ukrainian entry into NATO. In return, he has been persona grata in every administration. ‘He checked in with me regularly, sharing astute observations about foreign leaders, and sending me written reports on his travels’, Hillary Clinton noted of her time in his former position of Secretary of State. ‘I probably talk to Henry Kissinger more than I talk to anyone else’, Dick Cheney said at the height of the second invasion of Iraq. ‘We’ve been friends for a long time’, President Trump said, keeping to script. ‘He’s a man I have great, great respect for’. (In some rare contrast, Biden’s words of condolence to Kissinger’s family read like the Beltwayese for ‘fuck off’.)

In the gallery of Cold Warriors, one of the features that did set Kissinger apart was his attitude toward the Third World, which he came to rate as a greater threat than the Soviet Union. Kissinger was comfortably at home in the two-power rivalry – all those congenial lunches with Dobrynin – but the prospect of Southern nations using oil wealth to modernize and challenge the US-led order was intolerable. Hence so many photos of Kissinger powwowing with the likes of Suharto and Mobutu, and why he bothered keeping in touch with experts on decolonization like his old Harvard colleague Rupert Emerson. In the mid-1970s Kissinger started engaging in public ideological work to counter the rhetoric of the New International Economic Order, and private logistical work to re-channel OPEC oil revenues into Wall Street rather than development projects. This came to be seen as preferable to finding an excuse for military action against OPEC nations, which Nixon and Kissinger also mooted.

How did Kissinger become such a greedy historiographical blackhole, sucking the attention of historians, journalists and critics of US foreign policy away from all other corners, concentrating them in a single figure? One reason is that Kissinger was among the first products of the meritocratic post-war academy to ascend to such a height. The bitter sting that his academic peers felt about one of their own accruing such power made him the special negative object of their fascination, driven by unmistakable envy for a man whose most important decisions no longer included whether to grant a junior faculty member tenure. The result was mutual appreciation, with the academic historians elevating Kissinger, and Kissinger elevating them in return (common in the Nixon-Kissinger tapes is the slide from talking about Vietnamese bombing targets to complaining about ‘the professors’). In Niall Ferguson, Kissinger shrewdly selected a defender who will come to the net for him on every point (already in his first volume Ferguson has argued, not unjustly, that the substance of Kissinger’s reports back to the Nixon team from the Paris peace talks could have been gleaned by any attentive newspaper reader).

More important than the logic of the academy, though, was Kissinger’s grasp of the soft spots in the American press corps. A master at flattering journalists, or boring them when necessary, he was in his element where others were at their most flat-footed: in the impromptu interview, the barrage of questions at the podium. In one of the periodic windows when intellectuals were celebrities in America, and on the back of a Kennedy administration full of them, Kissinger projected a giant brain leavened by comic timing, Peter Sellars’s Strangelove come uncannily and delightedly to life. A quiver of self-deprecating sallies were at the ready. He was, as he liked to say, always trying to ‘organize an evasive reply’. In this domain he had learned more from Kennedy than from Nixon: never let the press forget that you are one of their own. You can hear the click of collusion in the background laughter to his jokes. Welcoming foreign diplomats, he would wheeze: ‘I have not faced such a distinguished audience since dining alone in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles’. It may be a while before Kissinger is seen in proportion: an unusually good student of the moods, and faithful servant of the interests, of his country’s elite.

Read on: Anders Stephanson, ‘A Monument to Himself’, NLR 86.

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Insomniac Visions

Philip Guston didn’t sleep well. The first room in Tate Modern’s current retrospective is hung with two late images of insomnia: a painting, Legend (1977) and a print, Painter (1980). They show different stages of the same sickness. Legend has the painter in bed, eyes squeezed shut, surrounded by half-formed clapped-out thoughts. Painter shows him at work, all hope of sleep abandoned, eyes gummed near-shut, face pushed as close to his canvas as it will go. The pairing is inspired. It gives clues to the meaning of figuration in Guston’s paintings – to his entire epistemology.

Legend is a large painting, almost two metres across. It shows that unique feeling for colour, or rather for a particular range of colour – roughly, between salmon pink and cadmium red – that Guston tested throughout his career. The painter’s face is a study in this range, from the delicate pinks of his crumpled forehead, flaccid and puffy like uncooked sausages, to the glistening reds of his temples. Pink suffuses the atmosphere and tints each object: the boot heel, the tin can, the billy-club raised by a disembodied fist. Guston’s pillow is crimped like a thought-bubble in a comic strip, and clearly we are meant to read at least some of the objects surrounding him as thoughts, projections of his sleepless brain. They float in pink space. Some cast no shadows.

Philip Guston, Legend, 1977 MFAH © Estate of Philip Guston, courtesy Hauser & Wirth Photograph © MFAH; Will Michels

There are objects here, like the tin can, the horseshoe, and the studded shield, that he returned to again and again, that he simply could not stop painting. Obviously he thought they were significant. But the weight of that significance, its clarity and legibility – these are what the painting puts in question. Take the horse’s rear end, poking out from behind the artist’s pillow. This has been linked to one of Guston’s favourite books, Isaac Babel’s Red Cavalry (1926), a collection of stories based on the author’s time as a journalist in the Polish-Soviet War. But it is an evasive reference, if indeed it is one. Much more important, within the space of the painting, is the way the downward curve of the horse’s tail is repeated and continued by the stream of brown fluid that pours from the lidless tin can onto an odd studded object (a boot heel?). This does cast a shadow, as do the discarded objects that surround it on the studio floor: an old bottle, brilliant green against the pink atmosphere, glass shards, and useless bits of misshapen wood.

Horse’s rear and boot heel; billy club and broken glass: such detritus is the material of Guston’s painting, as it is the stuff of his insomniac thoughts. For all the talk of his political convictions – which were real, and deeply felt, and drove him back to representational painting from abstraction in the teeth of savage criticism – his great paintings dwell among the sweepings of the studio floor, far from the legible images of waking political discourse. They speak a language of uselessness, anxiety, and helpless alienation. Like all insomniacs, the sleepless painter in Legend is tormented by yesterday’s leftovers: the pointless and circular, the looping thoughts that lead nowhere. These are the building blocks of Guston’s art, as they were for so many other modernists. They are what is left to a painter compelled to ‘bear witness’ (a favourite phrase of his) without much hope of averting the horrors he sees. ‘A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street’, as W.B. Yeats put it, ‘Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can, / Old iron, old bones, old rags . . . the foul rag and bone shop of the heart’.

There are many old bottles and broken cans in this exhibition, bones and iron too. There is an apocalyptic Kettle (1978) in the final room. It squats high on a red horizon against a black sky, at once a vision from a nightmare and the very picture of mundanity. This is the promise of Guston’s art: that in paying attention to the broken-down and meaningless – to what is cliché, outworn, comically decrepit – the painter might break through to some new intensity of expression.

Philip Guston, Kettle, 1978. Philadelphia Museum of Art. Bequest of Daniel W. Dietrich II, 2016, 2016-3-17

Turn again to Painter. The artist, squinting, encrusted with plasters, is shown so close to his work that he has even dispensed with his brush. The two raised fingers he presses to the canvas make the familiar sign of Christ’s benediction. This is a fantasy of painting as creation (rather than production), of the artist as a god, literally in touch with his canvas, rising from his insomniac visions to create new meanings. But it is also self-conscious, doubly mediated, done in a different medium – lithography – with no canvas present. Much of the pleasure in viewing the work comes from the blurring Guston achieves between print and painting, mediacy and immediacy. Surely few artists since Rembrandt have wrought such painterly effects from a print. Look at the flowing, incised greys on the artist’s shirtsleeve, the thick black smudges on his collar, the pooling shadow beneath his canvas. Painter shows Guston, in the year of his death, working at a furious peak. It is a self-portrait as a bandage-swaddled, mummified wreck, but at the same time a master creator, something divine.

Guston was born in 1913, to immigrant Jewish parents, and grew up in Los Angeles, before moving to New York and changing his name in 1936. He showed an early inclination for politics. In 1930 he made Painting for Conspirators, an image of the Ku Klux Klan lynching a Black man with a crucified Christ in the background (present at the Tate only as a small reproduction). He was still signing his paintings ‘Philip Goldstein’ when he made Female Nude with Easel (1935). It is young man’s work, arrogant, mock-heroic, straining for classicism. But it also shows the emergence of certain enduring concerns: the hard cast shadows of dream, the creaking assemblages of objects (boards, nails, staples), the intense reflection on the function and meaning of the painter’s art, and – perhaps above all – that emphasis on the expansive qualities of the colour pink. At this stage it is crisp, delineated: quattrocento pink, wrapping the easel and the painter’s stool in the colours of Della Francesca and Veneziano. The nude, modelled with a solidity drawn from Picasso’s work of the 1920s, is greyscale. She awaits the touch of the artist to give her colour.

Like other American modernists (his school friend Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko and Willem de Kooning among others), Guston found work in the 1930s painting murals. By 1943 he had worked on fifteen of them, mostly for the Works Progress Administration (a New Deal agency set up to fund public works). In 1934 he and two other artists, Reuben Kadish and Jules Langsner, were commissioned to paint The Struggle Against Terrorism, a mural in the Universidad de San Nicolás in Morelia, Mexico. A vast synthesis of Diego Rivera, Surrealism and the kind of large-format fresco painting perfected by Piero at Arezzo, it is one of the highlights of the exhibition, displayed through a series of ingenious projections. The mural shows the victims of fascist torture. Their massive bodies hang from ropes or are dumped, Christ-like, in open tombs. But the mood is not all sombre. At top right, sickle-brandishing communists charge into the frame, hurling down klansmen and swastikas. Bombast and dynamism are the painters’ creeds here, the searing critique of fascist violence married to a polemical faith in left-wing triumph.

In Bombardment (1937), which hangs nearby, these forces reach crescendo. Painted, like Picasso’s great masterpiece, in response to the bombing of Guernica, it adopts the format of a Renaissance tondo. Guston drives this into centrifugal motion, setting the blast at the painting’s centre back from the figures who surge forwards in extreme foreshortening. It is a painting that strains against its own physical constraints: against painting’s flatness, its stillness, its muteness. At the same time, Bombardment mobilizes these constraints for emotional effect. Its figures are eternally caught in the blast, both thrown and held; sucked in and pushed out. The leg of the naked, screaming child endlessly disappears into the void of the explosion.

Philip Guston, Bombardment, 1937. Philadelphia Museum of Art. Gift of Musa and Tom Mayer, 2011-2-1. © Estate of Philip Guston

Where did this model of engaged art go? How do we get from the young leftist painting communist murals to the tattered insomniac dreaming of horse shit and empty liquor bottles? A broad answer would take in the crushing of American communism, the end of the New Deal, the Nazi-Soviet pact, the waning of the Mexican revolution, World War Two. Mural commissions dried up. Artistic certainties came under pressure. One feels the 1940s for Guston were a period of gradual disintegration. He went on painting his Renaissance-modernist hybrids. But the convictions seem to have ebbed away as the war ground on and the first images began arriving from the death camps. There are no distinct sides in his paintings of this decade; no battle between good and evil. Self-Portrait (1944) shows him hollow-eyed and gaunt, raising a ghostly hand to touch his cheek, as if doubting the capacity of vision to confirm his existence. Gladiators (1940) updates Leonardo’s Battle of Anghiari into a duel of dunces with saucepans for helmets. It is an image of senseless violence unified by the tightness of its composition and the balance of its colours. The pink of its central figure’s strange garment (a dress? a tunic?) echoes in the hoods and fists of his adversaries.

In 1945 Guston brought this sense of uncertainty to an astonishing pitch with If This Be Not I, one of several images of street children that hang in room 3. The setting is some New York slum, piled with trash. Night is coming on. The clock on a distant roof looks past ten, though it might be earlier – the clock might have stopped – there is still a faint blue light in the sky. All is blue here, the hard blue of a winter evening, of street light on frozen metal, and of the stripes on the inmate’s uniform worn by the child at bottom left. He lies, stiff like a dead man, lips drawn back from his teeth. The imagery of the Holocaust is unmistakeable. The painting is haunting, perhaps nowhere more so than in its central figure, another child who stares out from beneath a magnificent paper dunce’s hat (done with a few thick dabs of brown, blue and white). His commedia dell’arte mask has slipped. His gaze is adult, as cold as the air.

It is a wonderful painting but it is also strained, lugubrious, cynical to the point of being hectoring. Guston wrote at the time of the need to find ways to ‘allegorize’ the Holocaust and as the forties wore on he abandoned the directness of his earlier work. Abstraction beckoned, although it was not an easy transition. A work like White Painting I (1951) registers the losses involved – of style and subject matter and commitment – as a kind of bleaching and thinning of the painted surface. The palette is stripped back to the greys and browns of analytical cubism. The central forms hover and crackle against their white ground. Everything seems on the verge of coming apart. Guston made it in a single session. It is easy to imagine him wondering whether he had anything else left to put in.

Guston was able to tolerate these gaps and absences, these crises of indecision. He seems to have driven himself towards them, sometimes destroying whole sequences of his paintings, at other times stopping painting altogether for months, even years, at a time. The effort it cost him to assemble an abstract manner is palpable. Dial (1956) bunches colour and form towards the centre. Reds and pinks stand off the surface in thick ridges. The contrast they create with the green forms is so strong it is almost crass. Thumb marks are visible. Meanwhile, towards the edges, the paint thins, the colours grow less harsh: mauve, sky-blue, here and there a hint of grey. Such abstractions are successful because they find ways to accommodate some of Guston’s old preoccupations – the obsession with certain colours, with the way a particular colour (a blue, a pink) can stabilize and link together a picture of extraordinary violence; the sense of an image straining to allegorize something terrible that is just beyond its reach. They always seem on the verge of materializing into a recognizable form. The meaty densities of Dial almost add up to a figure. There are triangles in Passage (1957-8) that recall the klansmen of the 1930s. In The Return (1956-8) these have become eyes, ears, and noses.

Philip Guston, Passage, 1957–1958 MFAH. © Estate of Philip Guston, courtesy Hauser & Wirth Photograph. © MFAH; Will Michels

There is a massive teleological bias in writing about these paintings, one I am aware of failing to avoid. Guston returned to figuration with his notorious Marlborough Gallery exhibition in 1970. It is difficult to view his abstractions without these later works in mind, as anything other than steps on a path back to the figure, back to the world. The balances they seem to strike – between the disembodied purity of the painted mark and the tendency of that mark, when set alongside others, to coalesce, to take on something of the look and feel of reality – can seem too provisional. Was Guston really serious about abstraction? Did he ever work hard enough to keep out the world? Such questions are to the point. At their best, Guston’s abstractions show the extreme difficulty involved in separating painting from the outside world, in limning it with a fragile autonomy. Others in his generation – Joan Mitchell most spectacularly – never stopped making paintings out of this contradiction. For Guston this wasn’t an option. The Heads he exhibited at the Jewish Museum in 1966 pushed the line between figurative and abstract to breaking point. They used the contrast between a dark central shape and broad, wet, grey brushwork to bring up, again and again, the image of a human head afloat in a sea of static. They are difficult paintings, depressive. They have something of the stunned tenor of If This Be Not I. The eighteen-month period of lethargy and crisis that followed is hardly surprising. It is what happened next that has always come as a shock.

*

There are continuities between the Marlborough paintings and Guston’s earlier work. But at the time they were read as an absolute break: an attack on modernism, a defection to the other side, or something even stranger. Guston’s friend, the composer Morton Feldman, never spoke to him again after he saw them. Even now, walking into room 8 is an overwhelming experience. The curation is intelligent: you walk through a dark corridor and emerge into a riot of massive, cartoonish forms; exuberant colour; pointed Klan hoods. Everything is pushed to extremes. City Limits (1969) is massive, bigger than any of the abstractions. It shows three klansmen driving a stupid cartoon car through a desolate landscape. The whole surface seems built from those smeared, liquid pinks and reds. Even the Klan hoods are more pink than white. But the affect has changed. There is no hint of the quattrocento in Guston’s pinks here, nothing of balance or grace. The blacks and greys blended with his colours make them look grubby, like greasemarks on cheap newsprint.

Philip Guston, Dawn, 1970. Glenstone Museum, Potomac, Maryland

These paintings were horrifying in 1970 and still are (witness the show’s near-cancellation back in 2020, on grounds that it might give offence). They pose a chilling equivalence between their elements. Everything – klansmen, buildings, corpses, cars, windows, cigarettes – is rendered in the same cheerily inane cartoon style drawn in part from Guston’s reading of comic strips like Krazy Kat. The tiny paintings on one wall, which Guston lived with, make the point brutally clear. Each shows a personage in his late paintings. The rubbery form of a skyscraper is there in one; a hanging lightbulb in another. A Klan hood appears in the series too, but fungibly, as one element among many. Dawn (1970) shows another carload of klansmen with a tangle of human body parts protruding from the back of their car. Blood drips from one of the feet. The sun in the sky is a jolly orange disk. The birds on the telephone wire might as well be singing.

It is this cartoonishness that people find disturbing. There is a chasm between the moral clarity of Guston’s work of the 1930s, with its bands of communists ever ready to fight off the Klan, and a work like Dawn or The Studio (1969). In the latter, perhaps his most famous image, it is the artist himself who wears the pointed hood, puffing on a cigarette while painting (yet) another klansman by the light of a single bulb. Guston makes the Klan cute. He identifies himself with those he is supposed to despise, and identifies these with the most debased products of American popular culture. The Studio recognizes the enmeshment of racist violence in the very tissue of American life, as much a part of its workings and history as cigarettes, cars and cartoons. More terrifying still, it suggests that there is no position outside this culture for the artist to take up; no separation that would arrive with the force of a moral binary. The horror of the landscape in City Limits, with its blood-red ground and looming skyline, is of a world in which the Klan have lost their identity as an embodiment of evil and become normalized, banal. We are a long way from the ‘us and them’ of World War Two and the Mexican Revolution. ‘We are all hoods’, as Guston put it.

This sense of helpless complicity, with all the paralysis it implies, returns us to the outlook of the insomniac, obsessing over a world he cannot change. Worry, with its circling momentum, disconnected objects and desperate leaps of inference, is often the subject of Guston’s work in the 1970s, his last decade, during which he produced many of his greatest paintings. Painter’s Forms II (1978) shows a mouth and part of a jaw literally vomiting up the objects – the boots, legs, cigarettes and tin cans – that Guston called his ‘visual alphabet’. It is an image of useless compulsion, as bleak and relentless as anything else to come out of this highpoint of the Cold War.

The final room, titled ‘Night Studio’, is the best in the exhibition. It is revelatory: the full range of Guston’s late works dealing with sleep, death and isolation become apparent. Kettle sits on its high red hill. The figure of the artist curls beneath a too-thin blanket, stick limbs shivering against a black void. Hands gesture unintelligibly. Flames gutter out in the dark. By this point the stakes of these images, their conjunctions of meaninglessness and desolation, the stress they place on bearing witness – even when to do so is impossible – are clear. In Couple in Bed (1977) the artist clutches his brushes even as he pushes his face so close to his stroke-stricken wife’s that their features disappear into each other’s. Guston never lost his faith in modernism; he sought the meaning of modern life, its poetry and heroism, among the wreckage. Creation was the other side of destruction. A sleepless night could always produce a painting.

Philip Guston, The Line, 1978. © The Estate of Philip Guston, courtesy Hauser & Wirth

The last work in the show, The Line (1978), shows a godlike hand reaching from a cloud. It makes the same divine gesture as the artist in Painter, although here the two fingers grasp a stick of charcoal and draw a line. It is at once an image of defunct cliché, absurdly anachronistic in the age of burgeoning postmodernism (who on earth still believed in the artist as divine?), and a serious statement of the painter’s vocation. Such paintings resonate today because they are able to hold both poles together: to be both anachronistic and contemporary. Ideas do not disappear simply because they have become outmoded. Like fascism or the Klan, returning to haunt capitalist modernity in ever-new configurations, it is when left behind that they can be most dangerous.

Read on: Saul Nelson, ‘Opposed Realities’, NLR 137.

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Free Agents?

‘Agency’ might be the word of the decade so far. When applied to the Ukraine war, the term is usually taken to mean that we must follow the lead of Ukrainians themselves – keeping mum about peace talks, sending more weapons, and supporting the maximalist aims of the Kyiv government. John Feffer, director of Foreign Policy in Focus, has described those calling for diplomacy as ‘blinkered and arrogant’, urging them to ‘listen to our progressive brothers and sisters in Ukraine’ instead of ‘some set of abstract principles’. Writing in Foreign Policy, Alexey Kovalev has condemned the ‘twisted worldview’ of peace activists for whom ‘Ukrainians have no agency and Russia is the victim of a proxy war’. For such commentators, there is no need to untangle the knotted historical context or weigh up competing Ukrainian interests; we can simply switch our brains off and outsource all decision-making to those under attack. This discourse is prevalent across the ideological spectrum, including on the left. At best, it has served as an intellectual cheat code for eliding the conflict’s complexities; at worst, it has shut down debate and silenced dissent. What are its underlying assumptions? And does its image of Ukraine align with the reality?

Pro-war commentators tend to see ‘Ukrainian opinion’ as a monolithic entity, embodied by those who oppose negotiations with Moscow and favour fighting until the country’s borders are restored to their pre-2014 lines. This notion is particularly prominent in the US and UK, where martial political cultures have fed the public images of a unified Ukrainian people who ‘will never surrender’, regardless of the toll it takes. After a recent trip to military hospitals in Lviv and Kyiv, Boris Johnson wrote that wounded Ukrainians ‘don’t want any anthems for doomed youth or moaning about the pity of war. They want to get on with killing Russians and expelling the invader from their land.’ Any Westerner who contradicts them is accused of being condescending or aloof.

It is true that most surveys depict a Ukrainian public that overwhelmingly backs the continued war effort – which is hardly surprising in a nation that has suffered unjustifiable aggression from its neighbour. But such polling has often excluded those in Russian-occupied or separatist-controlled areas, along with the millions who have fled the country, many of them from Ukraine’s south and east. More comprehensive studies suggest that Ukrainians are, in fact, divided on the question of a ceasefire when these demographics are taken into account. Support for one is significant among the displaced population, and is reaching around 40% in regions that have been hit hardest by the war.

In Crimea, separatism – whether joining Russia or becoming an independent state – has fallen in and out of favour since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It may not have commanded a majority in 2014, when Putin used a dubious referendum to justify his seizure of the territory. Yet a series of polls since then show that most Crimeans are now content to remain part of Russia. This is likely connected to the post-2014 Ukrainian retaliation against the region, which included cutting off its water supply and creating chronic shortages for its residents. While the 2014 annexation was a naked act of aggression, it would be hard to argue that a military reincorporation of the region into Ukraine would be legitimate either. It would certainly be contrary to the people’s will, or ‘agency’. (According to Zelensky’s government, at least 200,000 Crimeans would face collaboration charges were the territory recaptured by Kyiv.)

The picture is more complicated in the Donbas – but even there, ‘listening’ to Ukrainians throws up certain difficulties. When I interviewed two communists in Donetsk last autumn, Svetlana and Katia, both told me that Ukrainian shelling, which their communities have suffered since the eruption of civil war in 2014, had worsened significantly since the start of the Russian invasion. ‘This is primarily due to Western arms deliveries to Ukraine’, said Katia. ‘There are no safe places left in Donetsk.’ Svetlana recalled an incident where shelling had killed a young girl and her grandmother in the city centre, and vented her frustrations at the city’s constantly ravaged infrastructure. When I spoke with her, Ukrainian forces had just bombed the local water supply. ‘Every time our workers fix something, the next day it’s totally destroyed.’

While neither had any love for Russia or for Putin’s invasion, they explained how events like these – along with what Katia described as a long-standing and worsening ‘Donbassophobia’ in the country’s west – had left them out of sync with the perceived national mood. They both favoured peace talks and an end to the fighting, even if they were pessimistic it would hold. There is good reason to think Svetlana and Katia’s views are not unique. Within the Donbas, public opinion on the most desirable political outcome – whether it’s autonomy within Ukraine, absorption by Russia or outright independence – is fluid. A majority appeared to favour some kind of secession from Ukraine in 2021; and the most recent major surveys, conducted in January 2022, found that just over 50% of respondents in both Kyiv-controlled and separatist areas agreed with the statement ‘It doesn’t matter to me in which country I live: all I want is a good salary and then a good pension.’ This sentiment may well have hardened over the subsequent months of bloody warfare. 

*

There are also the many Ukrainians who do not wish to fight. Following the invasion, the government immediately barred men aged between 18 and 60 from leaving the country. Many of those who tried to flee were stopped by authorities, separated from their families and sent back to be conscripted. Since then, scores of Ukrainians have defied the order, resorting to elaborate schemes – often costly, sometimes life-threatening – to escape across the border. Thousands are facing criminal proceedings for doing so and hundreds have already been convicted. A Ukrainian official revealed in June that the Border Guard was detaining up to twenty men per day trying to make the illegal journey, while the BBC recently found that 20,000 men have fled to avoid conscription since the invasion. 

Those still in Ukraine have gone to great lengths to not be drafted, staying off the streets, resorting to bribery and consulting Telegram channels set up to help people avoid military recruiters, some of which have more than 100,000 members. Reports suggest that recent conscripts are overwhelmingly poor, whereas those with money have increasingly been able to buy their way out. A petition opposing aggressive recruitment strategies received more than 25,000 signatures last year, above the threshold necessary to elicit an official response from the president. None of this paints a picture of, in the words of Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates, a wholly ‘determined partner’ that is ‘willing to bear the consequences of war’, nor of a people who ‘do not fear a long war but an inconclusive one’, as one former CIA officer remarked. Nor does it indicate a population that uniformly views peace talks and concessions as greater evils than prolonged bloodshed.

There are, indeed, a considerable number of Ukrainians who believe that ‘even a “bad” peace is better than a “good” war’. After the invasion, prominent politicians and media figures called for negotiations and, in one case, outright surrender. Should we have listened to them simply because of their nationality? Or, indeed, to the minority of the population that actively support Russia? Left-wing Ukrainians who oppose diplomacy and a ceasefire are sometimes cited in the Western press and held up as a paradigm for their Western comrades; but their views are hardly unanimous. Volodymyr Chemerys, the respected human rights advocate who played a leading role in multiple Ukrainian revolutions and staunchly opposed Moscow’s invasion, has called on Zelensky to negotiate since the start of the invasion. When I interviewed him last year, he complained ‘that several small groups that call or called themselves “left”, in fact, have become personnel serving the Kyiv authorities, supporting imperialism and war, denying the existence of Nazism in Ukraine, rejoicing about repressions against left-wing activists and the banning of left-wing parties.’ Marxist groups like the Workers’ Front of Ukraine, and prominent activists like the Kononovich brothers, have taken similar anti-war positions. Listening to Ukrainian voices, given their diversity, is more complicated than Western pro-war commentators suggest. It is inevitably selective, and it requires an exercise of political judgement to decide between contradictory viewpoints. How could it not?

There is also the obvious fact that a population’s ‘agency’, or what we might usually call public opinion, is not static. It is influenced by a variety of factors and subject to external manipulation. Ukrainian views on the war have emerged in a climate of intense patriotism and heightened government repression, with pacifists and leftists facing prosecution, imprisonment and even torture for their political views. Opposition parties have been banned en masse and media outlets shut down or placed under government control, with the Ukrainian parliament recently voting to strengthen the system of state censorship.

As peace activist Ruslan Kotsaba – now in the US after being persecuted for his anti-war views – told me, ‘All opposition figures previously promoting the peaceful resolution of conflict with Russia have either fled or are in prison’, giving peace talks the air of ‘playing for Putin’ or being ‘the work of enemy agents’. When he visited Ukraine in March, Anatol Lieven found that Ukrainians open to conceding Crimea as part of a negotiated settlement dared not make their views known on the record. The bellicose ‘consensus’ in the country reflects these dynamics. With nonconforming positions marginalized by the media and political class, mass opinion is shaped by officials in Kyiv. 

Such malleability is perhaps best illustrated by Ukrainian attitudes toward NATO – another issue frequently cited by Western hawks who defend the country’s ‘sovereign right’ to join the alliance. Until 2014, only a minority of the population expressed support for membership (more have favoured a military alliance with Russia at various points since the breakup of the USSR). Historically, a plurality of Ukrainians have viewed NATO as a threat. George W. Bush’s attempt to draw the country into the military compact was met with angry protests that saw American flags set aflame on the streets of Kyiv. Diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks revealed that Ukrainian officials, rattled by the scale of opposition, joined their American and NATO counterparts in stressing the need for ‘public education campaigns’ to persuade the Ukrainian population. This was as clear a violation of Ukrainian agency as you could get – yet you’ll be hard pressed to find establishment commentators, then or since, who objected to it on those grounds.

*

Throughout the war, Ukrainian ‘agency’ has only been invoked by Western governments when it happens to align with their geopolitical interests, and steadfastly ignored when it doesn’t. NATO states and their client media have, on various occasions, been more than willing to defy the Ukrainian leadership. For months after the invasion, Zelensky called, both publicly and privately, for Western support in negotiations with Moscow, to no avail. Even after the discovery of the war crimes committed in Bucha, he insisted that ‘we have no other choice’ but diplomacy. In May 2022, a majority of Ukrainians polled by the National Democratic Institute – a quasi-governmental entity connected to the US Democratic Party – favoured peace talks. Yet, curiously, those insisting that the West defer to Ukrainian wishes did not amplify Zelensky’s pleas. They expressed no outrage at this denial of his agency and ignored the well-corroborated fact that the US and British governments worked to scuttle a tentative peace deal he was negotiating. Instead, they spent months arguing against a negotiated settlement and in favour of a total military victory. They proved willing to overlook both the Ukrainian president and people in pursuit of this goal, regardless of the risks involved. 

For almost two years, Ukrainian agency has only counted when it means prolonging the war – not when it might mean ending it. Nor does it apply to the designs of Western multinationals on Ukraine’s natural resources, nor to EU plans to use the country’s ballooning national debt and reconstruction costs – which grow with every week the war continues – to impose neoliberal shock therapy. Few invoked national sovereignty and agency when the US and Europe pressured Ukrainian leaders to enforce brutal austerity on their own people and open their farmland to foreign ownership. Today, reports suggest that Washington may finally be nudging Kyiv toward peace talks, only now against the wishes of Zelensky, whose vehement opposition to compromise no longer aligns with Washington’s evolving view of the war as a lost cause that is siphoning resources from a future showdown with China. In each case, the Western commentariat has had zero qualms about overriding Ukraine’s hallowed autonomy. It appears that certain forms of external interference – namely, those that come from the world hegemon and its relays – are considered entirely legitimate.

In a longdivided country like Ukraine, whose fault lines have deepened after years of civil war, public opinion is complex and differentiated. That Western war enthusiasts refuse to acknowledge this, and display no interest in the views of Ukrainians like Svetlana and Katia, is not especially surprising. Like other concepts that have migrated from liberal identitarian politics into the international arena, such as ‘Westsplaining’ and standpoint epistemology, the selective invocation of ‘agency’ was never really meant to reflect the nuances of Ukrainian thought. More often than not, these buzzwords are used to flatten them out. The result is a stifled political discourse and a rigidly conformist outlook the war, from opinionators spanning right and left.

The stakes are larger than Ukraine, as great as those already are. Before this war is even over, another great power conflict is brewing between the US and China. Once again, the ‘agency’ and ‘voices’ of those caught in the middle – this time on the island of Taiwan – are being wielded to whip well-meaning Westerners behind Washington’s aggressive foreign policy, even though it is those same people who will suffer most from its recklessness.

Here, we should pause to consider whether ‘public opinion’ – mutable, unstable, subject to ideological and circumstantial pressures – can be a reliable touchstone for the left. We should also question the wisdom of grounding our political positions in certain identities or experiences that are said to hold particular epistemic authority. In matters of war and peace, our political judgment ought to be informed by the ‘public’; but as in the domestic sphere, this can only be done by recognizing its heterogeneity, and by interrogating the complex factors that give rise to the ‘majority view’. Asking us to follow the latter uncritically may simply be a matter of political expedience for Washington and its subsidiaries, but coming from leftists, it’s a demand for intellectual cowardice.

Read on: Volodymyr Ishchenko, ‘Ukrainian Voices’, NLR 138.

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Smart People

‘I don’t think smart people should go to jail’, a young observer who works in crypto remarked outside one of the biggest fraud trials in US history. Samuel Bankman-Fried, the former CEO of the crypto exchange FTX and most famous advance man for the brave new ‘democratic’ alternative to the corrupt old world of cash and wing-tip finance, was the allegedly smart person in question. Three days later, on 2 November, a jury convicted him of wire fraud, conspiracy and money laundering. For his crimes, Bankman-Fried, 31, faces a maximum sentence of 110 years in prison.

The jury took just a few hours to conclude that he had siphoned off FTX customer funds to its sister hedge fund, Alameda Research, which spent, transferred or gambled that money away. For years he had assured customers that their funds were protected. Even when he knew $8 billion in customer money was gone, and no assets existed to repay it, he tweeted, ‘FTX is fine. Assets are fine’. It was necessary, he’d told his lieutenants, to send out ‘a confident tweet’ as customers frantically tried to withdraw their assets.

My young interlocutor hadn’t thought Bankman-Fried was innocent exactly, but fraud happens all the time, and Think how much good smart people can do in the world! The fallen tycoon’s smarts were much-invoked at trial, by both prosecution and defence. He graduated in physics from MIT. Trained at an elite Wall Street trading firm. Moved on to start Alameda, then FTX. A billionaire before he was thirty. He’d schmoozed with a passel of politicians including Bill Clinton and Tony Blair; a league of non-profiteers, Effective Altruists, vowing to serve mankind once they’d enriched themselves by any means necessary; and celebrities, who helped him market FTX as the safest, smartest place for anyone – the plumber, the barman, the most famous quarterback in American football history – to invest in cryptocurrencies. No one argued, not even his defence, that he’d done any good in the world.

I’d been watching his trial in federal court in New York, trying to put myself in the place of the only audience that mattered. I have to say the biggest revelation was that Sam Bankman-Fried isn’t too smart at all. Certainly not where it counted most – with his freedom in the hands of twelve ordinary New Yorkers: Female, 39, physician’s assistant. Female, 47, high school librarian, lives with cats, sister and sick mother. Female, 33, pediatric nurse. Female, 40, social worker, unemployed. Female, 65, corrections officer (retired), mother of three. Male, 61, postal worker, single. Female, 53, homemaker, divorced, onetime fundraising organizer for nonprofits. Male, 59, married, three children. Female, 50, Metro North train conductor, five children. Female, 43, Ukrainian immigrant, IT at Bloomberg, divorced. Male, 69, investment banker (retired), originally from Hong Kong. Female, 55, special ed teacher, originally from Bermuda.

These twelve were referred to only by numbers. Juror Number 4, a middle-aged white woman, handed the envelope to the judge and later pronounced, ‘Guilty’, seven times, to each of the counts. As she read out his fate, Bankman-Fried stood immobile. His parents, long-time law professors at Stanford – of ethics (Barbara Fried) and tax law (Joseph Bankman) – had walked into the courtroom clutching each other, small people looking smaller now, Barbara Fried gnawing uncontrollably behind drawn lips.

In sunnier days, both had played a role in their son’s business affairs. Bankman had been a paid adviser at $200,000, until he is said to have complained that wasn’t enough, and received a subvention from his son of $10 million. Fried counselled Sam on political donations. A political action committee she’d co-founded, Mind the Gap, received $1 million ostensibly from one of her son’s lieutenants, whose participation she had proposed (‘we don’t want to create the impression that funding MTG is a family affair . . . ’, she wrote in a cheeky email). While FTX customer funds were being raided, Bankman-Fried bought a $16 million house in the Bahamas, allegedly for his parents, who claim they didn’t know their names were on the deed. They are being sued by the post-bankruptcy custodianship of FTX, and call accusations of impropriety ‘completely false’. When Juror Number 4 pronounced ‘Guilty’ the third time, for ‘wire fraud (lenders of Alameda Research)’, Joe Bankman crumpled. For the rest of the proceedings, he remained like this, folded in half in his seat.

*

I was a latecomer to this event, which since 3 October had drawn a throng of youthful observers – reporters and bloggers, tech workers and traders, systems engineers, millennials dropping in for a glimpse of ‘our generation’s Bernie Madoff’. ‘This is the Super Bowl for nerds’, one attendee told me. Some said crypto’s a scam; others that Bankman-Fried’s a bad apple, ruining the party for revolutionaries fighting for ‘economic independence’, via pieces of code dependent on enormous amounts of real energy and real money to be anything more than figments in a computer game. For many this was their first trial, a kind of black-comic commons where everyone but the accused was making friends.

I arrived just before Bankman-Fried testified. It was a risky move, but Sam, as his attorney referred to him in court, is a gambling man, so he took the stand. Then he lied under oath. It’s arguable that he had nothing to lose (though the lying might cost him if Judge Lewis Kaplan decides that he perjured himself). The defence, having failed to undercut the government witnesses, had little else to offer. Maybe Sam could dazzle the jurors as he had so many journalists, celebrities and politicos; or charm them, as he had Michael Lewis, whose book on the man in the dock, Going Infinite, came out the day the trial began and quickly topped the lists. With a brazenness matching that of his subject, Lewis told the press his book was ‘a letter to the jury’.

This was not Bankman-Fried’s first wild gamble since FTX and Alameda went bankrupt last November and he came under federal investigation. The first was his decision to talk to the media: fifty or so interviews; days spent with Lewis after being arrested in December; hanging out with social media crypto influencer Tiffany Fong. The second was pleading ‘Not Guilty’. The government had millions of documents – myriad FTX financials; real and faked balance sheets of its biggest customer, Alameda; Slack chats; Signal chats; tweets; an executive’s contemporaneous journal; sworn Congressional testimony; records of expenditures by Bankman-Fried himself, on political donations, private jets (including for delivery of Amazon purchases), a $30 million penthouse in the Bahamas, where he’d headquartered the companies, etc.

It had the testimony of Bankman-Fried’s partners in crime, FTX and/or Alameda executives. Three of them had been the defendant’s close friends and associates (one a sometime girlfriend), who started talking soon after the enterprise imploded. Two pleaded guilty to fraud and conspiracy before Bankman-Fried was arraigned, and agreed to be witnesses for the prosecution. In court they would explain the details of the scam. The gist: there were one set of rules for ordinary FTX customers and effectively no rules for Alameda, which Bankman-Fried controlled by force of personality and 90% ownership. Alameda had unlimited ability to ‘borrow’ from FTX customer accounts, with no contract or written terms or posted collateral. That’s ‘stealing, plain and simple’, the government would argue.

Anyone else, aware of the awesome resources of the state and the cooperation of remorseful former associates, might have thrown himself on the mercy of the court. Bankman-Fried bet on himself. The jurors gave him the attention any defendant deserves. Then he spent hours kicking up dust in their face. The art of the con involves a number of skills. One is talking so much and so well that the mark has no room to think. Another is conjuring a personality that not only plays to larceny in the blood but also arouses in the mark an approving sentiment. The most skilled con artist is an extraordinary actor. The persona is seductive; it never slips, thus winning the mark’s confidence. A trial is not a confidence game; the jury has nothing to gain and much time to think. It is, however, a contest of stories. So, it is not impossible that a conniving storyteller might seduce one juror enough to believe him and then hold to that belief.

And here is where Sam Bankman-Fried’s bet on himself was bound to fail. For neither could he tell a compelling, exculpating, story of what had happened to other people’s money, nor could he make himself likeable. Questioned by his attorney Mark Cohen, he took roundabouts, spewing jargon as he went. I drew spirals in my notebook. With no coherent alternative to the government’s story, Cohen lingered on technicalities, fractured chronology, enabled his client’s discursive patter. One often couldn’t be sure what Bankman-Fried was saying, or why, or whether it was relevant or true. Fragments capture the substance of his testimony: I was busy. I didn’t know. I trusted others. Margin trading. Things happened. Yup.

This was the day of first impressions, and though some in the media would give his performance good reviews, it struck me as an exhibition of contempt – for the jurors’ time, their intelligence and something else: their likely relationship to money. For weeks they had heard about discrepancies of $2 billion, $8 billion, $14 billion; some of Bankman-Fried’s lieutenants had been anxious about multimillion-dollar expenditures. One had cried over what she had done. Here was the boss, speaking with nonchalance. Yup, he’d been ‘concerned’ when he learned of a multibillion-dollar ‘hole’ in his business.

‘Numbers like that just slide off our back’, one onlooker working in crypto told me later. No doubt they do, and jurors probably tried to see things from the perspective of someone who is young and has spent his adult life playing in the big casino. Bankman-Fried never returned the courtesy. In workaday America, a $400 unexpected expense can be calamitous for one out of three adults. Almost everyone knows someone for whom that is true. There’s a good chance that the librarian, the train conductor, the postal worker et al., did too. Most people are also likely to suspect that if a financial trading system is so complex that no one can keep track of the money, as Bankman-Fried had implied, something is wrong.

*

Overcoming doubt is the prosecution’s burden. ‘Beyond a reasonable doubt’ morphed into ‘no doubt at all’ the longer Bankman-Fried talked. Caroline Ellison, the former girlfriend and reluctant CEO of Alameda, had earlier testified that she had made seven alternate balance sheets when the legit one showed Alameda’s enormous liability from siphoning FTX accounts. She said that Bankman-Fried had requested the phony ledgers and picked the one that looked best, number seven, to show to potential investors. Bankman-Fried testified that he had just happened to look at only one tab of her attachment, which just happened to be number seven, which just happened to look the best. Who knows what Caroline was doing?

A skit from the Netflix show I Think You Should Leave became a meme among the young set, mocking Bankman-Fried’s performance. A car shaped like a hotdog drives into a shopfront window, shocking the people inside. A man wearing a hotdog suit pipes up, ‘Whoever did this, just confess; we promise we won’t be mad’. He directs suspicion at someone else and blathers about technology as he steals merchandise. ‘It says so much about what’s happening here!’, a tech designer told me during a break.

‘In what world is someone making eight balance sheets for themselves?’ the prosecution would later ask jurors in closing. Use ‘your own common sense and life experience’. Simplification had been the government’s strategy. It stripped down its list of witnesses and exhibits. It played to Judge Kaplan’s impatience with time-wasters. It explained FTX/Alameda’s secretive operations in plain language, and showed that whenever Bankman-Fried had faced a critical choice, he chose the crooked path. Contrary to defence histrionics, it did not make him out to be a ‘monster’; it likened him to an embezzler, a jewel thief, a banal criminal.

That Bankman-Fried could commit so major a crime and think he might beat the rap with so little effort spoke loudly of his character. Had anyone ever told him No? If not, the initial hour of cross-examination was a brutal first lesson. ‘A public flogging’, one observer called it. Bankman-Fried seemed to have internalized a single piece of legal advice – You can always say ‘I don’t recall’ – heedless of its corollary, that what the prosecution might present to ‘refresh your memory’ could spell trouble.

Assistant US Attorney Danielle Sassoon: Mr Bankman-Fried, isn’t it true that . . .

Bankman-Fried: I don’t recall.

Sassoon: Mr Bianco, please pull up Government Exhibit X . . .

By the government’s tally, under cross-examination Bankman-Fried said ‘I do not recall’ or some variant 140 times. I’d stopped counting at 76. He drew blanks on company policy that he had once touted, on contracts he had signed (some of them agreements with himself), on his sworn testimony to Congress (so many hands had written it), on what he’d told journalists a year ago, and what he’d told his attorney the day before. Relentlessly, Sassoon countered with documents attesting to something the defendant did, or knew, or should have known. Mr Bianco is now the most well-known courtroom tech assistant in history. A retired law professor watching the trial said the cross-examination should be studied by aspirants to the profession: no theatrics, just a clear story, a straightforward plan, and startling efficiency.

At one point some trial-watchers had wondered what Bankman-Fried’s strategy might be. A man so smart must surely have a plan. None ever revealed itself. Perhaps he thought he didn’t need one. He treated the courtroom like a betting parlour. To yes or no questions, he often paused for an uncomfortably long time, staring into a void as if calculating the odds of which response would get a better return. The case was lost. Anything he said might be honest, might be a lie, was likely a lie, because it’s hard to keep track of every previous lie, and Sam Bankman-Fried could not recall.

*

Now he’s going to prison. Twenty years, twenty-five, thirty? News reports have opted for ‘decades’. Sentencing will occur next March. Judge Kaplan has written of his disdain for the ‘studied calculation’ of white-collar criminals, whose offences he called ‘especially reprehensible’. At trial, he did not conceal his displeasure with Bankman-Fried’s circumlocutions. Mark Cohen has promised an appeal, something he was obviously preparing for throughout the trial.

What Cohen called Bankman-Fried’s ‘extraordinary journey’ is far from over. In March he is also scheduled to stand trial for bribery, conspiracy, bank and securities fraud in an alleged scheme to pay Chinese law enforcement officials $150 million to unfreeze $1 billion of Alameda’s trading funds when his companies were headquartered in Hong Kong. He may also face trial for federal election law violations related to at least $40 million spent on the 2022 US midterms. His lieutenant Nishad Singh pleaded guilty earlier this year in connection with the aforementioned $1 million donated to Barbara Fried’s political action committee.

This trial presented only one neat slice of an exceedingly messy story, both at FTX and in the larger ‘ecosystem’ that endures without it. Bankman-Fried had promoted FTX as the ethical operator in a murky world of a ‘currency’ especially well-suited to crime and crawling with grifters. His reference in court to people using crypto to ‘buy muffins’ or ‘pay rent’ – rather than, say, hire hitmen, fund private armies or steal from each other – was another, albeit minor, instance of giving a wholesome veneer to a fundamentally fraudy segment of an already deeply exploitative sector of the economy. US Attorney Damian Williams called the verdict ‘a warning to every fraudster who thinks they’re untouchable’.

If Bankman-Fried decides to plead guilty to the pending charges, he may have tradeable knowledge gained from his meteoric journey through the rot-riddled universe of finance, politics and crypto. In an excellent article in The Nation, Jacob Silverman reviews some ‘strange movements of cash and crypto’, involving everything from Hong Kong storefronts to US venture capital firms to crypto minters and others whose role remains largely shrouded:

Sam Bankman-Fried didn’t just control Alameda Research and FTX. He had some 140-plus registered companies – many of them shells used to direct billions of dollars in investments made with stolen funds. Some of these start-ups he controlled directly; others seemed to be covert parts of the Bankman-Fried empire . . . we still don’t know the full extent of this network of dirty and pilfered money . . . we do know that for a few years, Bankman-Fried controlled an incredibly valuable vehicle for laundering money.

While being led out of the courtroom, Bankman-Fried turned and gave a childlike smile to his stricken parents. Then he disappeared. Deputy US marshals escorted him to a vehicle waiting to return him to the Brooklyn Metropolitan Detention Center, where he has been locked up since August. Judge Kaplan had revoked his bail for attempts at witness tampering and other breaches of his conditions of release. (Among his offences: while lounging in his parents’ Palo Alto home, he gave Tiffany Fong pages of Caroline Ellison’s personal diary, which promptly became grist for The New York Times.)

Night had come. As observers gathered their things, Joe Bankman stood with Fried, looking up at Cohen imploringly for . . . what? Outside, jurors scattered into the subways. Lights bounced off the pale façade and blazing brass doors of the Daniel Patrick Moynihan Federal Courthouse. Thirteen Assistant US Attorneys lined up, unsmiling, to the left of a microphone. To the right, in shadow, stood at least a dozen of their aides. News photographers and spectators snapped pictures. None could fully capture the power that this disciplined formation projected.

Read on: Marco D’Eramo, ‘Bitmagic’, NLR–Sidecar.

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Hezbollah’s Next Move

Since Hamas’s attack on October 7, the Israeli retaliation has unleashed staggering levels of destruction – with the Palestinian death toll now exceeding 10,000. The US has hurried two airplane carriers and several destroyers to the region, along with special military personnel, to bolster its ally and ward off any possible intervention from Iran or Hezbollah. The latter has been engaged in tit-for-tat hostilities with Israel on its northern border, which runs for a hundred kilometers from the Naqoura in the west to the Shebaa farms in the east. This has forced the Israeli army to keep a high number of professional units stationed in the area, as well as maintaining air-force readiness and anti-missile defences. Whether this localized conflict will escalate is now one of the primary questions for the region and the wider world.

Far from being a puppet of Tehran, Hezbollah must be understood as a powerful political party with a strong militia and a significant influence in several countries beyond its native Lebanon – Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen. Its leadership and most of its rank-and-file consider themselves part of the transnational constellation that owes religious obedience to the Iranian Supreme Leader. But Hezbollah does not operate according to orders and fiats, and is itself a decision-maker in Iranian strategy in the Middle East. The final say on its policies comes from secretary general Hasan Nasrallah and his cadre. Their relation to Iran is that of partners, not auxiliaries.

Hamas, too, has a high degree of autonomy, and launched its attack based on its own political calculations rather those of Iran or Hezbollah. It decided that the policies pursued by the Israeli government and its settler population – indefinite occupation and gradual annexation – had reached a tipping point where inaction would prove fatal. This decision was rooted in a broader assessment of the geopolitical transformations taking place across the Middle East. Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel was anticipated by the end of the year. A deal between Iran and the Americans was on the cards. The proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, which promises to reinforce the centrality of Gulf states to the global economy, was rapidly becoming a reality. In light of all of this, the ‘international community’ was poised to further marginalize the Palestinian cause and revive the PA as a pliable alternative to Hamas. Internal and external dynamics convinced the organization that it had to either act or accept a slow death.

It is almost certain that Hezbollah had no prior knowledge of the consequent attack. The Lebanese party agrees with Hamas on many issues, and has spent years assisting it with money, arms and tactical advice, yet their geopolitical positions are not always aligned (they were on opposite sides of the Syrian civil war, for example). It appears that Hamas’s act of desperation – to engineer a conflict with the aim of reactivating the Palestinian anticolonial struggle and maintaining their political relevance – will not have a straightforward domino effect on Hezbollah. At least not for the time being. By launching limited strikes across the border, Hezbollah is signalling its readiness to open a second front should the pulverization of Gaza reach a point that the party can no longer tolerate. Yet this restrained form of engagement also gives it the space to continually reassess the situation, consider its options and determine its next moves.

At present, the questions facing Nasrallah’s forces are these. Were they to enter a full-blown war with Israel (and possibly the US), would they be able to stop the Israeli invasion of Gaza and the massacre of tens of thousands of Palestinians? Would they risk decimating Lebanon and inflicting tremendous damage on Hezbollah’s support base? Would they lose thousands of fighters and most of their weapons? Would they jeopardize the accomplishments of the resistance axis in Syria, Iraq and Yemen? What would they stand to gain from this hazardous course of action? The answers are liable to change at any moment. The optimum strategy today might be defunct tomorrow. But as yet, it seems that this is Hamas’s war, not Hezbollah’s.

Hezbollah’s options – whether to maintain hostilities with Israel at their current level, escalate them or reduce them – are governed by three important variables. The first is the situation in Gaza. Israel wants to obliterate Hamas in toto, and has been given the green-light to commit genocide in pursuit of this goal, even though its chances of fulfilment are highly uncertain. If Hamas is able to drag out the fighting, inflict significant harm on the enemy and thwart an all-out Israeli victory, then Hezbollah will score major political points with minimal sacrifices, simply by keeping Israel distracted on its northern front. The party could thereby avoid the dangers of escalation and live to fight another war at a more propitious moment.

The second variable is Hezbollah’s power base in Lebanon, which, along with the majority of the Lebanese society, is supportive of the Palestinians but hesitant about a war with Israel. They know very well that, on top of having lost their savings in the 2019-20 Lebanese banking crisis, an Israeli assault would threaten their homes and what remains of their vital national infrastructure. Hezbollah is, understandably, reluctant to endanger and alienate this constituency. The final variable is Iran and its interests, including the diplomatic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the delicate negotiations with the Biden administration concerning its nuclear technology and the extent of US sanctions. The Iranian leadership knows that both of these would be upended by a major regional conflict – hence President Raisi’s cautious position and his continued lines of contact with the Saudi Crown Prince.

Yet as Israel’s killing machine mows down Palestinians by the thousands, each of these factors could change. If Hamas appears to be in existential danger, the calculus for Hezbollah may be different – since the loss of this ally could embolden Israel to target its Lebanese adversary next. As for the Lebanese people, it is unclear whether they will continue to prioritize their homes and assets amid the proliferating images of Palestinian body bags. Might they instead prove willing to suffer alongside the Palestinians? The Iranians, too, might have to look again at the balance between their immediate material interests and their nominal commitments to Palestinian liberation. Will they be able to sit face-to-face with US officials while the latter cheers on the immolation of Gaza? Wouldn’t this send the wrong signal to their other allies across the region – that Iranian support is fickle and unreliable?

If the situation in Gaza deteriorates to the point that Iran shelves its negotiations with the US, the Gulf states sour on Israel, and Hezbollah’s base becomes convinced that the party is not doing enough, then this could be a trigger for Hezbollah to escalate. Likewise, if Israel decides to target civilians in Lebanon and causes major casualties, Nasrallah cannot be expected to stand by. For Hezbollah, military intervention is always a political strategy rooted in the arithmetic of gains and losses and the complex field of allies and interests. Its next move will not be decided by Iranian influence or Islamist ideology, but by the demands of pragmatism.

Read on: Tariq Ali, ‘Midpoint in the Middle East?’, NLR 38.