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Maspero’s Legacy

Late summer was marked by the loss of influential French publisher François Gèze. How should he be remembered? Born in Casablanca, trained as an industrial engineer, member of the Parti socialiste unifié and close to Parisian third-worldist circles, Gèze joined Éditions Maspero in 1977. Founded at the height of the Algerian War and linked to much of the then flourishing far left, the house was the principal Francophone publisher of Marxist theory and an emblem of anti-imperialist militancy. Six years later, amid straitened economic circumstances, François Maspero sold his stake for one nominal franc and transferred the directorship of what would henceforth be known as La Découverte to Gèze. At the time, the young publisher told anyone who would listen that ‘the Maspero catalogue was worthless’. Forty years later, we must assume the share of La Découverte in the €789 million annual sales of the Editis group is considerably larger than a symbolic euro.

In the world of books, where symbols are decisive, there is something more than a little disheartening about the Maspero list being in the hands of Vincent Bolloré, figurehead of a renascent, reactionary Catholic right. How did it come to this? La Découverte began publishing two years after Mitterrand’s election, as the government announced its U-turn on fiscal austerity and the official conversion of the PS to neoliberalism. Few doubted that the post-war epoch of political and social struggle – stretching from the great workers’ strikes through the campaigns against the war in Algeria, May 68 – had come to a definitive close. In Serge Halimi’s diagnostic, the left had stopped trying; in their stead the ‘intellectuals against the left’ of Michael Scott Christofferson’s description, spawned in the ideological slough of ‘anti-totalitarianism’, now took centre stage. France underwent a veritable ‘dégringolade’ in the words of Perry Anderson, an author who had been important for Maspero but who would not see a single book of his published by La Découverte.

The Mitterrand years: burial of egalitarian ideals and Marxist theories accompanied the terminal decline of the PCF as a mass party. ‘Worship of careerism, the Bomb, raison d’état, big business and the Mammon of cash-rackets-media-lies’, in Guy Hocquenghem’s summary. A terrible ordeal for a publishing house encumbered with the Maspero millstone. If the need to adjust the editorial line had already been on the agenda, Gèze made this the priority of La Découverte. Ever realistic in his approach to publishing, he refocussed the list on the humanities and social sciences (less politicized, more mass-market oriented) together with books by journalists dealing with hot-button cultural issues. To illustrate the evolution of the catalogue under his watch – an outpouring of more than 130 titles a year – it may suffice to consider two elements. First, the travesty of Maspero’s revolutionary anti-colonialism, dressed up in identitarian themes to please the taste of the cultivated petty bourgeoisie. The most emblematic example remains the metamorphosis of third-worldism into post-colonial hucksterism propagated by Pascal Blanchard and his co-thinkers, whose latest opus, Sexe, race et colonies (2018), packages the ‘domination of non-European bodies’ as coffee-table erotica. Second, the dumbing-down of social science, flagrant in the case of Michel Pinçon and Monique Pinçon-Charlot, authors of the crossover hit Le Président des ultra-riches (2011), whose most recent offerings are more or less unabashed exercises in tabloid voyeurism.

Gèze assumed the role of the rising entrepreneur, in tune with the social-liberal turn of a large portion of his readership. Symptomatically, he joined a host of other intellectuals associated with the ‘Second Left’ in signing the petition circulated by Esprit and the reformist CFDT trade union in support of the Juppé government’s plan to ‘modernize’ the French retirement and social security system. Algeria continued to occupy him: the 1990s were coloured by his campaign against the military regime in Algiers, accused of seeking to crush popular opposition by cultivating a climate of terror. Antipathy to Islamic radicalism caused many on the French left to hesitate in condemning the brutality of the Algerian government; Gèze’s engagement contrariwise led him to embrace an emergent form of cultural leftism, structured around faintly religious appeals to identity and denunciations of the ‘colonialist imaginary’.  

Perhaps no one attests more pungently than Hugues Jallon to the tragedy of the retreat of the publisher from post-68 idealism. Recruited by Gèze in 1997, Jallon referred to Malcolm X’s Le Pouvoir noir and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s Textes politiques, both published in French translation by Maspero, as ‘unreadable’ and ‘out-of-date’, belonging to ‘a past which is well and truly defunct’, literally: ‘Appalling!’ What of the bottom line? In 1995, La Découverte was bundled up with the Éditions ouvrières and Syros in a holding company capitalized by the CFDT. Three years later, following a bitter dispute from which it emerged victorious – with the dissolution of Syros and the departure of Éditions ouvrières – La Découverte was sold to the Havas group, itself on the cusp of being bought by the Compagnie Générale des Eaux, soon to become Vivendi and then Vivendi Universal. At last, Maspero featured on the Monopoly board of Parisian publishing, and Gèze’s career could truly begin. Three years after the spectacular collapse, in 2002, of Jean-Marie Messier’s megalomaniacal assemblage at Vivendi, La Découverte and three other Vivendi houses were snapped up by Hachette, which turned around and sold it off again the following year as part of a package deal, under the name Editis, to the Wendel investment company. Roller coasters and merry-go-rounds.

In 2005, now CEO of La Découverte in a group controlled by the boss of bosses, head of the Mouvement des entreprises de France ‘Baron’ Ernest-Antoine Seillière, Gèze not only affirmed that ‘I continue to publish exactly the same books as before, and no one has ever interfered with my editorial choices’, but concluded, ‘Now I have the peace of mind to edit, thanks to the economies of scale of a large group. Before, I spent more time working with my banker than with my authors’. When asked if he saw any contradiction between this cavalcade of owners from the ranks of France’s wealthiest men, and his loyalty to the ‘engagement’ of the Éditions Maspero, Geze replied: ‘Only the catalogue counts’.

Is this entirely true? It has often been reported that publishing attacks on the rich by José Bové, Michael Moore and their ilk greatly amused Seillière. A 2007 editorial innovation of Jallon’s also suggests that it’s not only the catalogue that counts: the creation of the ‘Zones’ imprint, intended to ‘renew the militant approach’ of La Découverte by ‘reconnecting with the third-worldist dimension of the Éditions Maspero’ through books that address the ‘problematics of the Global South’. Why pretend that a book series is published independently unless it is more politically coherent to construct ‘a site of editorial resistance’ – calling on partisans of ‘counterculture, activism and new forms of contestation’ to ‘whet their swords for new offensives and acts of resistance’ – independent of capitalist conglomerates?

As Jallon was promoted upwards, and learned the ropes as CEO, Gèze continued to exercise his talents in schemes concocted by the employers’ publishing union – in partnership with the French Ministry of Culture and the Centre national du livre – to shepherd the book business through its ‘digital transition’. When he retired in 2014, Jallon naturally was appointed his successor, with the agreement of the principal shareholder. Yet only four years later, the new CEO could not resist an offer from Vincent Montagne, recent owner of the Média-Participations cartel, to take the helm of Seuil and its subsidiaries. Jallon’s colleagues all congratulated him, if not so heartily as they congratulated his new boss – ‘representative of a moderate, even enlightened right’ in the words of one – for hiring this ‘authentic man of the left’. To replace Jallon, Gèze proposed Stéphanie Chevrier, who had started out as an editor in the Hachette and Flammarion groups before earning her spurs creating a bespoke ‘independent’ imprint, Don Quichote, at La Martinière. Once again, a left-wing publisher ensconced in a large corporate group striving to pass off the financier as a cobbler. The shareholders agreed. The mergers and acquisitions continued. A year after Chevrier’s arrival, Bolloré bought Editis from Planeta, which had purchased it from Wendel in 2008. In 2021, Chevrier’s boss was so pleased that he proposed she also take charge of the Éditions Julliard. At the time of writing – as part of his consolidation of the French media landscape – the sale of Editis to the tycoon owner of Le Monde, Daniel Kretsinky, is on the cards.

The conspicuous absence of Gèze, and any mention of La Découverte from the commemorative ceremony organized for Maspero after his death in October 2015, suggests that the handover thirty years earlier did not go altogether smoothly. By contrast, the tributes of Jallon and La Découverte to Gèze, ‘comrade, friend and fellow traveller’, leave no doubt as to the success of this latest bequest.

Read on: Emilie Bickerton, ‘Paper Empires’, NLR 76.

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Argentina Realigned

My flight landed in Buenos Aires on Saturday 21 October, early in the morning. The atmosphere was so tense it felt like a place I’d never visited before. Presidential elections were being held the next day, and the candidacy of hard-right libertarian Javier Milei appeared to threaten the consensus that had been in place since the democratic transition of 1983. He was soaring in the polls – vowing to demolish the welfare state, dollarize the economy and launch an authoritarian crackdown on dissent. Everyone knew that the ballot would have implications far beyond the next four years. When the results came through, there was palpable sense of relief: Milei got 30% of the vote, while the Economy Minister Sergio Massa outshone expectations with 37%. Now the two contenders will face a tight runoff election in mid-November. Regardless of who wins, there will be no reversion to the status quo ante. Argentina’s political system has entered a new era.

Frustration with the Peronist establishment had been mounting for some time. During the period of kirchnerismo – the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), followed by that of his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015) – the country’s economic outlook oscillated. There was almost a decade of sound recovery, poverty reduction and improvements in every social indicator, thanks to strong welfare policies and the global commodities boom. Yet in 2011 a period of stagnation began. Slow economic growth, plus political corruption scandals and weariness with kirchernista personalism, created the perfect storm for the 2015 elections – when Kirchner’s anointed successor Daniel Scioli lost to the conservative free-marketeer Mauricio Macri.

Macri was hardly an outsider. He had been the mayor of Buenos Aires for the previous eight years, while his political coalition, Cambiemos, had a significant presence in Congress and governors in a few provinces. Its prominence increased with the 2015 elections and even more with the 2017 mid-terms. In office, he removed currency controls and established a floating exchange rate, as well as pushing deregulation to court international investors. A new IMF loan in 2018 paved the way for punishing austerity measures, which did nothing to curb Argentina’s persistently high inflation. When the country returned to the polls in 2019, it was beset by increasing poverty and crushing foreign debt. Macri was duly kicked out of office and replaced by the Peronist Alberto Fernández, with Cristina Fernández as his VP.

The kirchneristas – favouring greater income redistribution and less concerned with the fiscal deficit and balance of payments – were to the left of the new President, who styled himself as a capable technocrat. Yet the former could not muster the same popular support as the latter, and they had little means of implementing their reformist policies in the absence of economic growth. The question for the right-wing opposition, now rebranded as Juntos por el Cambio, was whether they could rehabilitate Macri’s legacy, present a united front and capitalize on splits within the ruling coalition. Fortune seemed to smile on them, if not on Argentina itself, with the Covid-19 pandemic and the worst drought in national history, which sent annual inflation north of 100%. Juntos por el Cambio thereby cemented its position as the leading challenger to Peronism and made a strong showing in the 2021 mid-terms. Its hopes for the 2023 elections were high.   

Few saw what lay in store. Milei, a self-described ‘anarcho-capitalist’, opponent of ‘gender ideology’ and apologist for the Argentine dictatorship, erupted onto the political scene. Having led his coalition La Libertad Avanza into Congress in 2021, he began to build support among legions of discontented young men and first-time voters, with a programme that included shutting down the Central Bank and privatizing the healthcare and education systems. His breakthrough in the primary elections of 2023, where he won 30% of the vote compared to 28% for Juntos por el Cambio and 27% for the Peronist Unión por la Patria, was a shock. Milei benefitted from anger at the government while also exploiting the vivid memories of Macri’s administration. He showed up the fact that neither of these electoral formations had a hegemonic vision for Argentina: the incumbent was unable to fulfil its social-reformist promises; the opposition had no distinctive identity beyond its hatred of Peronism. For many voters, a third option was appealing.

These shifting tides prompted the two other leading candidates, Patricia Bullrich of Juntos por el Cambio and Sergio Massa of Unión por la Patria, to act. For the government, there was an urgent need to stop Milei from undermining Argentina’s democratic settlement – hence its promise to convene a national unity administration, bringing together Peronists and non-Peronists, following the elections. The kirchnerista forces within its ranks were either marginalized or fell in line. Massa hardened his economic nationalist rhetoric, stressing the importance of defending labour and development from unchecked markets. For the macristas, meanwhile, the problem was mainly tactical, since a popular candidate of the extreme right made them look like a weak imitation. Bullrich, attempting to attract both Milei voters and the centrist electorate, ran one of the most inept political campaigns in Argentine history. Milei, for his part, made an effort to soften some of his most radical positions – pledging that he would implement transitional policies to compensate for cutting welfare. But affecting moderation was not always easy. His television appearances were punctuated by fits of manic rage, such as when he accused Bullrich of ‘planting bombs in kindergartens’ – a baseless accusation intended to evoke her membership of the Montoneros guerrilla movement in the 1970s (she responded by suing him for defamation).

On the day of the election, most forecasts predicted that neither Mieli nor Massa would receive enough votes to avoid a runoff, though the first was ahead of the second. In the end, Bullrich plunged to 24%; Juan Schiaretti, a Peronist dissident, picked up 7%; and Myriam Bregman of the Trotskyist left won only 3%. Yet the two frontrunners saw their polling positions suddenly reversed. How to explain Massa’s surge? Various factors were in play. For starters, there were the pro-cyclical measures he implemented as Economy Minister, which succeeded in raising consumption and demand. Some of them, like the elimination of income taxes for certain white-collar workers and executives, were not progressive, but nor were they unpopular with voters. Others, like freezing transport fares and devolving certain sales taxes, tried to compensate those most affected by inflation. As a whole, their impact was to shore up his support in the short term while increasing inflationary pressures further down the line.  

On top of this, it appears that the protest vote against the government, though powerful in August, plummeted once there was a real threat of an unstable outsider winning the election. A former tantric sex coach and singer in a Rolling Stones cover band, Milei is open about his ‘unorthodox’ lifestyle. He employs a psychic medium to speak with his dead dog, Conan – a creature whom he had cloned for $50,000, thereby producing four other mastiffs, each of them named after a different libertarian economist. His violent rhetoric, climate denialism and unabashed misogyny make Trump and Bolsonaro look fainthearted. His political apparatus is almost non-existent: he has hired various family members including his mother and his sister, whom he quipped would be his ‘First Lady’ were he elected. As he grew more familiar to the electorate, and as his novelty value faded, Massa’s relatively staid and conventional persona began to seem more attractive. (There were even rumours that Massa secretly supported Milei in the primary, assuming he would be the easiest candidate to beat – although nothing concrete has emerged to support this speculation.)

Now, in the period between election contests, a broader realignment is in motion. The expectation that Juntos por el Cambio would establish a stable two-party system, alternating in power with the Peronists, has been fatally undermined. Tensions between the main components of the alliance, Macri’s Propuesta Republicana and the historic party of the centre right, the Unión Cívica Radical, have reached boiling point. Bullrich and Macri have endorsed Milei in a bid to bury Peronism once and for all. Yet for many other coalition members, who retain some minimal commitment to democratic and republican precepts, this is a line they will not cross. A split looks possible in the coming weeks.

As for the Peronists, the divisions within the Fernández government have been smoothed over, at least for now, by the spectre of Milei. There is cautious optimism that Massa – having already increased his tally by almost 9% since the primary – will triumph in the ballot next month. He is on course to monopolize most of Bregman’s supporters and some of Schiaretti’s. Yet the decisive factor will be Bullrich’s voter base. Faced with the choice between a Peronist and a wild-eyed authoritarian, whom will they back? The outsider candidate, who made his name by railing against Bullrich’s ‘political caste’, will now have to seduce her followers. Whether he has the strategic nous for this is unclear.

What is clear is the reshaping of the Argentine political system. For almost fifteen years it was structured by the antagonism between kirchnerismo and anti-kirchnerismo. Now that is no longer the case. The former has seen its influence diminished under Massa’s premiership, which marks a reversion to classical Peronism. The latter, represented by Juntos por el Cambio, has lost popular support and fallen prey to its internal contradictions. Over the coming years, Argentina might find itself in a situation not dissimilar to that of the US or Brazil: on one side, a reactionary bloc drifting in an increasingly anti-democratic direction; on the other, a centre-left coalition which, partly because it encompass such diverse actors, struggles to formulate a coherent programme. Even if Massa wins the runoffs, there is no denying that Argentine politics has swung to the right since first decade of the new century. How he governs, and the popular pressures to which he is subjected, will determine whether it swings back.

Read on: Maristella Svampa, ‘The End of Kirchnerism’, NLR 53.

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Humans and Trees

In 1992, Hayao Miyazaki visited Hachiman Elementary School to speak to a group of students. This was seven years after Miyazaki had co-founded Studio Ghibli with his peers Isao Takahata and Toshio Suzuki, four years after the release of My Neighbour Totoro and Kiki’s Delivery Service, and the same year he would release Porco Rosso. He was a god. The children, all aged eleven or twelve, would have waited patiently for the magic man to appear – perhaps by cat-bus, or insectoid aeroplane, or flying broom. But in he walked with orthopaedic shoes, eyebrows overgrown and hair greying, and reeking, as some naughty adults do, of cigarettes. He briefly introduced himself and then began to talk of death.

In the Jōmon period – the Japanese Neolithic era, around 14,000 BC – people only lived to thirty, he told the class, intimating that he, their hero, would already be dead. In those days, he continued, people died before they became grandparents, and most would have children when they were just fifteen years old! He pointed at one of the students. This was before modern medicine, and so most of these babies would die, and these young mothers would need to have lots and lots of children just to ensure some survived. And even if you make it through all those painful childbirths – no doctors, remember – you don’t get to enjoy life for long, because when you turn thirty your children will be fifteen and it’s time for them to have babies and you to die.

‘Why am I telling you these things?’ he asked the children, presumably all in tears. ‘Well, in winter trees dry up and shed their leaves, but in spring they send forth new buds and shoots. And people are the same, for they have babies, the babies grow up, and then they have their own children. Of course, babies look like their parents, so even as people die they in a sense reappear. Both humans and trees, therefore, seem the same to me.’

Miyazaki’s latest film, The Boy and the Heron, released without fanfare in Japan and currently touring the international festival circuit, is all about life, death, and rebirth. Like any good children’s film, it begins with the protagonist’s mother burning to death in hospital. Mahito Maki, a boy about the same age as those students at Hachiman Elementary, is awoken one night by a civil defence siren, and from his bedroom window sees the fire. He dresses in a hurry – Miyazaki carefully animating the awkwardness of buttoning one’s trousers in a panic, of attempting to speed down a staircase without falling – and then races toward the hospital, now alight with impasto pencil-scratchings in yellow, pink and red. As he runs, people enter the frame as already-charred corpses; they blur and flicker like flames. This horrific vision will recur throughout the film as a nightmare, as will fire – something violent, warm, divine, curative, illuminating, obliterating. (This year’s Oppenheimer, told from the other side of the war, opens with the myth of Prometheus.) In Miyazaki’s films, there is no good and evil, only the products of an oblivious natural world.

Mahito flees Tokyo for the countryside with his father, Shoichi, and his ‘new mother’, Natsuko, whose first interaction with Mahito includes placing his hand on her pregnant belly. He becomes quiet, avoidant, often looking to escape; he gets into a fight at school; he self-harms. All the while a grey heron seems to be mocking him – just circling and swooping at first, later crashing through his bedroom window and shitting all over the floor. ‘Your presence is requested’, the heron says through human teeth. Mahito isn’t sure what this means. He decides to kill the annoying bird by crafting a bow and arrow from bamboo, and in succumbing to malice he inevitably ends up in the underworld.

Here there is a milky-eyed wizard who builds the world each day from white marble tomb-stones, carved down to simple shapes, pyramids and columns and spheres, like toy blocks for children. There is an emerging empire of fat carnivorous parakeets who seek to overthrow him. There are little bulbous sperm-ghosts who represent unborn spirits (and will sell well as toys) and there are the vicious pelicans who gobble them up. There is a meteor that shines with the black rainbow of a polished pāua shell from which all the magic of this world is derived. And there is a Charon-like fisherwoman named Kiriko, who rescues Mahito, and who seems to be an age-inverted reincarnation – or parallel-carnation – of one of the goblin-like grannies who watch over him in the ‘real’ world. It’s all very strange.

But I am most taken by the island on which Mahito first arrives. It seems inspired by Arnold Böcklin’s Isle of the Dead, and also Dante, featuring a golden gate with an ominous inscription, and Virgil and Ovid, and perhaps most importantly Paul Valéry, whose poem, ‘The Cemetery by the Sea’ where ‘Time glitters’ and ‘Dreams are knowledge’, inspired Miyazaki’s previous film, The Wind Rises (2013):

This peaceful roof of milling doves
Shimmers between the pines, between the tombs;
Judicious noon composes there, with fire,
The sea, the ever-recommencing sea . . .

Miyazaki adapts the poem more literally than before: those ‘milling doves’ are old ships on the horizon, circling the island in a silent, spectral orbit much like the aeroplane graveyard of Porco Rosso. The sun bounces on the ocean’s surface to resemble ‘fire’, a commingling of antithetical elements, which forms a ‘peaceful roof’ for the bodies below. Kiriko warns Mahito to tread softly, lest he wake the dead. (‘Their gift for life flowed out into the flowers! . . . Now larvae spin where tears once formed’ – isn’t this a philosophy of death so like the one Miyazaki recounted to his preteen audience?) The island is an unnerving place and thankfully we don’t stay long. The pair undo their trespassing by walking backwards through the gate. Mahito is told not to look back, like Orpheus, until they reach the shore. The wind is rising, Kiriko warns, and they must set sail at once.

Valéry’s poem ends: ‘The wind is rising . . . We must try to live!’ The recurrence of this phrase – in the title of The Wind Rises, but also within the film, again as a warning to the protagonist – is worth lingering on for the fact that The Boy and the Heron originally took the title of the 1937 novel by Genzaburō Yoshino, How Do You Live? The two films form an answer and a question. Mahito discovers the book by accident one day, a gift from his mother, with a dedication to her ‘grown-up’ boy. We see him abandon reading it to chase the heron. It’s a well-known text in Japanese culture, often read by children, which asks people to act selflessly, lessons of wisdom passed on by an uncle to his fifteen-year-old nephew, Koperu. Miyazaki, now eighty-two, had announced his retirement after completing The Wind Rises in 2013. He first did so in 1997, and has continued this tradition every few years. But after that last film, people believed him. It struck an elegiac tone. Many of its narrative elements were autobiographical, as they are again here: Miyazaki’s father was involved in the manufacturing of aeroplane parts for the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, which the protagonist of The Wind Rises, Jiro, helped design; in The Boy and the Heron, Mahito’s father is seen hoarding aeroplane parts in the countryside to preserve his factory. Miyazaki and his father did flee the war in Tokyo for the countryside (though we can’t be sure that a talking bird changed his life). His mother did get sick, suffering for a long time from spinal tuberculosis – a similar disease to the one suffered by Jiro’s wife – but she didn’t die in his childhood, and instead shocked the family by living well into old age. Mahito is often seen whittling, which is a skill Miyazaki passed on to his son Goro, having learned it from his own father. Jiro is an engineer who dedicates his life to a creative industry which nevertheless harms the world, something Miyazaki feels is true of animation; in The Boy and the Heron, this self-insert is bifurcated between the young Mahito and the old Wizard – the one who has to keep building new worlds else everything will end.

The remedial nature of the wizard’s building blocks gestures to an old-world modality. He draws his power from the meteor, which we learn fell to earth during the Meiji Restoration, an era that marked the end of Japanese feudalism and the beginning of rapid industrialisation. It was a time when samurai were retired and spirits disappeared, when the syncretic, pluralistic approach to spirituality, a mix of Shintoism and Buddhism then called shinbutsu-shūgō, was replaced by the worship of an emperor. Castles were destroyed, deep woods were plundered and railways grew like striped serpents across the countryside, fuelled by coal, whose production rose 3450%. For Miyazaki, as for Timothy Morton, this marked the end of the world. ‘It was April 1784, when James Watt patented the steam engine, an act that commenced the depositing of carbon in Earth’s crust – namely, the inception of humanity as a geophysical force on a planetary scale’, Morton writes in Hyperobjects. The mid-war setting of The Boy and the Heron is no accident, of course. ‘Since for something to happen it often needs to happen twice, the world also ended in 1945, in Trinity, New Mexico, where the Manhattan Project tested the Gadget, the first of the atom bombs.’

Miyazaki is neither Karl Marx nor Ted Kaczynski. He has toyed with socialism and Maoism and now seems to have come around to an ecoterrorism led by nature itself. ‘I’d like to see Manhattan underwater’, he once told a writer for the New Yorker. ‘I’d like to see when the human population plummets and there are no more high-rises, because nobody’s buying them. I’m excited about that. Money and desire – all that is going to collapse, and wild green grasses are going to take over.’ Some of this thinking stems from reading Clive Ponting’s A Green History of the World, which traces the various histories of civilizational collapse brought about by climate catastrophes. (When I saw the empire of parakeets, I thought of Ponting: an invasive species that has repopulated the underworld, risen to power, reached its apex, and in doing so, doomed itself.) It likely influenced Miyazaki’s understanding of societal decadence, his curmudgeonly view that things will inevitably collapse and that this can only mean good things. He even disavows environmentalism for this reason, claiming that his own ecological pursuits – using profits from toy sales to fund rewilding projects, for example – are foremost in the service of a personal nostalgia: ‘When I participated, I felt more pleased by seeing a real crayfish than by some grandiose feeling that I was preserving nature. We were able to become simply happy rather than thinking we were providing aid to protect this or that. We could see that the river was getting closer to what we remembered as children.’

Industrialisation is a childhood’s end, and in Miyazaki we so often see this Promethean moment rendered through a Freudian hermeneutics. (His new film features a primal scene between the father and ‘new mother’, observed by firelight; when Mahito reunites with his biological mother, she’s made much younger; his great transgression in the underworld, which leads to its destruction, is one of ‘taboo’; and so on…) Is Miyazaki a sleeper agent of the Freudo-Marxists, or is this just the nature of children’s films? His producer, Toshio Suzuki, would answer more simply that he’s a ‘mama’s boy’. For the Soviet cartoons that inspired Miyazaki, The Snow Queen chief among them, the child was a symbol that existed outside of capitalism, a pure potentiality or budding revolutionary. In Spirited Away (2001), the young girl Chihiro is the only one in her family capable of seeing spirits, while her parents obsess over consumption and turn into pigs – basically red cinema with a sprinkling of Shintoism.

Miyazaki believes that Mahito’s mid-teen moment is one much like the Meiji Restoration, a maturation that prefigures entry into the labour force and the total deadening of the creative mind (or the spiritual mind, the natural mind – all the same). This is marked most explicitly in Japan by university entrance exams – introduced, of course, during the Meiji period – a time often referred to as shiken jigoku, or ‘exam hell’. (Climb out of the underworld, young people!) This is also the time, Miyazaki claims, when they fall in love with anime. ‘To escape from this depressing situation, they often find themselves wishing they could live in a world of their own – a world they can say is truly theirs, a world unknown even to their parents. To young people, anime is something they can incorporate into this private world . . . The word nostalgia comes to mind.’

Nostalgic for what? A time before adulthood, before industry, pollution, exams, emperors? In Marxism and Form, Fredric Jameson spends a long time teasing out a theory of Marxist literary criticism before arriving at his bravura example-analysis of Hemingway. He calls it ‘a mistake’ to think that Hemingway’s books deal ‘essentially with such things as courage, love and death; in reality, their deepest subject is simply the writing of a certain type of sentence, the practice of a determinate style’. Hemingway, Jameson argues, is attempting to reconstruct some lost lived experience through his prose, where writing is as much a ‘skill’ as bullfighting or fishing. This spiritual pursuit, the nostalgic desire for an old world where the ‘true’ and ‘good’ were possible, is borne out in form, and each sentence points to its creator as an artisan, athlete, hero. Miyazaki’s animation functions similarly. At stake in his work is the anima of all things, the essential lifeforce of a world soon to ‘end in flames’ (so his latest film tells us), which perhaps explains his obsessions with animism, Shintoism and mechanisms of flight – all are a kind of quickening.

Porco Rosso, for example, the story of a porcine fighter-pilot and the closest thing Miyazaki has made to a Hemingway novel, again has little to do with its ostensible themes of ‘courage, love and death’. Few children understand what fascism is or what it means to fight against it, fewer comprehend the geopolitical complexities of aeronautical warfare in the Adriatic, and fewer still catch the reference to Jean-Baptiste Clément’s communard anthem Les Temps des Cerises. But what so enthrals Miyazaki’s audience – as with readers of Hemingway – is the animation itself, which we might liken here to the magic of flight. Consider the propellor, a symbol we find emblazoned on Mahito’s bedsheets: through strict adherence to the scientific properties of aerodynamics (Miyazaki’s insistence on instilling ‘fictional worlds’ with ‘a certain realism’) the propellor spins, blurs and disappears – and in doing so catapults us into the sky. Miyazaki’s unique talent for animating animation has a similarly uplifting effect.

In the 2013 documentary The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness, filmed during the making of The Wind Rises, you can see Miyazaki at work. His process is quite simple: he closes his eyes, envisions the scene, then puts hand to paper. Nobody knows what the film will look like until then. Key animation, script and storyboard all arrive at once, direct from Miyazaki’s mind. Here is that old-world modality yet again – the wizard and his building blocks. In his refusal to capitulate to modern technology and his insistence on personally drawing tens of thousands of frames for each film, Miyazaki is equally nostalgic for what Jameson calls ‘nonalienated work’ – but his nostalgia goes further. If previous films lamented the post-industrial use-value of human creativity – be that the ecologically destructive colony of ‘Irontown’ in Princess Mononoke (1997) or the Mitsubishi warplanes of The Wind Rises – then The Boy and the Heron takes a more apocalyptic view. Yes, after the great flood, grasses will inherit the earth, or parakeets, or whatever warriors nature thinks to send, but despite this, humanity will be lost, and human creativity with it. Elephants can paint, just not very well – like most animals they have no eye for colour. So what’s a man to do? In The Boy and the Heron, the wizard is seeking an heir. Will Mahito rise to the challenge? For Miyazaki, the fate of the world hangs in the balance.

Read on: Fredric Jameson, ‘Gherman’s Anti-Aesthetic’,  NLR 97.

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That Which Haunts

Poetry, the American poet Louise Glück once told an audience, a member of whom had, preposterously, asked her to define it, ‘is that which haunts’. The response itself haunts, not least for being strikingly satisfactory. It ‘seems true and deep’, to borrow a phrase of Glück’s, from her essay ‘Death and Absence’. It begins in indeterminacy (‘that which’) and then tapers to a verb (‘haunts’) that is both distinctive and a little mysterious, achieving the air of the irrefutable while ‘loosing a flurry of questions’ (another of Glück’s phrases, this one from her essay ‘Ersatz Thought’). At once distilled and capacious, laconic and expansive, Glück’s definition of poetry shares many of the qualities of her poems.

Glück, who died aged 80 on 13 October, also talked about making poems ‘memorable’. She wrote thirteen collections in all, the first in 1968, the last in 2021, plus two slender books of essays, and a final short ‘fiction’ in prose published last year. She also taught poetry, from her late twenties onward, an experience she found she loved. Teaching was ‘the prescription for lassitude’; interludes of silence, some lasting years, were a feature of Glück’s writing life. Reflecting on working on her students’ poems in her essay ‘Education of a Poet’, she writes: ‘It mattered to get the poem right, to get it memorable, toward which end nothing was held back’. The repetition of ‘get’, producing that subtly odd, almost impatient phrase, ‘get it memorable’, enacts the kind of dogged focus it describes. (Occasionally lines would arrive like gifts, but making poems to house them was generally hard labour: Glück said her last book of poems, Winter Recipes from the Collective, ‘came in the most tortured little drips – I thought of it as rusty water coming out of the tap’.)

The ‘right’ poem, the complete or perfected poem, is the ‘memorable’ one; its raison d’être, to ‘haunt’. Neither claim, similar but not identical, is necessarily obvious. Many poems lend themselves to learning by heart – this is one function, or effect, of rhythm and rhyme – but why would being memorable be the sine qua non? And do we want to be haunted? That which is memorable – one is tempted to say, ‘merely’ memorable – stays with you; that which haunts won’t leave you alone. That which haunts affects, consumes, disquiets, returns unbidden, perhaps unwelcome. And insofar as haunting is often recursive – that which haunts comes back – it isn’t exactly memorable: in fact, we may be haunted by what we would prefer to forget, or are in danger of forgetting (or fear we are: Hamlet’s father’s ghost commands him to ‘Remember me’).

Haunting, then, is not a steady, nor altogether pleasant, voluntary form of persistence. ‘The advantage of poetry over life is that poetry, if it is sharp enough, may last’, Glück once wrote. Her poems are sharp in several senses. They are not only distinguished by clarity, precision and keen intelligence, often delivering a penetrating, sometimes harrowing insight with aphoristic authority (most famously: ‘We look at the world once, in childhood. / The rest is memory.’ – ‘Nostos’). Her poetry is also unsparing, and can be mordant, cutting or frank to the point of callousness. The poems in perhaps her frankest, and most relentlessly morbid collection, Ararat (1990), a kind of family self-portrait written in the aftermath of her father’s death, are studded with barbs, lines of unexpected hostility:

My sister’s like a sun, like a yellow dahlia.
Daggers of gold hair around the face.

‘Yellow Dahlia’

My son’s very graceful; he has perfect balance.
He’s not competitive, like my sister’s daughter.

‘Cousins’

Or almost violent candour:

My mother’s an expert in one thing:
sending people she loves into the other world.

‘Lullaby’

In the same way as she’d prepare for the others
my mother prepared for the child that died.

‘A Precedent’

‘My son’ and ‘my father’ are the only male figures in a collection otherwise dominated by women, including a sister, a ‘girl child’ in Glück’s painful phrase (‘Mount Ararat’), who died before Glück was born. (‘Her death was not my experience, but her absence was’, she reflects in ‘Death and Absence’. It ‘produced in me a profound obligation toward my mother, and a frantic desire to remedy her every distress’ – ‘a haunted child’s compulsive compensation’.)

Ostensibly about death and grief, Ararat is shot through with envy, jealousy, fearfulness, resentment. Poems ‘will not survive on content but through voice. By voice I mean the style of thought’, Glück once wrote, and the ‘style of thought’ – the dominant logic – of the collection is comparison. The speaker often begins by contrasting, likening, ranking, summing up, categorizing. Yet there is usually something awry with these attempts at summary; they seem beside the point, the significance misplaced, a kind of category mistake:

When I saw my father for the last time, we both did the same thing.

‘Terminal Resemblance’

This is a bizarrely roundabout way to begin: that the speaker and her father do the ‘same thing’ is a rather abstract, shallow fact about their final parting (not least because the ‘same thing’ turns out to be waving, hardly an unusual gesture during farewells). By the last stanzas, the opening observation, although outwardly unimpeachable, seems an evasion, a way of not speaking directly of the pain of the memory, much as the speaker’s ‘wave’ is an effort to hide or expel her emotion:

When the taxi came, my parents watched from the front door,
arm in arm, my mother blowing kisses as she always does,
because it frightens her when a hand isn’t being used.
But for a change, my father didn’t just stand there.
This time, he waved.

That’s what I did, at the door to the taxi.
Like him, waved to disguise my hand’s trembling.

Several of the poems in Ararat progress from static abstraction to a painful particular, from some seemingly unflinching summary to a muted emotional climax. Many lead with conclusions: ‘My sister and I reached / the same conclusion: / the best way / to love us was to not / spend time with us.’ (‘Animals’). The second poem in the sequence, ‘A Fantasy’, begins:

I’ll tell you something: every day
people are dying. And that’s just the beginning.

Glück liked poems that dramatize a ‘question, a problem’ in which the ‘poet was not wed to any one outcome’. (In ‘Death and Absence’, she recalls cutting lines that ‘summarized what the poem had to suggest’.) In the light of such preferences, the second sentence in ‘A Fantasy’ sounds almost like a self-referential joke. Glück seems to have set herself the perverse challenge of beginning the poems in Ararat in the most inert way possible, with beginnings that sound like endings, dead-ends (fitting for lyrics that are, after all, about going on after death).

Yet ‘A Fantasy’ doesn’t begin with the pronouncement itself – ‘every day / people are dying’ – but that strangely unprovoked promise of disclosure: ‘I’ll tell you something’ is an odder phrase than its colloquial aspect suggests. The ‘something’ can sound either confiding or a little menacing, either arbitrary (you’ll tell us ‘something’, but will you tell us what we asked, will anything do?) or aggressively pointed. Does the speaker have something to say or is she talking for fear of silence the way her mother compulsively blows kisses? And who would need to be told, who could fail to know, that every day people are dying? Several of the book’s opening lines have this unstable, inscrutable tone: forthright and somehow exposed, knowing and a little childlike, as though the speaker doesn’t quite understand the import of what they’re saying.

‘A Fantasy’ goes on to describe a funeral, but superficially and from a distance, mostly without the specificity that would suggest true intimacy with death:

Then they’re in the cemetery, some of them
for the first time. They’re frightened of crying,
sometimes of not crying. Someone leans over,
tells them what to do next, which might mean
saying a few words, sometimes
throwing dirt in the open grave.

And after that, everyone goes back to the house,
which is suddenly full of visitors.
The widow sits on the couch, very stately,
so people line up to approach her,
sometimes take her hand, sometimes embrace her.
She finds something to say to everybody,

Along with the accumulation of ‘some’ words (‘something’, ‘sometimes’, ‘someone’), the subtle lapses in logic (do people approach the widow because she is sitting ‘very stately’ as that ‘so’ suggests?) are little giveaways, indications that the speaker doesn’t fully comprehend the ‘something’ she set out to tell. It’s as though there is a child hiding within the world-weary manner, with its neat rhymes, or rather it’s the knowing posture that is part of what sounds like a child, a child’s botched precocity. The third and final stanza moves inward – ‘In her heart, she wants them to go away’ – and then ends on a note of unexpected ambivalence. The widow wants to be ‘back in the sickroom’: ‘it’s her only hope, / the wish to move backward. And just a little, / not as far as the marriage, the first kiss.’ She doesn’t want to revive her husband so much as relive his dying; to ‘move backward’ – not quite the same as ‘going back in time’, as though she wants to approach the past but doesn’t want to arrive.

Several of the poems in Ararat ‘move backward’, less advancing toward resolution than unravelling or backtracking from the certainties with which they begin:

Nothing’s sadder than my sister’s grave
unless it’s the grave of my cousin, next to her.
To this day, I can’t bring myself to watch
my aunt and my mother,
though the more I try to escape
seeing their suffering…

‘Mount Ararat’

Despite its sing-song matter-of-factness, the casual briskness of those two symmetrical apostrophes in the first line – among the formal signatures of the sequence – anticipates the speaker’s impulse to hasten past ‘suffering’. She can’t even bring herself to complete the sentence, to name what she can’t watch her aunt and mother do. Yet the second line of the couplet, which ends on that slightly hurried, forced rhyme with ‘sadder’ (‘next to her’), undermines or at least alters the first. The voice of a child is faintly audible, in the ‘unless’, which suggests the speaker searching for the right answer, as though there could be one. There’s the hint of a punchline, too, in the way the second line pulls the rug out from underneath the first by taking its proposition literally – as if it were a genuine invitation to comparison (and isn’t it her sister’s death that’s sadder than her grave?)

*

Escaping suffering – sometimes in the guise of confronting it – is among the major subjects of Ararat. Unlike her ‘brave’ friend ‘able to face unpleasantness’, the speaker is ‘quick to shut my eyes’ (‘Celestial Music’); she shows ‘contempt for emotion’ (‘Paradise’); she is a ‘living expert in silence’ (‘Children Coming Home From School’). The speaker in the sequence is in this sense an unreliable narrator (one poem is titled ‘The Untrustworthy Speaker’), and the drama of the poems arises from the way the language of neutrality, detachment or composure fails to convince. In ‘Cousins’, an amusingly nasty poem, the speaker compares her son to her ‘sister’s daughter’ who is ‘competitive’ (that she won’t say ‘niece’ is an early hint of the speaker’s hostility). But what the poem reveals far more vividly, because implicitly, is the speaker’s own competitiveness, formally disavowed by the even keel of the lines, which can’t quite disguise the tone of jealous vitriol:

Day and night, she’s always practising.
Today, it’s hitting softballs into the copper beech,
retrieving them, hitting them again.
After a while, no one even watches her.
If she were any stronger, the tree would be bald.

The measured pace of each line’s opening clause half-obscures the sound of bitter complaint, capped by that wonderful dry line ‘the tree would be bald’. The flat adjective exudes the venom behind the exaggeration. Next the speaker turns to boasting about her son, with a cloying internal rhyme followed by an almost preening dash: ‘I’ve watched him race: he’s natural, effortless—’. But her son always ‘stops’ – he ‘was born rejecting / the solitude of the victor’. Then follows the deliciously spiteful, socially unacceptable conclusion:

My sister’s daughter doesn’t have that problem.
She may as well be first; she’s already alone.

Reflecting on past efforts to write about her family in ‘Death and Absence’, Glück writes that ‘These poems, these many attempts, were frank but without mystery. The problem was tone… I kept taking appropriate attitudes, when what was wanted had to be, in some way unique’. As with the widow in ‘A Fantasy’, who only wants to go back in time as far as her late husband’s ‘sickroom’, the ending of ‘Cousins’ – feeling viciously competitive toward a child, and seeming to wish them ill – couldn’t be mistaken for an ‘appropriate attitude’. What makes Ararat’s remorselessly frank poems mysterious and unique is this disconcerting tension between sense and sound, between sentence and line, between implied emotion and composed appearance, which scrambles the voice of the speaker.

The speaker’s father is the absent centre of Ararat – ‘there was only one hero. / Now the hero’s dead…there’s no plot without a hero.’ (‘A Novel’). While alive, he appears remote, inexpressive, so much so that he seems to be waiting for death:

What he wanted
was to lie on the couch
with the Times
over his face,
so that death, when it came,
wouldn’t seem a significant change.

‘New World’

He is avoidant, perhaps depressed:

Late December: my father and I
are going to New York, to the circus.
He holds me
on his shoulders in the bitter wind:
scraps of white paper
blow over the railroad ties.

My father liked
to stand like this, to hold me
so he couldn’t see me.
I remember
staring straight ahead
into the world my father saw;
I was learning
to absorb its emptiness,
the heavy snow
not falling, whirling around us.

‘Snow’

The sharp line, the one that punctures the line before – ‘to hold me / so he couldn’t see me’ – brings out the latent desolation in the image of discarded scraps of paper blowing over the railroad ties, two parallel lines that face in the same direction like the child and her father, but never touch, remain permanently separate. ‘So you couldn’t see me’ makes us reconsider the whole first stanza – its scarcely established sense of intimacy and anticipation (‘to New York, to the circus’) – as well as the first mention of holding: ‘He holds me / on his shoulders in the bitter wind’. That line break now seems to foreshadow the winding blow of the later line break – as though the holding is retracted by the fact she is on his shoulders (does being on someone’s shoulders count as being held, or is the child holding the parent – holding on?) And is being on her father’s shoulders the pleasure we assumed it to be or was she too exposed up there to the ‘bitter wind’?

Yet the final verb in the final line – ‘the heavy snow / not falling, whirling around us’ – like the snow itself, ‘looses a flurry of questions’. Glück uses the word ‘whirl’ twice in her essay ‘Ersatz Thought’ to describe the effect of the implicit or the incomplete in poetry: ‘the unspoken, becomes a focus; ideally, a whirling concentration of questions’; ‘the unsaid’ becomes ‘the centre around which the said whirls’. She also talks about the way the sentence ‘initiates and organizes fields of associations which (in the manner of the void) may continue to circulate indefinitely’. In ‘Snow’, even as it could suggest a kind of frightening chaos, ‘whirling’ also revives the air of magic and excitement that opened the poem, and the possibility of wresting poetry from desolation.

Whirling concentrations, flurries of questions, indefinite circulation: this is the sort of poetic permanence – alive, ongoing – Glück prefers to the more commonplace notion of poems as ‘words inscribed in rock or caught in amber’. What is left out of such ‘images of preservation and fixity’, she explains in ‘Death and Absence’,

is the idea of contact, and contact, of the most intimate sort, is what poetry can accomplish. Poems do not endure as objects but as presences. When you read anything worth remembering, you liberate a human voice; you release into the world again a companion spirit. I read poems to hear that voice. And I write to speak to those I have heard.

Though they contain their fair share of haunting lines, Glück’s poems are for the most part not, strictly speaking, memorable. They remain ‘strange, and will never become familiar’, as the American painter Philip Guston once said of the work of ‘marvellous artists’. But a poem that endures, this passage suggests, is not ‘memorable’ in the sense of being easy to remember; it is rather ‘worth remembering’. What is worth remembering? That which we are liable to forget, that which we need to continually discover – unsayable feelings and intolerable facts, the ‘unpleasantness’ we are perennially unable to ‘face’.

And that which disappears. ‘It seemed to Marigold that you remembered things because they changed. You didn’t need to remember what was right in front of you’, Glück writes in her final work, Marigold and Rose, a kind of adult-children’s book about the inner lives of infant twins. Marigold is writing a book even though she can’t talk, let alone read, and is given to astonishingly adult – existential, morbid – thoughts: ‘I will be grown up, she thought, and then I will be dead’; ‘the twins knew somehow they were getting older whether they wanted to or not. They would someday walk instead of crawl. They would have teeth…Everything will disappear, Marigold thought.’ Far from being a time of innocence, pre-verbal infancy in Marigold and Rose is a time of concentrated, radical losses of innocence. If ‘we look at the world once, in childhood’, it is then, Glück’s inexplicably convincing swansong suggests, that we absorb the unacceptable fundamentals – nothing lasts, including us and those we love – in elemental form. ‘Everything will disappear. Still, she thought. I know more words now…And both these things would continue happening: everything will disappear but I will know many words.’

What survives is voice, and what distinguishes a ‘specific, identifiable voice’, Glück insisted, is ‘volatility, which gives such voices their paradoxical durability’. It is this volatility which makes a voice seem to speak ‘not from the past but in the present’, which ensures a poem endures not as an ‘object’ but as a ‘presence’. One advantage presences have over objects is that they are not only there; you can be in them. If you read Glück’s poems, you can not only hear her durably volatile voice, you can feel you are in her presence.

Read on: Anahid Nersessian, ‘Notes on Tone’, NLR 142.

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The Polish Continuum

The Polish parliamentary elections on 15 October have created a period of political uncertainty. Although the governing Law and Justice Party (PiS) won the largest share of the vote – just over 35% – it lost its parliamentary majority, and the poor showing of the far-right Konfederacja party deprived it of a potential coalition partner. Meanwhile, young people and women voted en masse against the incumbent, with an overall turnout rate of 74%. Should PiS fail to form a government, as looks likely, the task will fall to the Citizens’ Coalition (KO), which will try to assemble an alliance with the centre-right Third Way (TD) and the Left. PiS’s prospective removal has prompted sighs of relief from Brussels, legacy media outlets and international markets. The Guardian is triumphantly announcing that a KO-led government will ‘bring radical change to Poland’. Yet things may not be so simple.

Having come to power in 2015, PiS was able to increase its mandate in the 2019 elections thanks to a significant section of the electorate who felt that their living standards had improved under its tenure. It introduced universal child benefits and extra pension provisions, as well as raising the minimum wage. Yet while these measures have enabled it to retain a large voter bloc, its social spending waned during its second term. It did nothing to redistribute wealth nor challenge the power of international financial institutions and corporations, despite its nationalist rhetoric. Rising inflation, growing difficulties for young people to secure proper housing, a precaritized labour market and a crumbling health service – overburdened by the pandemic – contributed to popular frustration.

KO, led by the former Polish Prime Minister and President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, has led the opposition to PiS. A Christian-Democratic outfit tied to the European People’s Party, it has historically combined neoliberal economic policies with social conservatism. More recently, KO has attempted to court younger voters by tempering its free-market zeal and pledging to soften the government’s ban on abortion. Its electoral heartlands are situated mainly in urban regions, especially in the west of the country, and among highly educated and better-off voters. At this election it failed to make substantial inroads beyond such demographics, increasing its vote share from the previous parliamentary elections by only 3%. It now stands at 30.6%.

The Left gained a paltry 8.6% of the vote, a 4% drop since 2019. In recent decades, its strain of social democracy has struggled to gain a foothold in the Polish political scene. It was largely discredited in the mid-2000s when the governing Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) reneged on its electoral promises. The SLD continued the privatization and deregulation programme of the previous right-wing government. It did not reform abortion laws nor weaken the power of the Catholic Church in public life, and it actively supported the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This ceded ground to two political blocs from the right – the Law and Justice Party and the Citizens’ Platform (which later became the Citizens’ Coalition), with the left essentially becoming an appendage to the second. The 2023 election campaign exposed its signal failure to set out a coherent policy platform. Though it advocated more public housing and increased health spending, it also embraced the hawkish consensus on Ukraine and remained silent on whether a border wall should remain in place along the frontier with Belarus. Its support for higher military budgets made its social policies ring hollow. Having been fully assimilated into the KO agenda, it found itself without a distinctive pitch to make to the public.

The only real breakthrough was the newly formed TD, which brought together the Agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL) and a new political movement built around the media personality Szymon Hołownia. It won an impressive 14.4%, running on a neoliberal-conservative programme that drew some voters away from Konfederacja. TD promotes low taxes, market solutions to the housing crisis and an increased role for the private sector in public services. It supports reversing the complete abortion ban introduced by PiS but opposes legalizing abortion up to twelve weeks. The PSL leader Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has insisted that abortion and other social issues will not be part of any coalition agreement. Should the Left decide to join the incoming government, it will have no leverage to change this state of affairs. The dominant influence of KO and TD means that even if the administration passes some minor progressive reforms (such as restoring state funding for IVF), there will not be a real rupture with years of conservative rule.

The elections took place against a background of profound changes in Poland’s international relations. At the beginning of the Ukraine war, Poland was presented as a model for ‘the West’. It accepted large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, steadfastly supported Kyiv and supplied it with copious military equipment. PiS urged other nations to follow its lead, chastising Germany and France for their supposed heel-dragging. Commentators inside and outside the country began to hail Poland as a new European superpower that could shift the continental balance of power to the east. As part of this bombast, the government announced huge increases in military spending – around 4% of GDP this year – with the enthusiastic backing of the opposition. If all goes to plan, by 2035 Poland will have spent around €115 billion equipping its army and doubling its ranks.

Yet Poland’s status as NATO’s poster boy began to unravel last summer, as domestic farmers began to protest that a glut of Ukrainian grain was pushing down agricultural prices and threatening their livelihoods. With elections looming, PiS was forced to heed their demands, as agrarian workers constitute an important section of its voter base. Poland thus banded together with neighbouring states to place an embargo on grain imports from Ukraine. The EU followed suit – but when its temporary embargo expired last month, Poland reintroduced its own, along with Hungary and Slovakia. This led to a fierce diplomatic conflict between Warsaw and Kyiv, with the latter submitting a formal complaint to the WTO. In response, the Polish PM Mateusz Morawiecki threatened to stop sending new arms to Ukraine and discontinue financial support for Ukrainian refugees. Some in the Polish government mooted the idea of extraditing Yaroslav Hunka, the Ukrainian Nazi who served in the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS. Over the coming months, a KO-led government will likely have to confront the contradiction of satisfying Polish farmers while also avoiding conflict with Ukraine and the EU. NATO leaders are hopeful that tensions can be calmed. But it remains to be seen how Tusk’s attempts to curry favour with the ‘international community’ will affect his domestic political fortunes.

Though it took some time for PiS to turn against Ukrainian refugees, it has always been fiercely hostile to those arriving from the Middle East and Africa. The Polish security forces have illegally pushed back migrants crossing the Belarusian border, where hundreds of soldiers have been deployed and a towering fence constructed. In August 2021, at the request of the government, President Andrzej Duda introduced a temporary state of emergency in the border region to inhibit the work of journalists and activists. All this was in line with the EU’s demands to keep refugees at bay: an edict that has created a humanitarian catastrophe in Europe, with asylum seekers freezing in Poland’s forests and drowning in the Mediterranean. Far from opposing this agenda, KO pledged to secure further EU funding to help fortify the Polish border. Tusk has, if anything, positioned himself to the right of PiS on migration, whipping up hysteria about arrivals from Islamic countries and urging the government to stop the influx.

Despite enforcing the policies of ‘Fortress Europe’, PiS has repeatedly clashed with Brussels over its judicial reforms. The government has sought to challenge the EU strategy of ‘integration through law’, as well as the general supremacy of European laws over domestic ones, via a ruling by Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal that certain EU Treaty articles are incompatible with the national constitution. For these and other alleged violations of EU rules (regarding the appointment of judges, for instance), the Polish government pays a daily €1 million fine to the European Court of Justice, and the European Commission has refused to release €36 billion in loans and grants from the EU’s pandemic recovery funds. Yet the PiS, aware that its stage-managed confrontation with the Euro-bureaucracy bolsters its credentials as a defender of traditionalist values, is unwilling to back down. It rejects EU refugee quotas and LGBT rights directives, claiming that they represent attempts to impose multiculturalism on Poland and erode its family structure.

At the same time, the PiS government has claimed €1.3 trillion in reparations for damage caused in World War Two. During the election campaign, it accused Germany of supporting KO and presented Tusk as a servant of the Bundestag. One of its election broadcasts condemned Olaf Scholz for attempting to influence Polish politics and claimed that the only way to challenge German hegemony was to vote for PiS. Such rhetoric resonates with large swathes of the population, both due to legitimate long-term historical grievances and to more recent memories of Germany helping itself to Poland’s industrial and financial spoils during the chaotic years of capitalist transition.  

KO, by contrast, has styled itself as a modernizing Europeanist force – the voice of Polish liberal aspiration. Within days of the election result, Tusk announced he would travel to Brussels to reassure the EU that he would repeal PiS judicial reforms and, in return, gain assurances that frozen funds would be released. One of the primary aims of a Tusk-led government will be to return Poland to the European mainstream. Yet this hardly represents the triumph of liberal democracy over authoritarian populism, as some onlookers have claimed. For the EU is more than willing to embrace the latter when expedient: establishing a warm partnership with Georgia Meloni, tacitly approving Emmanuel Macron’s brutal crackdown on public protest, and turning a blind eye to rampant corruption – as well as the state-sanctioned abuse of minority populations – in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia and Malta. Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party was once a member of the European People’s Party which Tusk used to lead. On a substantive level, the Euro-Atlanticist policies of PiS and KO are not much different: rapid militarization, the retention of ten thousand US troops on Polish soil, shutting out refugees and sabre-rattling against Russia. The current government fell afoul of the Commission and ECJ not because of its right-populist politics, but because it challenged the EU’s legal supremacy and weakened the power of its institutions in Poland. This is the sin for which KO, by reaffirming its fealty to the Treaties, must atone.

Whoever governs Poland over the coming years will face an international situation fraught with difficulty. The Ukraine conflict will continue to take a major economic toll thanks to ongoing supply chain disruption, reduced energy supplies and higher military spending. If the new government does not significantly invest in housing and public services, hostility towards the large Ukrainian minority in Poland – whom the far right is portraying as the source of the country’s problems – may grow. A PiS opposition could easily capitalize on the discontent. It remains the largest party in parliament, attracting support from some of the most socially excluded sections of society; and it retains the Presidency, which has the power to veto government policies and – for now at least – controls the Supreme Court and public TV networks. As the euphoria of election night subsides, opposition parties must bring diverse political forces into a government that is united primarily by antipathy to the PiS. The latter stands ready to use its substantial influence to undermine this coalition and expose its internal divisions. Tusk looks set to become Prime Minister – but the last laugh may not be his.

Read on: Gavin Rae, ‘In the Polish Mirror’, NLR 124.

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Speak, Geology

The world of the German author Esther Kinsky is the world after Babel. The Biblical story goes like this: once, the people of the world had a single language. They found an empty plain and, having worked out how to bake clay into bricks, decided to build a tower in order to reach the heavens – ‘otherwise’, they feared, ‘we will be scattered over the face of the whole earth’. When God comes to punish them, this is exactly what happens. The tower goes unbuilt, the universal language vanishes. Kinsky, who began her literary career as a translator of Polish, English and Russian, invokes Babel in her book-length essay Fremdsprechen (2013), a manifesto of sorts that sets out her conception of what it means to exist between languages. It begins with an extended riff on the thwarting of the tower of Babel as humanity’s third collective punishment (after the expulsion from Eden and the Flood), one that condemned it to ‘difficulties of comprehension’, to language as a site of otherness.

Yet for Kinksy, the chasm between languages is not a bleak place, but rather a field of resonances, a ‘transit space’, a creative sound-zone. Everyone must face the complex reality of life after Babel; everyone, too, is capable of excavating their personal relationship to language, formed through the accumulation of layers of association and memory, which can be unearthed and probed as Kinsky herself does in a series of autobiographical fragments that conclude the book. Kinsky employs such geological terminology throughout Fremdsprechen: language is likened to clay, loam, bricks.

Language and discontinuity, geological excavation and reconstruction: these are themes that run through the triptych of novels that has made Kinksy’s name in the anglosphere. River (2017), Grove (2018) and now Rombo (2022) – the first translated by Iain Galbraith, the latter two by Caroline Schmidt – have tended to be received as nature writing. Yet Kinsky has rejected this rubric, and for good reason. Not only is her vision of the natural world far less pristine than that found in many of that genre’s naiver examples, but nature in her work is ultimately more of a charged setting than Kinsky’s main subject – a device, or metaphorical resource. Her interest is not in geology itself, but in the geological workings of memory, while her central preoccupation is language – the ‘shapeable material’ of post-Babel Earth.

Kinsksy’s three Geländeromane (‘terrain-novels’) are formally experimental meditations on disturbance – at once geological, personal and linguistic. All are set in the aftermath of loss, and show their narrators trying to come to terms with change. In River, an unnamed narrator – about to leave town for good – wanders the ‘partly mutilated’ mudscapes of east London’s lower Lea Valley, recording what she sees with both photographs and words, journeying into the ‘lower reaches’ of memory:

Hidden in the middle of the large Hackney Marshes Playing Fields, as in the depths of the instant pictures I had taken with my bulky camera, were memories I was only gradually learning to read: the steady drone of an invisible plane above the white cloud cover, chirring pylons lisping messages from the air, the wispy rustling of pale winter grass in the wind, and between it all a stillness that masked the proximity of the city.

Grove, written in the wake of the death of Kinsky’s husband, the translator Martin Chalmers, sees a recently widowed woman move to a small Italian town southeast of Rome; her fragmented, memory-suffused relections on the land and her place in it produce a teetering superimposition of images. Kinsky’s investigation into what she calls ‘disturbed terrain’ finds perhaps its most literal expression in Rombo, about the series of earthquakes that rocked Friuli in northern Italy in 1976, killing around a thousand people, with countless more displaced.

The cataclysm is reconstructed through the fragmentary accounts of several fictional eyewitnesses; this collective narrative is interspersed with a narrator’s intricate descriptions of Friuli’s ecology and landscape, its local flora and fauna:

Up the Rio Nero, the terrain is always wild. The path is forever being shifted by fresh rock falls and descending scree – a terrain of interference in the tenor of events. The scent of resin sits above the sunny barren land, where dwarf pines brace themselves between chunks of rock – the trees so small one might be quicker to attribute to the stones their scent. Beside the pine saplings junipers take root, small bell flowers, heather on blown-in soil.

There are also detailed accounts of Friulian culture and folk customs, including a traditional song dedicated to the mermaid Riba Faronika – sung while undulating one’s hands in front of one’s chest – and the bile maškire performance, which takes pride of place in the region’s carnivals:

The men and women who masquerade in white all wear the same costume: a long white skirt adorned with colourful cording, a white shirt and a colourful belt. On their heads, a prodigious bonnet, bedecked with colourful paper flowers. Some bonnets dangle colourful ribbons that hide one’s face; all roaming strangers by no account recognizable, white as the limestone mountains and not-white as the flowers from the interglacial period that managed to salvage themselves, whiling in the cracks of the limestone peak that towered over the glacier.

As in the story of Babel, the disorienting fallout from the earthquake is social, cultural, linguistic. ‘An earthquake rattles everything and turns it upside down, even the thoughts in your head’, one local observes. ‘My life is this place’, says another. ‘Here I know everything. Every stick and every stone. The animals and the people.’ But then suddenly she doesn’t. Amid the rubble, it is not only the roads and pathways that are thrown into confusion; folktales and social bonds stop making sense too. ‘Work, the neighbourhood, the animals, music – all that was now divided into the before and after’, one resident says. Many families leave the region, never to return. The village cemetery has fallen into disarray. Displaced former locals who have decamped to nearby coastal towns look out towards the sea – the legendary home of the mermaid Riba Faronika: ‘But they said nothing about it, not even to one another, and they didn’t sing either, not even quietly, because it was too late for that – and even had they hummed, out of homesickness or simply from memory, never would they have moved their hands up and down before their breast, imitating a wave or a snake: not here, beneath this endless sky and in the presence of the horizon.’

While River had a looping, forking structure and Grove imitated its photographic leitmotif by layering – or superimposing – different exposures of its subject matter, Rombo’s snatches of memory and information overlap, diverge and rub against each other like tectonic plates. River and Grove were each narrated by a single coherent persona, whereas Rombo’s fractured chorus of voices dramatizes the ruptures created by the trauma of the earthquake. Together, the eyewitness accounts produce a kind of shifting mosaic – one might call it ‘rubble narration’which tries to convey the catastrophe, and the community it destroyed, while stranded irredeemably in the aftermath.

As an act of critical reconstruction, one might compare Kinksy’s approach to kitsugi pottery, or to the chunks of ruin and graffiti preserved in Berlin’s rebuilt Reichstag. The cracks are the highlight; the conspicuousness of the commemorative effort is the point. Kinsky’s descriptive exertion – although occasionally wearing in its attention to esoteric detail – is similarly paramount. It is a method for refusing oblivion. In each novel, dislocations of self and setting initiate a process of reorientation. ‘Memory’, one Friulian local says, ‘is something that is being forever woven.’ After the first earthquake, the residents find themselves arguing about what happened:

One argued over the form of the cliffs, the course of the brooks, the trees that avalanches rolled over. About the whereabouts of objects, the order of things in the house, the fate of animals. Each of these arguments was an attempt at orientation, at carving a path through the rubble of masonry, mortar, split beams and shattered dishes, to understand the world anew. To begin living in a place anew. With one’s memories.

In the New Testament, Jesus says that if people keep silent, the stones themselves will speak. Kinsky’s fiction is full of articulate, evocative stones: bits of brickwork in River; the Ravenna mosaics in Grove; Rombo’s twisted geological layers. But can stones be made to speak of absence, of loss? In Rombo, the loss in question is not just that of 1976. The novel, after all, is not titled Sisma – Italian for earthquake; Rombo is rather the local term for the subterranean growling that comes before seismic activity. ‘The earthquake is everywhere’, our narrator observes. ‘In the mountains’, says one local, ‘something is always shifting’. The narrator offers various theories about the kinds of tectonic activity that cause such disasters; they also note that Friuli is home to some of the deepest cavities on Earth:

What constitutes a cavity? Is it the absence of stone, soil, light – or the presence of walls enclosing it? The darkness within or the light without? When does cant remember become forgotten, after all? In the early days of geology there was a science of abyssology. A theory of shafts, chasms, voids where forgotten things lie trapped, like tonsil stones. Things lost.

For Kinsky, nature ultimately provides no escape from loss, no solace or release from human tragedy (it is sometimes, as with the earthquake, the cause of it). What it may offer, however, is the possibility of coming to terms with this absence-filled world. Kinsky’s nature is never quite cruel, but it is utterly indifferent to humans’ emotional claims. As she once remarked in an interview: a landscape ‘touches our heart, but doesn’t itself have a heart’. Yet her strikingly unsentimental novels seem to suggest that to attend to the natural world, in all its icy, violent otherness, is to begin to find ourselves a place in it.

Read on: Jonathan Rosenbaum, ‘Rural Sensualist’, Sidecar.

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Impending Genocide

In Gaza, Israel is gearing up to commit genocide. It is not doing so quietly. It is repeating its intent every day, announcing it to the world in both its words and actions. Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant described those in Gaza as ‘human animals’ while declaring that Israel was cutting off water, fuel, electricity and food to the entire blockaded strip. Likud officials have called for nuclear strikes as well as a second Nakba. Israel’s President, Isaac Herzog, has rejected the distinction between civilians and combatants, asserting that ‘it is an entire nation out there that is responsible’. Israeli military officials have made clear that their aim is ‘damage, not precision’. All the while, Israel has subjected the 365-square-kilometre area to relentless shelling, dropping the same number of bombs on its 2.3 million inhabitants as the United States unleashed on Afghanistan in an entire year at the height of its murderous invasion. Hospitals, mosques, schools and homes – all have been deemed adequate military targets. At least 2,750 people have died so far, over one million have been displaced, nearly ten thousand are wounded.

Half of Gaza’s inhabitants were told to relocate to the south of the strip via military-approved ‘safe routes’. Israel then bombed these routes while people were doing just that. Many other Palestinians refused to follow the order. They know better than anyone that this is a straightforward attempt at ethnic cleansing. Nearly 80% of Palestinians in Gaza are refugees, expelled from their lands in 1948 and refused their right to return by their colonial rulers. In the south, the situation is dire too, thanks to continual aerial bombardment, shortages of water, food and electricity, and the influx of new arrivals. Israel continues to block the entry of humanitarian aid through the Rafah crossing, which has been hit repeatedly by air raids. 

Israeli officials, including Netanyahu himself, have announced that this is ‘only the beginning’. More than three hundred thousand troops have been mobilized and are awaiting orders to launch a ground offensive which could, we are told, last months. The resultant death and destruction would be unimaginable. There is a high likelihood that the entire northern Gaza Strip would be razed to the ground, and that the inhabitants of the enclave would be corralled into an even smaller area – forcing them to choose between death, unbearable captivity, or exile. Israel justifies this indiscriminate bloodshed as a response to the killing of 1,300 Israelis in the days following the Palestinian break-out on 7 October, and the need to prevent Hamas from carrying out further operations. Its current assault must be understood, first and foremost, as a response to the political humiliation it suffered at the hands of the most isolated section of the Palestinian population.

After eighteen years of siege by land, air and water, during which Israel’s stated policy was to ‘put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger’ by severely restricting food access, while regularly ‘mowing the grass’ – i.e., carrying out campaigns of assassination and mass killing – Palestinians in Gaza finally managed to tear down the barbed wire that kept them captive. Through that act alone, they endangered the political future of Netanyahu and his coalition, along with the process of normalization between Israel and the region’s most autocratic and repressive regimes. In addition, they punctured Israel’s illusion of omnipotence, exposing its vulnerability for the whole world – and, more importantly, for all Palestinians – to see. Retribution will now be conducted by all available means – including forced displacement or outright annihilation.

The question facing all of us in the West is how to stop the impending genocide. Our rulers have made it clear that they will allow Israel to carry out its plans – invoking the country’s ‘right to defend itself’ by carpet bombing a civilian population. The US and the UK have sent battleships to demonstrate their unflinching support. Ursula von der Leyen travelled to Tel Aviv to give Netanyahu the EU’s backing. Keir Starmer insisted that Israel had a right to cut off vital supplies to the entire blockaded population. Simultaneously, our governments have tried their best to repress Palestine solidarity movements on the domestic front: France banned pro-Palestine demonstrations altogether, Berlin followed suit, and the UK considered joining in. Of course, this follows a years-long attempt to criminalize the Palestinian cause and stamp out the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, under the guise of ‘countering terrorism’ or ‘fighting antisemitism’. Why is our political class so invested in suppressing criticism of the apartheid regime? The answer is obvious. Western states support Israel in order to maintain their power at a crucial crossroads of world trade. Challenging that power is impermissible, because any attempt to hold Israel accountable for its crimes is – by definition – an attempt to hold our own states accountable for their involvement in them. Not only are our rulers prepared to let Israel level Gaza; they will even provide it with diplomatic cover and military supplies.

What is standing between Gaza and genocide, then, is political pressure – an internationalist movement whose aim is to force Western governments to backtrack and restrain the Israeli killing machine. Last weekend we saw the first stirrings of this movement in its current phase. Across the globe, hundreds of thousands – perhaps millions – turned out to march. Sana’a, Baghdad, Rabat, and Amman were filled with protesters as far as the eye could see, bringing cold sweats to the rulers of the region, who see the connection between their populations’ demands for Palestinian liberation and demands for their own. In London, Amsterdam, Paris and Berlin, in New York, Brussels and Rome, in Cape Town, Tunis, and Nairobi, in Sydney and Santiago, people took to the street to demand an end to the onslaught, an end to the siege, and a free Palestine.

These scenes were extraordinary – but they alone will not be enough. In the US, activists have targeted the offices of key policymakers, staging protests and sit-ins, demanding that they drop their support for Israel’s crimes and take action to end the assault. Shaming politicians in this way will be an important tactic in the days and weeks to come. The recent history of the solidarity movement offers other methods that may also prove effective. In the UK, Palestine Action has spent years targeting armaments factories and stopping the production of weapons intended for use against Palestinians. Dockers in Italy, South Africa and the US have refused to handle Israeli cargo during previous military assaults on Gaza, disrupting the flow of goods and weapons to the country. During the winter of 2008-9, as Israel launched its first massive assault on the strip following the imposition of the blockade three years earlier, students across the UK occupied their campuses, calling for their universities to show concrete solidarity with Palestinians and for their government to cut diplomatic ties. They used the occupied spaces to host lectures, discussions and debates. Amid growing repression against the Palestine solidarity movement, such spaces could once again play a crucial role in enabling street-level organization.

It is up to activists themselves to decide which methods are most suited to their local and national contexts. Yet, across the board, there can be no return to business as usual. We have a collective obligation to ratchet up the pressure on our governments, and on Israel itself, to stop the genocide and mass displacement. In the UK, several trade unions expressed support for the demonstration last weekend, as well as their concern about the situation in Gaza. Can such concern be translated into meaningful interventions? Can union militants move from making solidarity statements to taking solidarity industrial action? If lecturers and teachers, dockers and train drivers – to name but a few of those who turned out at the rally in London – could organize work stoppages, demanding that the government reverse its position and stop the ongoing mass murder, then Britain’s leaders would not have the political space to give Israel a carte blanche.

Today, Palestinian unions have called on trade unionists across the world to show their solidarity by refusing to continue with the provision of arms to Israel. They have asked that workers in relevant industries make the following commitments:

  1. To refuse to build weapons destined for Israel.
  2. To refuse to transport weapons to Israel.
  3. To pass motions in their trade union to this effect.
  4. To take action against complicit companies involved in implementing Israel’s brutal and illegal siege, especially if they have contracts with your institution.
  5. Pressure governments to stop all military trade with Israel, and, in the case of the US, funding to it.

These demands must now be brought to workplaces and unions across the West, where they will find important allies among existing campaigns against the arms trade. Points four and five are not industry-specific, and can have a much wider application across the labour movement.  

The task ahead of us is clear. Genocide, ethnic cleansing and a second Nakba are not acts of God. They can be prevented. Our governments have so far refused to raise objections. Let us remind them of the costs of their complicity.

Read on: Gabriel Pitterburg, ‘Converts to Colonizers?’, NLR 59.

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Border Lines

‘The first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, bethought himself of saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society.’ With this celebrated incipit from his Discourse on Inequality (1755), Rousseau reminds us what lies behind the institution of the border, and just how vexed this concept is. There is, first of all, the introduction of a physical discontinuity in space: a line, a wire, a fence, a wall. Then there is a proclamation, an affirmation that what’s on one side of that line is mine. Finally there is society’s acceptance of this assertion: I become the rightful owner of the land when society believes me to be so.

Rousseau thereby captures what history has demonstrated countless times: that a border is not a physical entity but a social construction that divides an inside from an outside – a division that, precisely because it is constructed, is liable to alter, disappear and reappear. Indeed, there is nothing so changeable as the ‘sacred borders of the homeland’. One feels a certain tenderness leafing through the atlases of fifty years ago. Or one is struck by sorrow, as I do whenever I travel between Italy and Austria and think of the hundreds of thousands killed in WWI to move a border that no longer exists; or through Alsace and Lorraine, transferred from the Germanic Holy Roman Empire to France in the late 1600s, then from France to Germany with the War of 1870, and again from Germany to France with WWI. Of course, borders also spring up where there were none before, as in the former Soviet Union. The ongoing war in Ukraine is essentially a border dispute – over Ukraine’s borders and NATO’s borders. Its anachronistic, nineteenth-century flavour is due not only to its brutal pattern of trench warfare, but also to its character as a boundary struggle: one that has now brought the entire planet to the brink of nuclear holocaust.

As a social construction, the boundary is always the (temporary) outcome of power relations. There is a particular metric, almost inhuman in its abstraction, that can be used to measure the violence with which it is drawn. This is straightness. Where borders are sinuous and jagged, every indentation and protrusion tells a centuries- or millennia-old story of rivalry, conflict, compromise, agreement. Where borders are rectilinear, on the other hand, there has usually been no such negotiation between the two parties, but an autocratic diktat expressed in the exactitude of the geometry. An almost straight north–south border runs for thousands of miles between Canada and the US. Straight lines also separate various American states, especially west of the Appalachians, where the previous inhabitants were ignored, the land considered ‘virgin’ and the geographical lines drawn with rulers. Likewise with many African nations, with the division of Papua New Guinea, and with the borders between Syria and Iraq, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia, decided at a desk by two officials, Mark Sykes and François-Georges Picot, tasked with dismembering the dying Ottoman Empire in 1916.

But as borders change, appear and disappear, the border as the founding institution of world geopolitics becomes more and more problematic. It seems paradoxical that in the age of globalization, when the earth appears to us as a small blue planet, when human agency extends under the seas, into space and on the waves of the ether, the problem of borders seems to be more urgent than ever. It was at the end of the 1990s – the ideological apogee of globalization – that the new discipline of Border Studies took shape, giving rise to academic journals, conferences, factions and subdisciplines. At the turn of the millenium, all the trendiest sociologists gravitated towards ‘the border’, whatever their political orientation: Étienne Balibar, Manuel Castells, Saskia Sassen, Ulrich Beck, Zygmunt Bauman. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the advent of European integration, traditional borders seemed obsolete, yet new forms of delimitation emerged. Thus, Sassen:

One of the features of the current phase of globalization is the fact that a process happens within a territory of a sovereign state does not necessarily mean that it is a national process. Conversely, the national (such as firms, capital, culture) may increasingly be located outside the national territory, for instance, in a foreign country or in digital spaces. This localization of the global, or of the non-national, in national territories, and of the national outside national territories, undermines a key duality running through many of the methods and conceptual frameworks prevalent in the social sciences, that the national and the non-national are mutually exclusive.

This is what Beck calls ‘globalization from within’, whereby borders no longer follow the territorial limits of the nation, but multiply, diversify and become sectorialized. There is no reason why the boundaries of ethnicity, culture or religion should coincide with those of states themselves:

When cultural, political, economic and legal borders are no longer congruent, contradictions open up between the various principles of exclusion. Globalization, understood as pluralization of borders, produces, in other words a legitimation crisis of the national morality of exclusion . . . if the nation-state paradigm of societies is breaking up from the inside, then that leaves a space for the renaissance and renewal of all kinds of cultural, political and religious movements. What has to be understood, above all, is the ethnic globalization paradox. At a time when the world is growing closer together and becoming more cosmopolitan, in which, therefore, the borders and barriers between nations and ethnic groups are being lifted, ethnic identities and divisions are becoming stronger once again.

With the twentieth-century revolutions in transportation, new types of borders cropped up. Airports are an anomaly, since there the border is located not at the edge of the country but within it. One of the UK’s border posts is located in the centre of Paris, at the Gare du Nord from which the Eurostar departs; another can be found in the middle of Brussels. With Covid-19, we saw the creation of temporary borders, such as those that prevented people from entering or leaving China’s vast metropolises. Still, it is interesting to see how confidently the shrewdest social scientists of the time presented globalization as irreversible and, without openly admitting it, situated themselves within the conceptual horizon of the ‘end of history’ – a concept widely mocked but tacitly embraced. Just as they were tracking the rise of ‘globalization from within’, the ultimate cosmopolitanization of human society, deglobalization was already waiting in the wings – ready to erupt with the successive shocks of Brexit, Trump, Covid-19, war in Ukraine and decoupling from China. Meanwhile, the frontiers of yesteryear were getting ready to take their revenge, in the oldest and most mythical fom: that of the wall, like the Vallum Adrianum or the Great Wall of China.

Mind you, barriers had never ceased to be erected – in concrete, latticework, or barbed wire (the list is not exhaustive):

  • 1953: a 4 km wall between South and North Korea;
  • 1959: 4,057 km of the Line of Actual Control between India and China;
  • 1969: 13 km of peace lines in Ireland between Catholic Belfast and Protestant Belfast;
  • 1971: a 550 km line of control between India and Pakistan to divide Kashmir;
  • 1974: a 300 km green line between Greek and Turkish areas of Cyprus;
  • 1989: a 2,720 km Berm between Morocco and Western Sahara;
  • 1990: a 8.2 +11 km wall between the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and Morocco to block migration;
  • 1991: a 190 km barrier between Iraq and Kuwait;
  • 1994: a 1,000 km Tijuana wall between the US and Mexico.

But globalization has done nothing to curb the walling frenzy; quite the contrary:

  • 2003: 482 km between Zimbabwe and Botswana;
  • 2007: 700 km between Iran and Pakistan;
  • 2010: 230 km between Egypt and Israel;
  • 2014: 30 km between Bulgaria and Turkey;
  • 2013: 1,800 km between Saudi Arabia and Yemen;
  • 2015: 523 km between Hungary and Serbia;
  • 2022: 550 km between Lithuania and Belarus;
  • 2022: 183 km between Poland and Belarus.

Not to mention naval fortifications to prevent migrants from disembarking by sea. Still, perhaps the country that best exemplifies the level of sophistication – indeed, the level of perversion – that borders have reached, is Israel. This is how Eyel Weizman describes Clinton’s peace plan for the partition of Jerusalem:

64 km of walls would have fragmented the city into two archipelago systems along national lines. Forty bridges and tunnels would have accordingly woven together these isolated neighborhood-enclaves. Clinton’s principle also meant that some buildings in the Old City would be vertically partitioned between the two states, with the ground floor and the basement being entered from the Muslim Quarter and used by Palestinians shop-owners belonging to the Palestinian state, and the upper floors being entered from the direction of the Jewish Quarter, used by Jews belonging to the Jewish state.

In short, the proposed solution was to create a de facto airport, with the Arrivals and Departures located on two different floors that don’t communicate with one another, each with its own entrance and exit. So the border is not a line on a two-dimensional plane, as it appears on a map, but a dynamic partition in three-dimensional space – one whose complexity can be labyrinthine.

Where such ingenuity has been most striking, however, is in the construction of the 730 km wall separating Jewish settlements from Palestinian lands, which began to be constructed in 2002. Weizmann devotes a chapter of his magnificent Hollow Land (2007) to this wall and its consequences. Since those on each side of the partition must still be able to interact, the problem for Israeli planners is how to reconcile such interaction with isolation. For instance, when it comes to a highway that must serve Israelis and Palestinians,

The road is split down its centre by a high concrete wall, dividing it into separate Israeli and Palestinian lanes. It extends across three bridges and three tunnels before ending in a complex volumetric knot that untangles in mid-air, channelling Israelis and Palestinians separately along different spiralling flyovers that ultimately land them on their respective sides of the Wall. A new way of imagining space has emerged. After fragmenting the surface of the West Bank by walls and other barriers, Israeli planners started attempting to weave it together as two separate but overlapping national geographies – two territorial networks overlapping across the same area in three dimensions, without having to cross or come together.

In the face of such intellectual perversion, we must return to that fabled man who first fenced off a piece of land, and read Rousseau’s reaction to this founding act:

From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes, might not anyone have saved mankind by pulling up the stakes, filling in the ditch, and crying to his fellows, ‘Beware of listening to this imposter; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.’

Read on: Chin-tao Wu, ‘Biennials without Borders’, NLR 57

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Kasselakis Ascendant

Few people would have imagined that, by autumn 2023, Greece’s Syriza would no longer be led by Alexis Tsipras, nor any other high-ranking party official, but by a centrist business magnate who has spent most of his adult life in the United States – a man who is not a member of the Hellenic Parliament, who has no history of progressive activism (unless we count volunteering for one of Joe Biden’s Senate campaigns), and who was not even involved with Syriza until the moment he decided to become its leader.

Yet this is the story of 35-year-old Stefanos Kasselakis, who was elected last month after a democratic process that included more than 140,000 party members and supporters. A graduate of UPenn’s Wharton School who worked as an analyst at Goldman Sachs before founding three successful shipping companies, Kasselakis was keen to stress his entrepreneurial experience during his campaign. He also emphasized that, in a country which has seen three prime ministers from the Papandreou family, two from the Karamanlis family and two from the Mitsotakis family, he does not come from a political dynasty. This combination of ‘expertise’ and ‘outsider status’ was enough to convince the Syriza faithful.

How did this happen? Why did a party supposedly rooted in the traditions of the left anoint someone to whom they are entirely alien? According to opinion polls, Syriza voters wanted a leader who could stand up to Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s New Democracy government, whose current popularity outstrips that of the opposition by more than twenty percentage points. They came to view Kasselakis – openly gay, photogenic and social-media savvy, adept at attacking the incumbent while avoiding the langue de bois of the traditional left – as the best option. Yet this was also thanks to the flat-footed performance of his rival, Efi Achtsiouglou, the former Minister of Labour who was widely believed to be Tsipras’s heir apparent. Though she made a last-minute attempt to frame the contest as a face-off between the centre and the left, she otherwise ran a moderate, timorous campaign – insisting that regaining power meant relinquishing any pretensions to radicalism. If Kasselakis’s politics are roughly equivalent to Biden’s, Achtsiouglou styled herself as something like the Greek Sana Marin.

Under Kasselakis’s leadership, Syriza will move even further to the right. He will be aided not only by the cadre that rallied around his candidacy from the beginning, who believe that Syriza needs to blend populist rhetoric with a centrist strategic orientation, but also by former allies of Tsipras, such as the former Media Minister Nikos Pappas, who have decided that the party must slowly rebuild its electoral credibility by presenting Kasselakis as the ‘anti-Mitsostakis’. Yet Syriza’s rupture with left-wing politics has a much longer lineage. Ever since 2015, when it capitulated to the demands of the Troika despite the tremendous popular defiance expressed in the bailout referendum, the party’s leftism has been exclusively cultural, rather than political or ideological.  

This disjuncture between ‘identity’ and praxis was the trademark of the Syriza government. Ministers and MPs would insist that they were ‘on the left’ while implementing aggressive neoliberal reforms. Euclid Tsakalotos, who served as Finance Minister from 2015 to 2019, embodied this contradiction most clearly. On the one hand, he ratified the infamous ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ imposed by the EU, IMF and ECB, meeting all of their punitive demands without exception. On the other, he remained the leader of the party’s putatively left faction, running as its standard-bearer in the recent leadership election. Many commentators have scolded Kasselakis for elevating image over ideology; yet it was Tsipras’s administration that emptied its ideological reference-points of their political content or practical consequence.

This was reflected in Syriza’s declining popularity and eventual defeat at the ballot box. In 2019, after four years of brutal austerity, it won 31.5% of the vote compared to New Democracy’s 40%, and was duly ejected from office. In 2023, the party’s fortunes sank further still, picking up only 20% in the 21 May election and 18% in the rerun on 25 June. Though it was initially unable to form a majority, New Democracy ultimately triumphed over Syriza with a margin of almost 23%, the largest gap between first and second party in recent history. The latter was hit especially hard in predominantly working-class constituencies.

These results are even more stark when we consider the many potential reasons for discontent with the Mitsotakis government. Because of its understaffed and underfunded public health system, which was bled dry during the Memoranda period, Greece had much higher Covid-related mortality rates than most European countries, including the UK, despite harsh lockdowns and restrictions. In March, a deadly train wreck – the result of a long delay in implementing adequate safety measures – led to a wave of protests across the country. Unrest was fuelled by authoritarian crackdowns, including the deployment of so-called ‘University Police’ to campuses. Meanwhile, a cost-of-living crisis erupted, with working-class households spending an unmanageable portion of their income at the supermarket. Following the 2023 election, the government’s failure to prepare for climate change became blindingly apparent amid the floods in Thessaly, prompting assessments of Greece as a failed state.

At each of these junctures, Syriza did nothing to capitalize on popular frustration. This was partly because it had not developed ‘organic’ connections with the majority of the subaltern classes, failing to establish a significant presence in the trade unions, play a leading role in the student movement, or embed itself in local democratic structures. The party had an electorate, but never a base. As a result, it did not exercise a hegemonic nor even a pedagogic function for the lower strata. This rendered its relations of representation weak, its voters liable to become fickle or disengaged. Unable to cohere anything like a left-wing ‘common sense’, Syriza remained a detached parliamentary vehicle, associated with the betrayal of 2015 and the austerity that followed. Its refusal to participate in any meaningful self-criticism made matters even worse.   

Consequently, large segments of the subaltern classes could be influenced by the rhetoric of the government, or, even worse, that of the far right (whose parties won 13% at the last election). Once in power, New Democracy positioned itself as the voice of ‘stability’ – putting things ‘back to normal’ after the trauma of the Memoranda period and the pandemic. It benefitted from the fact that some economic indicators had improved since Syriza was in office. The unemployment rate is now at 10.9%, whereas in the summer of 2019 it exceeded 17%, and wages have increased somewhat despite rising inflation.  

But New Democracy’s success was also the result of Syriza’s abandonment of any strategic orientation. Its ‘left identity’ never translated into a coherent plan for government – not even a reformist one. Towards the end of its tenure, it refused to chart a new course following the nominal conclusion of the Memoranda. It made general references to moving beyond austerity, maintaining some public control over certain utilities and reinstating parts of labour legislation that had hitherto been suspended – but none of this amounted to a forward-looking policy platform. The party’s ‘Green Transition’ rhetoric was easily appropriated by Mitsotakis. New Democracy could thereby present itself as the only credible party – while Syriza, having failed to present an alternative programme during its years in office, failed to convince the public that one was possible.

In a party which has created an audience rather than a base, which has repudiated organizing from below, and which lacks a clear legislative programme, the role of the leader is transformed: he is no longer the expression of a collective political will, but rather an image or an avatar. His primary purpose is to use his personality – or ‘brand’ – to halt the process of electoral decline. This is the shift that Kasselakis represents. He has already suggested moving away from key policies such as opposition to private universities: the issue that ignited the student movement in 2006 and allowed Syriza to make initial contact with a generation of young activists. Addressing the annual assembly of the Hellenic Association of Enterprises, Kasselakis thundered that ‘the word “capital” should not be demonized.’ His emphasis on social media rather than interviews or public speeches, as well as the fact that he is not an MP, enables him to mask his political inexperience. It also prevents him from being pinned down on specific policies, creating a deliberate ambiguity about Syriza’s platform which facilitates its rightward drift.

Could Kasselakis’s ascent cause a split in Syriza that might liberate its left-wing forces? It is indeed the case that many members suggested leaving the party after the leadership election. The former MP Nikos Filis, who once ran the party newspaper, has excoriated the new leader as a ‘post-political’ demagogue reminiscent of Beppe Grillo or Donald Trump. For the time being, Kasselakis’s opponents are hoping that the upcoming Party Congress will allow them to win the party back. But, failing that, one should not rule out the possibility of a new left formation emerging in the near future – hopefully in time to contest the June 2024 European Parliament elections.

With each day that passes, the Greek government sinks further into its morass of authoritarianism and incompetence. Across the aisle, what was once Europe’s most promising experiment in left-wing governance has become the testing ground for a vacuous ‘progressivism’ spearheaded by an ex-banker. Meanwhile, the subaltern classes remain fragmented and disaggregated, with strong pockets of resistance but also large segments that are aloof from collective politics. The cycle that opened with the Memoranda and the movement against them is now closed. It is unclear what forms of opposition will emerge in its wake. But one thing is certain: Syriza can no longer be their catalyst.

Read on: Stathis Kouvelakis, ‘Syriza’s Rise and Fall’, NLR 97.

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Uprising in Palestine

In December 1987, a new intifada erupted in Palestine, shaking Israel as well as the elites of the Arab world. A few weeks later, the grand old Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani wrote ‘The Trilogy of the Children of Stones’, in which he denounced the older generation of Palestinian leaders – today represented by the corrupt, collaborationist Palestine (No-)Authority. It was sung and recited in many a Palestinian café:

The children of the stones

have scattered our papers

spilled ink on our clothes

mocked the banality of old texts…

O Children of Gaza

Don’t mind our broadcasts

Don’t listen to us

We are the people of cold calculation

Of addition, of subtraction

Wage your wars and leave us alone

We are dead and tombless

Orphans with no eyes.

Children of Gaza

Don’t refer to our writings

Don’t be like us.

We are your idols

Don’t worship us.

O mad people of Gaza,

A thousand greetings to the mad

The age of political reason has long departed

So teach us madness…

Since then, the Palestinian people have tried every method to achieve some form of meaningful self-determination. ‘Renounce violence’, they were told. They did, apart from the odd reprisal after an Israeli atrocity. Among Palestinians at home and in the diaspora, there was massive support for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions: a peaceful movement par excellence, which began to gain traction worldwide among artists, academics, trade unions and occasionally governments. The US and its NATO family responded by trying to criminalize BDS across Europe and North America – claiming, with the help of Zionist lobby groups, that boycotting Israel was ‘antisemitic’. This has proved largely effective. In Britain, Keir Starmer’s Labour Party has banned any mention of ‘Israeli apartheid’ at its upcoming national conference. The Labour left, scared of being expelled, has fallen silent on this issue. A sorry state of affairs. Meanwhile, most of the Arab states have joined Turkey and Egypt in capitulating to Washington. Saudi Arabia is currently in negotiations, mediated by the White House, to officially recognize Israel. The international isolation of the Palestinian people looks set to increase. Peaceful resistance has gone nowhere.  

All the while, the IDF has attacked and killed Palestinians at leisure, while successive Israeli governments have worked to sabotage any hope of statehood. Recently, a handful of former IDF generals and Mossad agents have admitted that what is being done in Palestine amounts to ‘war crimes’. But they only plucked up the courage to say this after they’d already retired. While still serving, they fully supported the fascist settlers in the occupied territories, standing by as they burned houses, destroyed olive plantations, poured cement in wells, attacked Palestinians and drove them from their homes while chanting ‘Death to the Arabs’. So, too, did Western leaders – who let all this unfold without a murmur. The age of political reason had long departed, as Qabbani would say.

Then, one day, the elected leadership in Gaza begins to fight back. They break out of their open-air prison and cross Israel’s southern border, striking at military targets and settler populations. Palestinians are suddenly top of the international headlines. Western journalists are shocked and horrified that they are actually resisting. But why shouldn’t they? They know better than anyone that the far-right government in Israel will retaliate viciously, backed by the US and the mealy-mouthed EU. But even so, they are unwilling to sit by as Netanyahu and the criminals in his cabinet gradually expel or kill most of their people. They know that the fascist elements of the Israeli state would have no compunction about sanctioning the mass murder of Arabs. And they know this must be resisted by any means necessary. Earlier this year, Palestinians watched the demonstrations in Tel Aviv and understood that those marching to ‘defend civil rights’ did not care about the rights of their occupied neighbours. They decided to take matters into their own hands.  

Do the Palestinians have a right to resist the non-stop aggression to which they are subjected? Absolutely. There is no moral, political or military equivalence as far as the two sides are concerned. Israel is a nuclear state, armed to the teeth by the US. Its existence is not under threat. It’s the Palestinians, their lands, their lives, that are. Western civilization seems willing to stand by while they are exterminated. They, on the other hand, are rising up against the colonizers.

Read on: Perry Anderson, ‘The House of Zion’, NLR 96.