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Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico is in a ‘stable but serious’ condition following an attempt on his life. The 59-year-old premier was shot multiple times on Wednesday afternoon as he greeted supporters in the former coal mining town of Handlova, before being airlifted to Banska Bystrica for emergency surgery. Fico’s politics have made him many an enemy among Europe’s liberal Atlanticists. Though he has taken some boomercon swipes at ‘gender ideology’, his foreign policy is the most contentious part of his programme. During his 2023 election campaign he pledged ‘not another bullet’ for the war in Ukraine – which he characterized as a ‘Russian-American conflict’ – and urged the EU to help negotiate a peace settlement rather than sending further military aid. Unlike uber-Zionist Viktor Orbán, with whom he is often compared, Fico has also criticized the hypocrisy of European leaders in refusing to acknowledge Israeli atrocities in Gaza.

While these positions are typically presented as evidence of Fico’s authoritarian populism, they reflect mainstream public sentiment in Slovakia. In 2022, just 47% of Slovaks supported sending EU aid to Ukraine; last March, 60% said they opposed the transfer of fighter jets. More than half the population believes that Ukraine or the West are to blame for the war. For the past two decades, Fico has dominated the country’s political landscape. His party, Smer-SSD (Direction–Slovak Social Democracy), governed from 2006 to 2020 – save for a short break between 2010 and 2012 – and returned to power after winning last year’s parliamentary elections, running on a pledge to protect welfare entitlements, end austerity and deescalate tensions with Russia. Blending popular social policies with cultural conservatism, it won 58 out of 72 electoral districts and continues to poll well ahead of its liberal rivals.

No wonder the media reaction to Fico’s attempted assassination has bordered on victim-blaming. A Sky News commentator suggested that Fico was a Russian stooge and that the attempted murder was the natural consequence. ‘He’s become very pro-Russian over the years; one wonders why and how . . . It’s not surprising that this sort of event might take place, because it’s a very unhappy country at the moment’. The question, he said, was whether Slovakia ‘will go towards a more authoritarian future, or a more conventional West European future’ – the shooting presumably having opened up this brighter possibility.   

The BBC meanwhile recalled Fico’s leading role in the ‘unruly and ugly’ demonstrations against the previous centre-right government, ‘rousing the angry crowds with megaphone in hand’. It claimed that he had ‘taken a sledgehammer to Slovakia’s institutions’, citing his closure of the Special Prosecutor’s Office and restructuring of the national broadcaster. Following a similar script, the Guardian likened Fico to Trump, and provided a rundown of his most ‘extreme positions’: ‘attacks on western allies, pledges to stop military support for Kyiv, criticism of sanctions on Russia and threats to veto any future NATO invitation for Ukraine.’ It noted that he had ‘worked hard to exploit the division between older, more conservative provincial voters and those in the capital, Bratislava, with its more progressive culture, and wealthier and often more educated population.’ This approach, we were told by outlets from the Telegraph to the Financial Times to Politico, had given rise to ‘polarization’ and ‘toxic politics’ which had culminated in the shooting.

This, of course, was idle speculation. The would-be assassin was identified as Juraj Cintula, a 71-year-old poet from the town of Levice who reportedly worked in Handlova’s now shuttered coal mine. Why he pulled the trigger is unclear. It was revealed that he had once expressed admiration for a far-right Slovakian quasi-paramilitary unit with loose ties to similar outfits in Russia – prompting Yahoo News to report that Cintula ‘may belong to pro-Russian paramilitary group’. Yet his more recent Facebook posts were supportive of Ukraine and the liberal Progressive Slovakia party. In a video clip recorded after he was detained, Cintula can be heard denouncing Fico’s domestic record.

If the shooter’s precise motives are unknown, the attempts to define them have nonetheless been telling. Moscow alleged Ukrainian involvement; right-wing conspiracists pointed the finger at the vaccine lobby; establishment commentators swung between implying that Fico had it coming given his support for Russia, and that Russia itself must be responsible. While they lamented Slovakia’s polarized condition, they did not stop to consider their own role in creating it. For just as the populist right have exploited ethnic divisions across Europe, the liberal centre has resurrected Cold War narratives that separate East from West, bringing this rhetoric to fever pitch. Acceptable opinion is tightly circumscribed. Dissenters are tarred as foreign agents. Violence against them may be outwardly deplored. But is it tacitly accepted?

Read on: Susan Watkins, ‘An Avoidable War?’, NLR 133/34.

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A Bronx Tale

In 1909, at a library in Manhattan’s Yorkville neighborhood, Abraham Kazan, a twenty-year-old union clerk who had grown up on the countryside estate of a Russian general in what is now Ukraine, and who arrived in the US aged 15 to work on a Jewish agricultural colony in New Jersey, met an older Scottish anarchist named Thomas Hastie Bell. A friend of Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman and Oscar Wilde, Bell had recently been arrested for political organizing in France and had once shouted in the face of Tsar Nicholas II. He made a deep impression on Kazan, introducing him to the philosophy of cooperatives – ‘that men can help themselves if they try to combine their forces and work together’. Soon, Kazan joined Bell’s Cooperative League, which met on the Lower East Side and operated a hat store and a restaurant.

As Kazan worked his way up through the powerful International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union and, later, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, he continued his studies of cooperatism. In 1920, after successfully wholesaling sugar and matzos to union members, he put his ideas to the test by opening a cooperative grocery store. But his dream was to build cooperative housing that would undercut New York’s notorious landlord class. ‘The question in my mind at the time was, “Why couldn’t 50 people . . . join their forces and put together the required equity money and buy a house and own it, and not be subject to rent increases or any other problems such as confront people who live in somebody else’s house?”’

The passage of New York State’s 1926 Housing Act gave Kazan the chance he needed. The law allowed for the creation of limited dividend corporations, which granted developers a twenty-year exemption from property taxes provided a third of the capital was raised from shareholders, and that dividends and rents were limited. Under Kazan’s initiative, the Amalgamated soon formed the state’s first limited dividend corporation and, only a year later, opened the Amalgamated Cooperative Apartment House in the Bronx, where rents were capped at $11 per month. Thriftily using brick that had arrived as ballast on Dutch ships, yet featuring oversized neo-Tudor façades and dumbwaiters to bring ice to residents’ iceboxes, the development gained a reputation as a worker’s idyll. Kazan himself moved in, and went on to build cooperative housing across New York City. But it took another forty years for his vision of a ‘cooperative commonwealth’, in which workers would live and shop only in collectively owned establishments, to come closest to fruition, when Co-op City opened just a few miles from his Bronx home.

The world’s largest housing cooperative is hidden in plain sight. It is tucked away in the northeastern corner of America’s most populous city, in an area disconnected from the subway. Comprised of over 15,000 apartments in 35 towers and hundreds of townhouses on a 130-hectare site, it caused entire neighborhoods to empty as people clambered to move in. This nearly bankrupted the city and the state, shaping municipal housing policy for decades – yet Co-op City barely appears in the many urban histories of New York.

Co-op City ‘fits awkwardly or not at all into the standard narrative’ of New York’s dramatic postwar decline and revival, Annemarie Sammartino writes in Freedomland, one of two well-researched books that give the development its due. It is an outlier, she argues, because of its consistency in providing affordable housing since the 1960s to ‘residents occupying the hazy space between the working class and the lower middle class’. ‘Even if the color of these people’s skin may have changed in the ensuing five decades’, Sammartino notes, ‘their social and economic position has not’. During this period, as New York City dramatically cut public services, from local libraries to the City University of New York, Co-op City ‘weathered New York’s neoliberal transition in a way that residents of other neighbourhoods often did not’. But it was not an easy path. Its outsized ambition made Co-op City both the crowning achievement of the cooperative housing movement and its swansong.

Robert Fogelson’s Working-class Utopias begins this history earlier, describing the rise of cooperative housing in New York as one of several responses to the city’s endemic housing crises. The Bronx of the 1920s saw a cooperative renaissance. In 1927 alone, the year that the Amalgamated Houses opened, Jewish Communist and Socialist groups inaugurated three other sizable cooperative apartment complexes. The depression and World War II slowed the construction of cooperatives, but in 1951 Kazan formed the United Housing Foundation (UHF) to expand the movement again in the prewar spirit. In 1955, two state senators sponsored what became known as the Mitchell-Lama act to stimulate the construction of affordable housing; five years later, a Housing Finance Agency (HFA) was created to enact the law by offering long-term, low-interest mortgages to cooperatives. As well as seeking funding from banks and the state, cooperatives relied on economic support from labour unions, insurance companies and of course the ‘cooperators’ themselves, as the tenants were endearingly known.

Kazan cultivated a somewhat unlikely partnership with city planner Robert Moses, who was typically hostile to unions but who shared Kazan’s contempt for slums, as well as his conviction that entire neighbourhoods could be razed. Both of them dreamed of scale. In the early 1960s, the UHF significantly expanded its developments: Brooklyn’s Amalgamated Warbasse Houses have over 2,500 apartments; Penn South, in midtown Manhattan, has nearly 3,000; a group of buildings known as Cooperative Village, on the Lower East Side, comprises 4,500; while Rochdale Village in Queens contains nearly 6,000 units. By 1964, the UHF had built twenty-three large cooperatives that provided housing for over 100,000 people in four of the city’s five boroughs, amounting to half of all affordable housing constructed in postwar New York. At the same time, the failure of public officials to rehouse the tens of thousands of New Yorkers displaced by slum clearance had become impossible to ignore. Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr. called relocation the city’s ‘number one problem’. Proposals for redevelopment were met with increasingly intense protest.

No one would have to be displaced from the land where Co-op City would be constructed. The site of a failed American history-themed amusement park called Freedomland, it was a marshy and uneven tract on Pelham Bay. Its vacancy made it attractive, but it would need to be rezoned, and it lacked sewer mains and other essential amenities, necessitating a close relationship with the city and state from the outset. The HFA agreed to provide $261 million of the $285 million the UHF needed to purchase the land in 1964 and build the enormous complex, which required transporting tonnes of dredged sand from Coney Island to fill in wetlands, and driving thousands of steel pylons into bedrock. The city agreed to build infrastructure such as schools and planned to extend the subway to the site (which never happened). The long-term, low-interest loan from the state, and a 50% tax abatement from the city, ensured that apartments would cost an affordable $450 per room, plus around $20 in monthly carrying charges, while Co-op City’s inclusion in the Mitchell-Lama programme meant that cooperators could earn no more than seven times the carrying charges. When the UHF broke ground in 1966, the New York Times reported that ‘officials of the United Housing Foundation say Co-op City will be the world’s largest apartment development, including any built in the Soviet Union since World War II’.

Co-op City attracted fierce criticism for its twenty-four-, twenty-six- and thirty-three-storey high-rise towers designed by Hermon Jessor, whose style Sammartino compares to that of late modernist social housing in the GDR. Sammartino notes that Jane Jacobs, in The Life and Death of Great American Cities, ‘reserves particular contempt for the UHF’s Lower East Side cooperatives . . . She chastises the affiliated cooperative supermarket for its lack of friendliness’. Fogelson recalls that a group of academic architects told the mayor and governor that Co-op City represented ‘the negation of the ideals of the Great Society’. But the old union executives running the UHF could not have cared less. They understood their role as providing ‘the best possible housing at the lowest possible price’ and allowing people to shop at the cooperatively run grocery stores, banks, daycares, pharmacies and opticians that eventually opened in the complex. UHF leaders harboured ‘an almost perverse pride in Co-op City’s lack of charm’, writes Sammartino. As Harold Ostroff, Kazan’s longtime assistant and the executive vice-president of the UHF, explained, ‘We do not subscribe to the theory that people become frustrated, alienated or dehumanized by the size and shape of buildings. What is important is for people to have the opportunity to live in dignity and self-respect with their neighbours’. Less than two months after Co-op City was unveiled, almost 15,000 people had applied to live there. After the groundbreaking ceremony, Ostroff declared optimistically that the UHF was ready to build forty Co-op Cities to solve New York’s slum problem once and for all.

A lot happened between 1964, when the UHF bought the Freedomland tract, and 1968, when Co-op City opened. Co-op City had been promoted as a solution to white flight from urban neighborhoods but came to be seen as a cause of it. Sammartino writes that despite the universalist aims of the UHF, ‘in practice most residents of UHF cooperatives were Jewish, or involved in the labour movement, or both’. In her estimate, Co-op City was over 70% Jewish when it opened, and a large number of these residents moved from the West Bronx, especially the area around Grand Concourse. This alarmed the administration of John Lindsay, the liberal Republican mayor elected in 1965, who was concerned that entire Bronx neighborhoods would be destabilized by such a dramatic demographic shift, and that non-whites would be left out of Co-op City. Herman Badillo, the Bronx Borough president, told Lindsay, ‘Everybody knows that the word “co-op” is a synonym for “Jewish housing”’. Under pressure from the NAACP, the UHF advertised outside of Jewish labour circles to attract more black tenants while continuing to stress that its priority was economic integration. In 1970, when the Black Caucus at Co-op City denounced a board election that saw no people of colour elected, they put forward a controversial resolution that called for an additional seat set aside for ‘any non-white Jew, or any person other than the Jewish faith’. The resolution passed. By 1972, when tenants moved into the final section of Co-op City, the racial demographics reflected those of the city as a whole.

That year, construction costs had run about $150 million over the original estimate. Cracks were beginning to appear in walls in each tower, pylons were sinking, and miles of pipes already needed to be replaced. There were also instances of alleged corruption, such as the hiring of Kazan’s nephew to design a power plant that never worked, and the cost of Kazan’s extravagant, shareholder-backed retirement party in 1968. (He died in 1971.) Perhaps most significantly, interest rates shot up on the government-backed bonds that financed Co-op City, which meant that the UHF planned to pass on the cost of its ballooning mortgage to cooperators in the form of rising carrying charges.

The UHF and Riverbay, the corporation it formed to run Co-op City, required new residents to undertake multipart courses on cooperative philosophy. But as Sammartino and Fogelson both observe, the utopian rhetoric of Co-op City tended to dissipate in the face of mundane matters such as carrying charges, which the UHF, now headed by Ostroff, raised by 15% in 1970, 35% over three years beginning in 1971, and an additional 20% in 1973. Ostroff was just as radical as his boss, Kazan. Raised in the Amalgamated Houses by anarcho-syndicalist immigrant parents, he had wanted to convert even the sprawling cemeteries in Brooklyn and Queens, along with a slice of Central Park, into cooperative housing. Now he was in the difficult position of negotiating with cooperators and tried to blame the rising carrying costs on the state and its mortgages. Yet as Sammartino writes, ‘the majority of residents saw the UHF as part of the same power structure that was imposing the cost increase in the first place’. In 1974, cooperators formed a Steering Committee to address the rising charges, by striking if necessary.

The following year, a charismatic, thirty-two-year-old union typographer by the name of Charles Rosen became head of the Committee. The child of Jewish immigrant anarchists, Rosen was widely read in the history of the left and a member of the Maoist Progressive Labor Party. Carrying charges had gone up 250% since Co-op City opened, and that summer Rosen helped spur a strike. Sammartino observes that ‘the New York Jews who made up most of Co-op City’s population were generally undeterred by his political views, which were – if somewhat more colorful than most – certainly not as far removed from the mainstream as they might have been in many other places in America at the time’. Residents were easy to organize in the lobbies of the towers they had to pass through daily, and support for a strike was overwhelming. Cooperators were instructed to write out rent checks, which were collected and hidden in secret locations, while mimeograph machines churned out literature around the clock thanks to Rosen’s expertise as a printer. Sammartino argues that ‘Rosen’s Marxism was central to his understanding of why the rent strike had to happen and how it would be won’. UHF leaders maintained a paternalistic attitude, criticizing residents for showing a ‘lack of cooperative values’. Despite threats of eviction, and a trial of Rosen and other strike leaders for contempt, cooperators hung on until the HFA made moves to foreclose on Co-op City. Thirteen months into the strike, the Steering Committee and New York Governor Hugh Carey struck a deal that would allow cooperators to run Co-op City if they handed over their checks, which they did, in hundreds of boxes that filled up the Bronx County Courthouse.

While Fogelson ends his book after the rent strike, Sammartino carries the narrative forward to 1995. The Steering Committee ran into the same problems as the UHF. Unable to pay its mortgage or afford construction repairs (which the state eventually funded), Co-op City stopped paying city taxes. In 1979, Mayor Ed Koch threatened Co-op City with foreclosure again before coming to an agreement to gradually raise carrying charges over the next six years in exchange for a state loan to offset operating expenses.

The demographic shifts that had affected so many other parts of New York City eventually reached Co-op City. According to census data, in 1990, the complex’s black and white populations had evened out at 40% each, with 18% of residents identifying as Hispanic (and an additional 2% in none of these categories). Sammartino cautions against understanding this as ‘white flight’, noting that the elderly population of Co-op City was always whiter than the rest of the development. ‘What caused Co-op City to become less white was not so much that white people moved out but that so few white people moved in’, she writes. Nonetheless, some of the conditions that caused white flight in other areas, such as a rise in crime, did touch Co-op City, although not as much, in part due to close coordination of residents, both black and white, with local law enforcement. ‘Two decades after it had been constructed, there were few utopians left in Co-op City. Instead, Co-op City’s residents were hard-bitten realists’. Today, monthly carrying charges for a one-bedroom apartment in Co-op City are well below the citywide average. Co-op City is majority-black and still home to a Jewish community and radical labour leaders such as Bhairavi Desai, the head of the New York Taxi Workers Alliance. Charles Rosen lives there to this day.

At the heart of Co-op City is the tension between the old utopianism and the new. Union leaders’ vision of economic equality conflicted with, but eventually accommodated, the demands for racial justice that characterized New York liberal politics of the 1960s. It was this balance that helped it survive ‘the supposed transition between the urban liberal era to the neoliberal era’, argues Sammartino. Another key factor was Co-op City’s sheer size, which gave it political power in Albany, the capital of New York state, and, due to the quantity of its debt, leverage in the rent strike. Sammartino also suggests that the persistence of a belief in the value of living in a multiracial community helped Co-op City residents avoid the racial tension that plagued other New York neighbourhoods. But these ideals were isolated from the broader philosophy of a cooperative commonwealth. Even at the height of Co-op City’s financial troubles and existential crises, ‘Riverbay and others rarely made a larger case about the importance of either subsidized housing or the cooperative model’.

Fogelson’s conclusion is harsh – Co-op City ‘was not the wave of the future, not in New York City and not anywhere else in the United States’ – while Sammartino’s is more optimistic: ‘It is possible to imagine a way in which Co-op City would represent the vanguard of a better America rather than its past’. Yet both authors acknowledge the utopianism at the heart of the cooperative endeavor. Sammartino lingers on Co-op City’s streets, named after figures such Edward Bellamy, Eugene Debs, Theodore Dreiser, George Washington Carver and Sholem Asch. Bellamy’s 1888 novel, Looking Backward, tells the story of a man who falls into a century-long sleep only to awaken in the year 2000 and find the United States has become a socialist utopia. To walk Bellamy Loop and Debs Place today, or for that matter Kazan Street on the Lower East Side, surrounded by thousands of affordable homes, is to tour a past generation’s version of the future. In such moments, one feels that it is those outside of the cooperatives who have yet to awaken from their slumber.

Read on: Alexander Zevin, ‘Unchanging New York’, Sidecar.

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Radio Waves

Among the explanations the early NLR gave for the parochialism and inertia of post-war intellectual life in Britain was its reception of the wrong kind of Central European immigrant. In ‘Components of the National Culture’ (1968), Perry Anderson noted that over the course of the thirties and forties, ‘in this intensely provincial society’, émigré intellectuals – from Nazi Berlin, Austro-Fascist Vienna, Horthy’s Budapest, occupied Prague and Warsaw – ‘suddenly became omnipresent’. The ‘quality and originality’ of their work varied greatly, ‘but their collective role’ was ‘indisputable’. ‘A process of natural selection occurred, in which those intellectuals who had some elective affinity to English modes of thought and political outlook gravitated here. Those refugees who did not went elsewhere.’ The Americans got Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer, Wilhelm Reich and Brecht; we got Ludwig Wittgenstein, E.H. Gombrich, Karl Popper and H.J. Eysenck. Empiricists, Anglophiles, ‘classical liberals’, these émigrés would flatter English culture and reinforce its conservatism. This, after all, was what had drawn them to Britain in the first place, as an alternative to the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary turbulence of their home countries.

This picture was in part the product of Anderson’s exclusion of natural sciences and creative art in order to focus on areas of culture that ‘directly provide our basic concepts of man and society’ – history, economics, political theory, psychoanalysis and so on. Anderson’s argument was strongest on the fields of art history and philosophy. The examples of Popper, Gombrich and Nikolaus Pevsner, were most telling, all eventually receiving what Anderson called ‘the appropriate apotheosis’, a knighthood. Each took discordant, disruptive forms – Viennese positivist philosophy, Warburgian art history, Bauhaus design – and made them cosier and safer, inoculating Britain against their original avant-gardism. 

In visual cultures, however, the hue of the British intake was not so pale. To cite some obvious examples: filmmakers, publishers and even municipal planning departments employed Otto and Marie Neurath’s Isotype Institute, which developed a pictographic language for educating children, after their escape to Oxford on the eve of war in 1939. The development of modern sculpture in Britain is scarcely imaginable without Naum Gabo’s ten years living in Hampstead and Cornwall. In architecture, Ernő Goldfinger and Berthold Lubetkin became the major figures of twentieth-century socialist modernism while in exile, and Walter Segal used his modernist training in an embrace of anarchic self-built housing. None were liberal or conservative: the Neuraths were on the far left of social democracy; Gabo and Segal were Anarchists; Goldfinger and Lubetkin were both Communists. In cinema, Alexander Korda hired the Bauhaus exile Moholy-Nagy long before Hollywood discovered Modern Art, while Expressionism and Surrealism could be found in surprisingly unadulterated forms in the films of The Archers, Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger’s production company, which employed a team of Weimar cinematographers, musicians and set designers.

Reputations have risen and fallen. Gombrich and Pevsner’s work has endured, but few even on the right read Popper today, preferring the more hard-headed apologetics for capitalism of his Viennese compatriot, the former LSE lecturer Friedrich Hayek. In the arts, the stock of municipal modern architects like Segal, Goldfinger or Lubetkin, or commercial filmmakers like the Hungarians Pressburger and Korda, is far higher now than it was in 1968. It is also true that many important Central European émigrés lived in Britain for periods ranging from a few months to a few years, before escaping to more expansive horizons over the Atlantic at the end of the 1930s. This included Frankfurt scholars like Adorno and Franz Neumann (whose Behemoth was published by the Left Book Club), Brecht himself (a lifelong Anglophile whose stay in North London was sadly brief), Gropius and Moholy-Nagy (who had lived with other exiles in the Constructivist Lawn Road Flats in Belsize Park); their work here, like Gropius’s Impington Village College in Cambridge or Brecht’s poem ‘On the Caledonian Market’, is better known today.

Some major Weimar artists created their weakest work in Britain, like John Heartfield, whose London montages are seldom included in his anthologies, even though he lived here for ten years; others created important work more obscurely, either publishing in German, like the socialist poet Erich Fried, or going undiscovered until after their death, as in the case of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, whose Intellectual and Manual Labour, composed during his London exile, was rejected by Lawrence & Wishart. Most unusual of all was the radical Central European intellectual actually interested in British culture and history, and who made it central to their worldview – a rare case is Karl Polanyi’s account of the world-historical consequences of upheavals in early 19th-century Berkshire in The Great Transformation (which he began in England and completed in the US). For most, London – usually somewhere near the ‘Finchleystrasse’ in Hampstead – was a refuge, but a rather dull and uninteresting one. Indeed, the dullness was the point.

New discoveries are constantly being made. The bestselling success, upon its re-issue a few years ago, of Ulrich Alexander Boschwitz’s forgotten novel The Passenger is a spectacular example. In 2019, the nationwide ‘Insiders-Outsiders’ arts festival celebrated a cast of little-known British émigrés, which included ‘red’ exiles like the Polish Socialist Realist Josef Herman, who painted epic frescoes of the miners of South Wales, and the German late Expressionist Eva Frankfurther, whose vivid street portraits were early documents of multicultural East London. Now arriving among these rediscoveries is Esther Leslie and Sam Dolbear’s exhumation of Ernst Schoen: Frankfurt radio pioneer, socialist intellectual, close friend of Walter Benjamin, and long-term resident of East Molesey, Surrey.

Dissonant Waves: Ernst Schoen and Experimental Sound in the 20th Century does not, however, present an easily accessible oeuvre, let alone does it resemble Alan Powers’s Bauhaus Goes West (2019), an attempt to make the case for parochial British culture at mid-century. Rather, it’s a story of failure, of someone who in the Weimar era was involved in some extraordinary projects, and then was unable to piece the fragments of his shattered world back together in the decades that followed. He owed Britain his life, but little else. The book begins with Schoen’s son leaving answerphone messages for Leslie at her Birkbeck office, asking if she was aware of his father’s work; after this, she and Dolbear (who is working on an account of another émigré and friend of Benjamin’s, the psychologist Charlotte Wolff) embarked on a series of meetings with the younger Schoen at his home in East Finchley. These led them to an archive in Koblenz and an apartment block in Surrey. Dissonant Waves is not a conventional biography; its non-linear approach evokes the fragmentation of Schoen’s own life, a montage method Schoen introduced to mainstream broadcasting in the 1920s.

The book’s centrepiece is a long chapter, ‘Radio and Experiment: Weimar’, whose approach will be recognisable to readers of Leslie’s heavily illustrated, punk-and-Dada-infused, explicitly Marxist accounts of Weimar culture in books like Hollywood Flatlands (2002) and Synthetic Worlds (2005). The story of Schoen’s life is chopped-up, One-Way Street-style, with sections on the motifs of the era, from the radio tower to the popular magazine, with biographical details featuring elliptically, and not chronologically – an account of Schoen’s birth and early life does not appear until around sixty pages in. His career in radio was enlivened by a close alliance with the avant-garde. He was a contributor to the great Berlin-based Constructivist journal G. In one article, ‘The Theatre Muse’, he blasts the sentimentality of Expressionism – ‘the Teutonic religious-pacifist epidemic’, with its ‘flood of brotherly dramas (that was our revolution)’. In typically unsentimental style, he also contributed a mock advertisement for ‘Musical Portraits’ and ‘Musical Advertisements’, ‘individually and universally designed by Ernst Schoen’. Schoen enjoyed a long friendship from childhood with Walter Benjamin (and an affair with Dora Benjamin, whom we eventually find in post-war Britain, running a hotel), and readers of Benjamin will know Schoen, if at all, for his role in producing, directing or otherwise collaborating in many of the broadcasts later collected in the anthology Radio Benjamin. Schoen wrote the music and created sound effects for Benjamin’s ‘Much Ado About Little Kaspar’ and directed ‘A Pay Raise?!’. The otherwise unsympathetic Adorno credited Schoen’s commissions with Benjamin’s only years of financial security (and accordingly, happiness) at the end of the 1920s.

In Weimar-era Frankfurt, Schoen also worked as a composer (creating a series of atonal ‘art songs’ for children), and as a critic, writing about the links between jazz and the avant-garde, which can scarcely have endeared him to the fanatically anti-jazz Adorno. At Frankfurt Radio, where Schoen worked in one form or another for many years – producer, jobbing musician, critic – he wanted to explore the specifically radiophonic properties of the medium, rather than simply broadcasting plays or concerts; he and Hans Flesch pioneered the Hörspiel with the 1924 show ‘Broadcasting Radio Magic’, which in Leslie and Dolbear’s words ‘presented radio not merely as a technology, but as technology mediated by social relations, a realm of conflict, negotiation and work’: the piece contains a sound collage, scratching, static, and ‘a booming voice announcing the station has lost its mind’. Until 1933, Schoen had fairly free rein: although Frankfurt Radio was funded by the ‘reactionary industrialist’ Carl Schleussner, it ‘fostered experimental work and employed leftists’. The local trade unions had their own half-hour weekly slot, and Schoen worked on a broadcast of excerpts from Trotsky’s My Life. Working deep in the culture industry, Schoen couldn’t stray completely from entertainment, but like many in Germany during the 1920s he regarded popular forms and the avant-garde as by no means antithetical. The authors note that in his ‘Conversation with Ernst Schoen’, Benjamin recalled the producer stating as a motto: ‘give every listener what he wants, and even a bit more (namely, of that which we want’).’

Working back from East Finchley, Dolbear and Leslie find Schoen in the 1920s living in one of Ernst May’s modernist ‘New Frankfurt’ housing estates, the Siedlung Höhenblick. A neighbour, the Dadaist Willi Baumeister, painted for Schoen and his wife Johanna a ‘Still Life with Head’, a post-Dada assemblage in which ‘a dummy head is surrounded by “the dials, amplification and antenna of radio”’. Despite Schoen’s work for G and friendship with Baumeister, Dada could be a step too far for Frankfurt Radio – a proposed radio programme with Raoul Hausmann was aborted for being in Schoen’s words ‘too difficult conceptually for our listeners’.  

Less than a decade after the start of their experiments in 1924, these radical radio producers were targeted by the Nazis. In 1933, they were dismissed en masse, and worse was to come. In the middle of that year, ‘one issue of the Nazi programme press, Der Deutsche Sender’, write Dolbear and Leslie, featured a full-page piece on the radio producers that they had persecuted. A group including Schoen’s close collaborator Hans Flesch was photographed arriving at the Oranienburg concentration camp, beneath which the caption read: ‘a Roll of Honour for the “Systemrundfunk”’. Schoen was imprisoned in 1934, released due to the lobbying of his wife and the intercession of an enthusiast abroad, Lord Reith. The memory of the heroism of his Communist fellow inmates seems to have stayed with Schoen for the rest of his life, and given this left-leaning but previously unaligned figure a strong loyalty to German Communism; but it was to Reith’s country that he would escape.

With the subsequent long section on ‘Exile Life’, the book becomes more straightforwardly biographical, and the excitement of the early radio experiments gives way to growing disappointment. It was not, at first, clear that Britain would be so uncongenial. The BBC’s producers were from early on aware of what Frankfurt Radio was up to. Schoen hoped he would be able to continue his experiments in the new laboratory of Broadcasting House. In 1934, he wrote in the BBC House Yearbook that ‘radio music would be “music that is played nowhere”’ and ‘works on the basis of electricity, tube technology and radio waves’. But Reith was hardly a natural ally. Despite his role in Schoen’s release from prison, privately, he was an enthusiast for Hitler and Mussolini, and related in his diary his pleasure that ‘Germany has banned hot jazz and I’m sorry that we should be behind in dealing with this filthy product of modernity’. In the pages of the Radio Times, Schoen tried to introduce readers to Paul Hindemith and Béla Bartók, which led to a furious response from a pseudonymous critic in Musical Times, describing these composers’ works as a ‘swindle’ and Schoen as an ‘extremist’. In the BBC Annual of 1935, Schoen criticised the notion that ‘the famous man in the street wants “none of your high-brow stuff”’, arguing that this attitude is owed largely to ‘hard and tedious factory or office work day after day . . . artificially keeping down his claims on life’. With greater leisure, this would change; the experiments at the BBC between the 1960s and the 1980s, from the Radiophonic Workshop to Dennis Potter, would appear to vindicate Schoen, though long after his death.

If the populist side of Schoen’s interests was now blocked, so too was the avant-garde route. He tried and failed to publish a long history of radio with the Frankfurt School’s Zeitschrift, causing a bitter enmity with the ‘snob’ Adorno, whose work he considered a blunderbuss attempt to find the ‘commodity character’ in music (Leslie and Dolbear note that ‘Schoen wondered if Oxford University was to blame’). Perhaps most interesting among Schoen’s British activities were his productions of mixed classical and modern opera with an ‘Opera Group’, touring all around the UK, with stops in Portsmouth, Belfast, Sunderland, Sheffield and Leeds. These performances impressed even Adorno, upon whom one of the Opera Group’s London shows ‘made a brilliant impression’. In 1938, Schoen would take the group to perform excerpts from The Threepenny Opera at the New Burlington Galleries’ ‘Twentieth Century German Art’ show, the famous Herbert Read-curated counter to the Entartete Kunst exhibitions.

Schoen, his family and their Willi Baumeister portrait were by the mid-1930s installed in Kingfisher Court, a mildly modernist block near Hampton Court Palace, designed in a provincial approximation of the high modernist housing he had left behind in Frankfurt. Dolbear and Leslie record a visit in the 1940s from Hanns Eisler, who paused to mock the Baumeister painting, by then terribly unfashionable. The building, on the Surrey/London border, had serious pretensions, with its own tennis court and bowling green; its records include complaints about the Schoens’ throwing fishbones out of their windows. From Kingfisher Court, Schoen wrote a series of London Elegies in German in 1943. These poems, including one elegy for Benjamin strikingly similar to Brecht’s, have an uncanny thematic resemblance to the greater poet’s Hollywood Elegies of the same time: similarly lonely and disenchanted, but set in a rainy, bombed out city rather than in the hills of Los Angeles. In ‘Peace and War’, Schoen looks out of his window at

A fascinating old woman: England,

London: Millions of tightly compressed

Identical little houses built quickly out of dirt

After the war, Schoen attracted the attention of MI5, who were keeping tabs on a discussion group with other fellow-travelling cultural émigrés, including the American actor and director Sam Wanamaker, the actors Ferdy Mayne and Herbert Lom, and the Czech LCC architect Walter Bor; he was unaware of this surveillance when he returned to live in Germany in the mid-1950s. Back in Frankfurt, he found that his modernist house had been destroyed; he would move first to the western and then the eastern zones of occupation, but the ‘New Germany’ wasn’t much more hospitable than old England. In Berlin, Schoen proposed numerous projects for the stage, radio and translation, from a DDR production of Shelagh Delaney to a project with his friend Ewan MacColl, but few of these came to fruition. This last section of the book, on Schoen as a ‘re-emigrant’, is enlivened with his dream diary from the time – mostly melancholy, racked with guilt and loss. Schoen’s widow blamed the Nazis for Schoen’s relatively early death at the end of the fifties; Dolbear and Leslie also connect his premature decline to the interruption of his project in Germany in 1933, and his inability to resume it elsewhere.

Schoen thrived for a startlingly brief period. Over two decades in outer London he did not successfully burrow into British cultural life and transform it. Nonetheless, his interests while working as an English translator in the DDR – of work by Delaney, Joan Littlewood and Wolf Mankowitz, among others – suggest that had he lived into the sixties, he would have found his conviction that the avant-garde and the popular were not opposed was not so eccentric after all. More mercifully, having died before 1961, he would not have been forced by the construction of the Berlin Wall to choose between comfort and Communism. When the avant-garde of which Schoen was a part was rediscovered in the 1970s, it was via post-punk pop culture – the cult of Weimar Germany, Constructivist album sleeves, Brecht-Weill cover versions and late-night screenings of M and Metropolis. Schoen himself had no influence on this, but the revival of the unadulterated Weimar culture he represented – political and populist, harsh and witty, tasteless and experimental – had come to influence a genuinely vital culture over here, and the sanitised version that once made up part of our ‘National Culture’ would be forgotten.

Read on: Perry Anderson, ‘Components of the National Culture’, NLR I/50.

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The Winning Side

If the battle of Điện Biên Phủ – the Stalingrad of decolonization – were in need of a symbol, you could do worse than a bicycle. One saddled with pieces of Katyusha rocket artillery, en route to be reassembled on the rim of the highlands overlooking the valley where the army divisions of Võ Nguyên Giáp smashed the French imperial forces seventy years ago. To commemorate their victory, the Vietnamese state this week staged a full-scale re-enactment of the events, with thousands taking up the roles of peasant porters and army regulars who won the First Indochina War. Everything was in place except for actors to play the French, though if the invitation had gone out to veterans of the French New Wave, it’s hard to see them turning down the call. Jean-Pierre Léaud as Henri Navarre!

One of the central dramas of Điện Biên Phủ is that both sides wanted the showdown. The commander of the French, Navarre, was confident they could rout the Vietnamese army just as they had done at Nà Sản two years before. He wanted to shut off any Vietnamese incursion into Laos in the north, turning Điện Biên Phủ into an ‘entrenched camp’ populated by 12,000 French troops, while simultaneously dispatching 53 battalions to root out the Vietnamese forces in the southern river delta. His second in command, René Cogny, wanted to meet Giáp’s soldiers out in the open in the style of battles of the previous century: ‘I want a clash at Điện Biên Phủ. I’ll do everything possible to make him eat dirt and forget about wanting to try his hand at grand strategy.’ Giáp was happy to take up the gauntlet, telling his planners that ‘Điện Biên Phủ could be the battle’.

The battle itself had features that seemed to look backwards rather than forwards: a set-piece confrontation, in open terrain, with trenches that, with tropical monsoons, must have rivalled Verdun (a few of whose veterans fought on the French side). There were calls to go over the top; there were attempts to tunnel under the enemy; there were even poets involved on both sides. French politicians tried to gin up war fever by suggesting that Ho’s forces were nothing less than Nazis. ‘I say that any current policy of capitulation in Indochina would be just like Vichy’, Edmond Michelet told the French deputies in Paris. (The call went unheeded by the dockworkers of Marseilles who refused to unload the coffins that came back from Điện Biên Phủ.)

But for Ho the battle was even more existential: it would be the masterstroke that would put Hanoi in a strong position in the postwar negotiations in Geneva. In the month leading up the clash, the Chinese supplied the Vietnamese troops with a bounty of artillery and ammunition. Giáp’s guns took out the French airstrip within the early days of bombardment. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese, the majority of them women, were recruited as porters, providing food and weapons. The French focused on breaking their access to rice. ‘Starve the adversary’, was Raoul Salan’s command. The robustness of food supply chains was paramount for such an extended battle, and northern Vietnamese memories were raw from the experience of famine brought on by the US aerial blockade in 1944-5 – a famine in which at least a million people died, and which deserves a firmer place in the annals of liberal-capitalist infamy.

The First Indochina War was in many ways a continuation of the US–China confrontation in Korea, carried out on new terrain, with the US supplying the French. The 1950s were a decade when nuclear weapons still figured as a godsend in the Western military mind, and their use was not at all off limits. MacArthur had mused about their deployment in Korea; Eisenhower would threaten China with them in the Taiwan Straits Crisis. Whether or not Secretary of State John Dulles offered to supply the French forces with atomic weapons – as Georges Bidault said he had – the idea of nuking a coalescing communist state was far from fantastical for Washington or Langley.

‘What must we do to realize a Điện Biên Phủ? How do we go about doing it?’, Fanon asked in The Wretched of the Earth. It’s a question the historian Christopher Goscha answers with aplomb in his recent history of the battle. His response is that the Vietnamese revolution in the postwar decades went beyond that of almost any other decolonizing state. Ho may have spoken in parables about Vietnam being the guerilla tiger capable of taking on the imperial elephant. But by 1954, as Goscha shows, Ho had an elephant of his own. As well as introducing obligatory military service, the communist Vietnamese state daringly – and brilliantly – implemented land reform at the height of its conflict with the French, in order to build the type of war communism that could fully mobilize a peasant class and turn minorities into Vietnamese. For Ho the war had two fronts: against the French, and against even the most ‘patriotic’ Vietnamese landowners. The peasants proved to be the decisive factor in Giáp’s victory. This was in stark contrast to the more guerilla-style forces of Indonesia and Algeria, which had no communist states to guide them.  

The legacy of Điện Biên Phủ was already of limited use by Fanon’s time. There was no conventional force in the Middle East, nor Africa, nor the rest of Southeast Asia capable of meeting the Western powers on open terrain. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by some Southern states, if anything, obviated the need for conventional forces that aspired to that level of strength. The Algerians, meanwhile, showed that political victories could be as effective as battlefield ones. But the capacity of Asian states to fight maximal wars with vast tolerance for casualties and shift to a war economy on a dime never became entirely idle. Though the battle was merely a prologue to the decade of aerial bombardment and chemical warfare that the US was about to unleash, no Western power ever won another major land war in Asia. Western leaders were haunted by the memory of 1954. As Lyndon Johnson put it: ‘I don’t want any damn Điện Biên Phủ.’

Read on: Che Guevara, ‘Vietnam Must Not Stand Alone’, NLR I/43.

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A Global War Regime

We seem to have entered a period of war without end, extending across the globe and unsettling even the central nodes of the world system. Each contemporary conflict has its own genealogy and stakes, but it is worth taking a step back and placing them in a larger framework. Our hypothesis is that a global war regime is emerging – one in which governance and military administrations are closely intertwined with capitalist structures. To grasp the dynamics of individual wars, and to formulate an adequate project of resistance, it is necessary to understand the contours of this regime.

Both the rhetoric and practices of global warfare have changed dramatically since the early 2000s, when the ‘rogue state’ and the ‘failed state’ were key ideological concepts thought to explain the outbreak of military conflicts, which were by definition confined to the periphery. This presupposed a stable and effective international system of governance, led by the dominant nation-states and global institutions. Today, that system is in crisis and unable to maintain order. Armed conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Gaza, are drawing in some of the most powerful actors on the international stage, summoning the spectre of nuclear escalation. The world-systems approach has typically viewed such disruptions as signs of a hegemonic transition, as when the World Wars of the twentieth century marked the shift from British to US global hegemony. But in today’s context, the disruption portends no transfer of power; the decline of US hegemony simply inaugurates a period in which crisis has become the norm.

We propose the concept of a ‘war regime’ to grasp the nature of this period. This can be seen, first of all, in the militarization of economic life and its increasing alignment with the demands of ‘national security’. Not only is more public expenditure earmarked for armaments; economic development as a whole, as Raúl Sánchez Cedillo writes, is increasingly shaped by military and security logics. The extraordinary advances in artificial intelligence are in large part propelled by military interests and technologies for war applications. Logistical circuits and infrastructures are similarly adapting to armed conflicts and operations. The boundaries between the economic and the military are becoming ever more blurred. In some economic sectors, they are indistinguishable.

The war regime is also evident in the militarization of the social field. Sometimes this takes the explicit form of suppressing dissent and rallying around the flag. But it also manifests in a more general attempt to reinforce obedience to authority at multiple social levels. Feminist critiques of militarization have long highlighted not only the toxic forms of masculinity that it mobilizes but also the distorting influence of military logics on all social relations and conflicts. Various right-wing figureheads – Bolsonaro, Putin, Duterte – make a clear connection between their militarist ethos and their support for social hierarchies. Even when this is not outwardly articulated, we can observe the spread of a reactionary political repertoire that combines militarism with social repression: re-enforcing racial and gender hierarchies, attacking and excluding migrants, banning or restricting abortion access, and undermining gay, lesbian, and trans rights, all while often invoking the threat of a looming civil war.

The emergent war regime is also visible in the seeming paradox regarding the continual failures of recent hegemonic war campaigns. For at least a half century now, the US military, despite being the most lavishly funded and technologically advanced fighting force on the planet, has done nothing but lose wars, from Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq. The symbol of such failure is the military helicopter carrying off the last remaining American personnel, leaving a devastated landscape in its wake. Why does such a powerful war machine keep failing? One obvious answer is that the United States is no longer the imperialist hegemon that some still believe it to be. Yet this dynamic of failure also discloses the overarching global power structure that such conflicts help to sustain. Here it is worth recalling Foucault’s work on the perpetual failures of the prison to accomplish its stated goals. Since its inception, he remarks, the penitentiary system, ostensibly dedicated to correcting and transforming criminal behaviours, has repeatedly done the opposite: increasing recidivism, turning offenders into delinquents and so on. ‘Perhaps’, he suggests, ‘one should reverse the problem and ask oneself what is served by the failure of the prison . . . Perhaps one should look for what is hidden beneath the apparent cynicism of the penal institution.’ In this case, too, we should reverse the problem and ask what is served by the failures of the war machine – what is hidden beneath its apparent aims. What we discover when we do so is not a cabal of military and political leaders plotting behind closed doors. It is rather what Foucault would call a governance project. The incessant parade of armed confrontations, large and small, serve to prop up a militarized governance structure that takes different forms in different places, and is guided by a multi-level structure of forces, including the dominant nation-states, the supranational institutions and competing sectors of capital, which sometimes align and sometimes conflict.

The intimate relation between war and circuits of capital is nothing new. Modern logistics has a military genealogy with roots in colonial endeavours and the Atlantic slave trade. Yet the current global conjuncture is characterized by the increasing imbrication of ‘geopolitics’ and ‘geoeconomics’, amid a constant making and remaking of spaces of valorization and accumulation, which intersect with the contested distribution of political power across the planet.

The logistical problems of the Covid-19 pandemic set the scene for a number of subsequent military disturbances. Images of containers stuck in ports signalled that world trade had become sclerotic. Corporations made frantic attempts to cope with the crisis, reconsolidating old routes or opening new ones. There followed the invasion of Ukraine and the consequent logistical disruptions. The oil and gas trade from Russia to Germany was one of the major casualties of the war, especially after the spectacular sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea, renewing talk of ‘nearshoring’ or ‘friendshoring’ as a strategy to wean Western economies off Moscow’s energy supplies. The war also stemmed the flow of wheat, maize and oilseeds. Energy prices soared in Europe; food staples grew scarce in Africa and Latin America; tensions rose between Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine after limits on the export of Ukrainian agricultural products were lifted. The German economy is now stagnating, and several other EU member states have been forced to reorganize their energy provision by striking deals with North African countries. Russia has rerouted its energy exports eastwards, mainly to China and India. New trade routes – through Georgia, for instance – have allowed it to at least partially circumvent Western sanctions. This reorganization of logistical spaces is clearly one of the main stakes of the conflict.

In Gaza, too, logistical and infrastructure arrangements are decisive, although they are often obscured by the unbearable spectacle of the slaughter. The US hoped that the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, stretching from India to Europe through the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Greece, would shore up its regional economic influence and counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Yet this relied on the project of Arab–Israeli normalization, which may have been fatally undermined by the ongoing war. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have, moreover, compelled major shipping companies to avoid the Suez Canal and take longer and more expensive routes. The US military is now building of a port off the coast of Gaza, supposedly to facilitate aid deliveries, although Palestinian organizations claim that its ultimate purpose is to facilitate ethnic cleansing.

The fighting in Ukraine and Gaza thus exemplifies the worldwide remaking of spaces of capital. Key sites of circulation are being reshaped, under a war regime, through the active intervention of nation-states. This implies the intermingling of political and economic logics: a phenomenon that is even more apparent in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region, where mounting tensions in the South China Sea and military alliances such as AUKUS are influencing economic networks like the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. In this transitional period, each conflict or supply-chain disruption may benefit this or that state or capitalist actor. Yet the system as a whole is beset by increasing spatial fragmentation and the emergence of unpredictable geographies.

In opposing the global war regime, calls for ceasefires and arms embargos are essential, but the present moment also demands a coherent internationalist politics. What is needed are coordinated practices of desertion through which people can depart radically from the status quo. At the time of writing, such a project is most clearly foreshadowed by the global movement in solidarity with Palestine.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, internationalism was often conceived as solidarity among national projects. This sometimes holds true today, as with South Africa’s case at the ICJ. Yet the concept of national liberation, which served as the basis for past anticolonial struggles, seems increasingly out of reach. While the struggle for Palestinian self-determination is ongoing, the prospects of a two-state solution and a sovereign Palestinian state are increasingly unrealistic. How, then, can we configure a project of liberation without assuming national sovereignty as a goal? What needs to be renovated and expanded, drawing on certain Marxist and Pan-Africanist traditions, is a non-national form of internationalism, capable of confronting the global circuits of contemporary capital.

Internationalism is not cosmopolitanism, which is to say that it requires material, specific and local grounding rather than abstract claims to universalism. This does not exclude the powers of nation-states but casts them in a wider context. A resistance movement fit for the 2020s would include a range of forces, including local and city-wide organizations, national structures and regional actors. Kurdish liberation struggles, for example, extend across national borders and straddle social boundaries in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. Indigenous movements in the Andes also cut across such divisions, while feminist coalitions in Latin America and beyond provide a powerful model of non-national internationalism.

Desertion, which designates a range of practices of fugitivity, has long been a privileged tactic for war resistance. Not just soldiers but all members of a society can resist simply by subtracting themselves from the war project. For a fighter in the IDF or the Russian Army or the US military, this is still a meaningful political act, though in practice it may prove extremely difficult. This could also be the case for Ukrainian soldiers, although their position is very different. Yet for those trapped in the Gaza Strip it is hardly an option. Desertion from the current war regime must therefore be conceived differently from traditional modes. This regime, as we have already noted, exceeds national boundaries and governance structures. In the EU, one can oppose one’s national government and its jingoist positions, yet one must also contend with the supranational structures of the trading bloc itself, while recognizing that even Europe as a whole is not a sovereign actor in these wars. In the US, military decision-making structures and fighting forces also spill beyond national boundaries and include a wide network of national and non-national actors.

How can one desert such a variegated structure? Local and individual gestures have little effect. The conditions for an effective praxis must involve collective refusal organized in international circuits. The mass protests against the US invasion of Iraq, which took place in cities across the world on 15 February 2003, correctly identified the supranational formation of the war machine and announced the possibility of a new internationalist, anti-war actor. Though they failed to stop the assault, they created a precedent for future practices of mass withdrawal. Two decades on, the mobilizations against the massacre in Gaza – springing up on city streets and college campuses worldwide – portend the formation of a ‘global Palestine’.

One of the primary obstacles to such a liberatory internationalist politics is campism: an ideological approach that reduces the political terrain to two opposed camps and often ends up asserting that the enemy of our enemy must be our friend. Some advocates of the Palestinian cause will celebrate, or at least shrink from criticizing, any actor that opposes the Israeli occupation, including Iran and its allies in the region. While this is an understandable impulse in the current conjuncture, when the population of Gaza is on the brink of starvation and subject to horrific violence, campism’s binary geopolitical logic ultimately leads to identification with oppressive forces that undermine liberation. Rather than supporting Iran or its allies, even rhetorically, an internationalist project should instead link Palestine solidarity struggles to those such as the ‘woman, life, freedom’ movements which challenged the Islamic Republic. In short, the struggle against the war regime must not only seek to interrupt the current constellation of wars, but also to effect broader social transformation.

Internationalism, then, must emerge from below, as local and regional liberation projects find means to struggle alongside one another. But it also involves an inverse process. It should aim to create a language of liberation that can be recognized, reflected and elaborated in various contexts: a continuous translation machine, as it were, which can bring together heterogenous contexts and subjectivities. A new internationalism should not assume or aspire to any global homogeneity, but instead combine radically different local and regional experience and structures. Given the fracturing of the global system, the disruption of strategic spaces of capital accumulation, and the interweaving of geopolitics and geoeconomics – all of which has laid the groundwork for the emergence of the war regime as a privileged form of governance – the project of desertion requires nothing less than an internationalist strategy to remake the world.

This article owes several insights to Brett Neilson, who is the author with Sandro Mezzadra of The Rest and the West: Capital and Power in a Multipolar World, forthcoming from Verso.

Read on: Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, ‘Empire, Twenty Years On’, NLR 120.

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Ghosts of ’68

‘And they’ll say that we are disturbing the peace. There is no peace. What bothers them is that we are disturbing the war.’

Howard Zinn, Boston Common, 1971.

On 17 April, at dawn, students at Columbia University camped out on the lawn outside Butler Library, demanding that their institution divest from companies complicit in Israel’s genocidal war. The following afternoon, the administration began suspending students and summoned the NYPD, which tore down the encampment. Another was quickly put up. Faculty were informed that because Columbia was in a state of emergency, its standard policies had been superseded by ad hoc ones, which included circulating fliers to threaten demonstrators with arrest or expulsion. Faced with the crackdown, on 30 April a small group of protesters – perhaps several dozen – took over Hamilton Hall, just as students had done on the same day in 1968. They renamed it Hind’s Hall, after Hind Rajab, a six-year-old Palestinian girl whom the IDF killed in late January, and flew a banner reading ‘Liberation Education’ from the second-story window overlooking Amsterdam and 116th St.

When self-censorship at US universities fails – a rare occurrence, as Edward Said noted three decades ago – overt censorship takes over. Yet few were prepared for the swiftness or brutality of the police-administrative-political response. With encampments springing up across the country, a series of police sweeps took place from 30 April to 3 May, at campuses including UT-Austin, UT-Dallas, Emory, USC, UCLA, UCSD, Emerson College, Northeastern, Dartmouth College, Washington University, Arizona State, University of Arizona, University of Wisconsin-Madison, University of Virginia, Virginia Tech, Portland State, SUNY-Stony Brook, Cal Poly Humboldt, Ohio State and Indiana University (both of which saw rooftop snipers deployed). More than 2,400 arrests were made. Steve Tamari, a history professor at Washington University, was beaten unconscious and hospitalized for filming police during their rampage. At the same protest, Jill Stein, the seventy-four-year-old presidential candidate for the Green Party, was roughed up, arrested and charged with assaulting an officer. At Dartmouth, Annelise Orleck, a sixty-five-year-old labour historian and Chair of Jewish Studies, was knocked to the ground by riot police, who cut off her airway before handcuffing her and taking her to jail. The college subsequently banned her from the campus where she has worked for thirty years.

Federal law enforcement agencies had clearly been coordinating with city, state, county, highway and campus police; the New Hampshire governor said as much. At UCLA, a group of pro-Israel demonstrators attacked the Gaza solidarity camp while the LAPD stood by (a pattern that has since been replicated nationwide). The next day, hundreds of riot police fired rubber bullets, tear gas and stun grenades at the students, dismantling the tents and arresting more than two hundred people, including some two dozen faculty, on unknown charges. Students at CCNY, New York’s flagship public university, had initially managed to chase the NYPD out of their uptown campus quad. Yet they later returned in full force, imposing a military-style occupation that saw the encampments destroyed and protesters detained. At NYU, the police stormed the protest site at Gould Plaza and arrested more than 130 people, including some professors trying to get into their offices, for trespassing. The encampment went back up days later, but in the early hours of 3 May the NYPD destroyed it and arrested a dozen or so protesters. The same sequence of events played out at the New School.

With dozens of quasi-military vehicles deployed, and entire city blocks cordoned off, riot police occupied the New York campuses, brutalizing anyone they perceived to be standing in their way. Columbia will remain under police lockdown until 17 May. Its commencement ceremony has been cancelled and some of those arrested will face criminal charges. The NYPD claims that roughly 30% of those detained at Columbia are non-students, while at CCNY the figure is said to be 60% – including some alleged jihadis who have yet to be named. Stanford has sent a photograph of one suspected ‘terrorist’ to the FBI. Students and staff have been subject to constant surveillance and relentless administrative harassment, with Columbia calling in the federal agents and private investigators. Policy changes and disciplinary measures have generally been announced ex post facto, via email or fliers, with no transparency or accountability. At NYU, an early career academic has been suspended for removing a pro-Israeli poster from a wall.

Politicians from both parties helped to manufacture the hysteria, with Democrats playing a leading role. President Biden declared the protests antisemitic and accused the students of causing ‘chaos’. From the senate floor, Chuck Schumer called students ‘terrorists’. The House of Representatives voted that slogans in support of Palestinian liberation constituted antisemitic hate speech and were therefore unlawful. Representatives from New York introduced the bipartisan Columbia Act, which pledges to create a federal commission at the Department of Education to oversee government-approved, third-party ‘antisemitism monitors’. New York Mayor Eric Adams held a press conference where he railed against ‘outside agitators’ and stressed the importance of identifying them through the Intelligence and Counterterrorism Unit, in coordination with the Columbia administration. Rebecca Weiner, an adjunct professor at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, currently serves as the Deputy Commissioner of that unit – which has an office in Tel Aviv, where it studies crowd control tactics and surveillance technologies with the Israeli security state. Adams remarked that Weiner had been ‘monitoring the situation’ on campus and deserved credit for the NYPD operation.

What explains the scale of this response? The semester ends sometime between late April and mid-May. Why not wait the encampments out, negotiating and offering symbolic concessions to buy time? This is partly a reflection of the changes that universities, like many other institutions, have undergone during decades of neoliberalization. In the mid-1970s, Republicans identified public universities as a crucial source of anti-authoritarian sentiment and demanded a complete institutional overhaul. The subsequent process of privatization, which has made tuition prohibitive for most prospective in-state students, has been catastrophic for democratic principles and practices. With massive, untaxed endowments running into the tens of billions, universities have slowly morphed into public-private police-carceral states, catering to ‘customers’ and answering to benefactors and politicians, not students or faculty.

At Columbia, whose endowment is $13.6 billion, students must pay $90,000 per year plus travel expenses – a dramatic rise since the 1980s. Administrative posts and salaries have increased relative to faculty ones, and the number of non-tenured staff has grown steadily. Nationally, three-fourths of faculty are non-tenured and therefore do not have academic freedom. The privileged minority of tenured faculty did nothing to fight this trend, nor did they participate in adjunct efforts to unionize, since the current system enables them to take research leave and sabbatical. Now tenure itself – under attack from Republican politicians, trustee boards and university administrations – seems unlikely to survive. Recent years have seen an upswell of labour activism among graduate students and adjunct faculty, some of whom have managed to win collective bargaining rights, but they are a long way from re-democratizing the academy.

Another crucial factor is the influence of so-called ‘shot callers’: a donor class of billionaires, often working through politicians or board members, with the power to force institutional changes or get people fired by threatening to withhold funding. As universities have become more like corporations, whose primary duties are to their shareholders, administrators have become increasingly pliant before donors and their representatives. Presidents can be forced to resign even when they have strong support from students and faculty, as at Harvard; or, conversely, they can ignore significant internal opposition because they have outside backers, as at Columbia. (One of the main shot callers there is Democratic donor Robert Kraft, the owner of the New England Patriots, who responded to the protests by revoking a donation and taking out full-page advertisements in major newspapers which denounced ‘antisemitic hate’ and demanded greater ‘protection’ on campuses.)

It was the aftermath of 9/11, however, that brought the neoliberal university deeper into the embrace of the national security state. In the run-up to the second invasion of Iraq, campuses saw a new wave of political organizing spanning students and faculty, including the formation of groups like Historians Against the War (which remains active today). The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign was founded in 2005 and took wing at the end of Bush’s second term, attracting the ire of university administrations. At the same time, radical academics faced greater scrutiny and often direct surveillance. Alan Dershowitz, having been exposed as a plagiarist by Norman Finkelstein, used his connections to get Finkelstein’s tenure at DePaul denied. Finkelstein never found academic work again. Aijaz Ahmed, a leading critic of US empire, was fired from York University in Toronto for his writings on Palestine. Perhaps the most emblematic case was that of Sami Al-Arian, a professor of computer science at the University of South Florida who worked in the Clinton White House, and who came under federal surveillance because of his advocacy. In 2003 he was falsely accused of providing ‘material support’ to Islamic Jihad ‘terrorists’, fired from his job, held in solitary confinement for three years and hounded through the courts. Federal prosecutors failed to convict him on a single count. The only evidence they presented was Al-Arian’s public statements and writings on Palestinian liberation. In 2014 the government dropped all charges, and he was deported to Turkey the following year.

After the 2008 financial crash, austerity became the order of the day for everyone except bankers, big tech and investors, and public universities were starved of funding. Anti-imperial scholarship and activism generally receded, even as Obama ramped up drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan while opening new fronts in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Somalia. His presidency was crucial in consolidating the relationship between the higher education sector and the Democratic establishment. In 2012, his leading campaign donors were faculty, staff, students, alumni and administrators at UC Berkeley, with Harvard and Stanford not far behind. The eruption of BLM in 2014-15 did little to change this trend and may have even accelerated it. To the extent that it was a movement at all, as opposed to a branding exercise, it never represented a threat to the Clintonite wing of the party, much less to the donor class. It merely helped turn the creed of diversity, equity and inclusion into more rigid and constricting policies used, especially by HR departments, to keep people in line. Universities have now become factories where Democratic ideology is mass produced and disseminated in the media, cultural, entertainment, technological and scientific spheres. By pointing this out, and by disingenuously framing higher education institutions as insufficiently supportive of Israel, Republicans hope to burnish their ‘anti-elitist’ credentials and target a key site of Democratic power.

By the time university presidents were hauled before Republican lawmakers to answer a series of cynical questions about campus ‘hate speech’, they had long since sawed off the branch on which they needed to stand. Having spent decades silencing criticism of Israel, they could not invoke first amendment rights or academic autonomy. Instead, they have simply tried to comply with the Republican clampdown. Of course, as Trotsky noted, playing nice with wannabe fascists rarely works. There are no steps the university presidents could take that would satisfy far-right legislators. For the latter have nothing to lose by continuing their offensive, which allows them to divide the Democratic base against the leadership and the Zionist donor class to which it answers, increasing the likelihood of a Republican victory in November.

In 1968, a split Democratic Party handed the presidency to Nixon, at a time when most US citizens opposed the Vietnam war and, paradoxically, opposed the peace demonstrators as well. Today, a majority of Biden voters want the genocide in Gaza stopped, and most Americans support the student protests. This is bad news for the incumbent. Of his 2020 voters, 10% now plan to back Trump. Should a significant number of independents, who make up 43% of the electorate, or ‘progressives’ – who number about 35% and reliably vote Democrat – decide to stay home or support another candidate, the president will be in trouble. Between the growing uncommitted block of anti-Biden delegates, the potential for mass unrest over the summer, and the protesters planning to converge on Chicago for the Democratic Convention, a repeat of some aspects of ’68 appears to be on the cards, although this time it is as if a much-diminished LBJ had decided to run for re-election. The latest polls indicate that if Biden wins, it will be because abortion mobilizes predominantly white suburban women in sufficient numbers. The failed Democratic strategy in 2016 – ‘for every blue-collar Democrat we lose in western Pennsylvania, we’ll pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs of Philadelphia, and you can repeat that in Ohio, Illinois, and Wisconsin’ – seems to be the only one that the leadership is capable of pursuing.

The 1968 occupation of Hamilton Hall – protesting the university’s complicity in the war, its real-estate rapacity in Harlem and its authoritarian approach to student demonstrators – was captured on film, along with the brutal retaking of the building and over 700 arrests. As the footage circulated, protests spread to high schools and other campuses across the country. Over the next two years, the tide of history turned. Võ Nyugên Giáp, architect of the Tet Offensive, famously remarked that the US could never have won in Vietnam regardless of its superior military strength. Why? Because ‘the human factor’ was decisive. It did not matter how many Vietnamese the US killed. There would always be enough willing to fight and die in defence of their country. The goal of the NLF and Hanoi was to break the will of the American government to continue the war. Eventually, with help from the US student and anti-war movements, they succeeded.

Since then, the so-called human factor has played a crucial role in other anti-imperialist struggles. General Giáp’s insight has held true in Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon, South Africa, Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Somalia, the West Bank and now Gaza. In none of these cases have bombs, artillery, torture, surveillance technology or counterintelligence, whether used by US military or its proxies, secured outright victory for the hegemon. Resistance movements, some of them popular and democratic, have endured.

Nor can militarized police raids, which bring counter-insurgency operations home, vanquish the ghosts of ’68. Thanks to student organizers, along with a critical minority of professors, intellectuals, scientists, technical workers, lawyers, human rights activists and cultural producers, people across the US are mobilizing in defence of first-amendment rights and against Israel’s genocide of Gazans. They are making history, and they know it. An increasingly authoritarian variant of neoliberalism will not stop them. Following a forty-year eclipse, might we see the rebirth of what Said called democratic criticism, or what Mike Davis called the revolutionary socialist project, as an antidote to ethno-religious nationalism, empire and thanatocracy?

Read on: Ernest Mandel, ‘Lessons of May’, NLR I/52.

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Problem Trump

A mystery surrounds Donald Trump: if he is so good at selling himself, why is he so bad at selling his own-brand products? That he sells himself well is self-evident; otherwise, he wouldn’t have one of America’s historic political parties on a leash, like a well-trained puppy. He wouldn’t have won the presidency of history’s most powerful empire, nor be at risk of winning it again. As a result, for the past seven years half the world’s political commentators have talked about little else.

What’s more, last month he showed he could sell himself not just politically but financially, when the paper value of the Trump Media & Technology Group touched $10 billion (before falling by $2 billion when 2023’s balance sheet was made public). It’s clear that Trump was actually selling himself here since TRUTH, the social media controlled by TMTG, has only 9 million users and posted a loss of $58 million for the year 2023, after losing $50 million the year before. These figures are laughable compared to those of X, better known as Twitter, which has 550 million users and revenues of over $5 billion. Only its identification with Trump could explain why such a flimsy, loss-making project was valued (briefly) at such an eye-watering sum.

But equally evident, and quite funny, is the disastrous performance of the many products launched under the orange man’s logo. A non-exhaustive list, in chronological order:

  • Trump: The Game, a boardgame released in 1989, sold badly. It was re-released in 2004 to coincide with The Apprentice, but failed once again. Today it is a collector’s item for Trumpomaniacs.
  • Trump Shuttle, launched in 1989. A regional airline operating between New York, Boston and Washington, complete with faux-marble burgundy carpets and gold-coloured toilet fixtures. Went bankrupt 1991.
  • Trump Table Water (Ice Natural Spring), on sale in 1990, in cheap plastic bottles. Discontinued in 2010, though still available at Trump-branded restaurants and golf-courses.
  • Trump Pale Ale, announced in 1998 but never went on sale. Ditto, two soft drinks, Trump Fire and Trump Power.
  • Donald Trump: The Fragrance, a perfume brand launched in 2004. Sold under various labels, always at a loss; the cologne was relaunched this year as Victory47.
  • Trump University, which opened in 2004, was not a university and did not grant degrees. It provided courses lasting a few days on how to get rich, with fees of up to $34,000. Sued by 7,000 former students, Trump settled the lawsuit for $25 million after his election in 2016.
  • Trump Vodka, launched in 2005 as ‘Success Distilled’. Discontinued in 2011, though still sold in Israel, where it proved popular for Passover as distilled from potatoes, not grain.
  • GoTrump.com online travel agency, set up in 2006, promising Trump-style travel. Closed the following year.
  • Trump Steaks, launched in May 2007, advertising fillet at $96 per pound. Closed down two months later owing a debt of $715,000 to suppliers.
  • Trump Home, a furnishing brand, launched in 2007. Produced the Trump Mattress, to very poor reviews. After various mishaps, these disappeared from shops in 2017.
  • DJT, a steak house, opened in Las Vegas in 2008. Briefly shuttered in 2012 for an alleged 51 health violations, including parasites in undercooked halibut, expired yoghurt, month-old caviar, four-month-old duck, two-week-old tomato sauce, expired peanut dressing and an improperly functioning freezer.
  • Trump Winery, a 500-hectare estate in Virginia, purchased by Trump in 2011 and run by his son Eric. Produces various wines, including Trump Pinot Noir, etc.
  • Trump Sneakers, all gold, with a capital T on the buckle. Launched in February this year at $399 a pair.

I’ll skip other failed initiatives, like Trump Magazine or Trump Mortgage, as the picture is pretty clear already.

It’s plain that the purpose of selling this stuff was not political. Trump was not using merchandise to spread ideas, as with party T-shirts, or the Tory flip-flops with Keir Starmer’s face, or the barracks humour of the UKIP condoms with a picture of Nigel Farage and the motto, ‘For when you have a hard Brexit’:

The only generically political Trump merch is his God Bless the USA Bible, released in March this year for $59.99. In addition to the canonical King James text, it includes the US Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Pledge of Allegiance and the Lee Greenwood lyrics to God Bless the USA. We don’t know yet how sales of the MAGA Bible will go. In this instance, it is not so much that Trump wants to be seen as a co-author (though that cannot be ruled out), but rather hopes to endear himself to Evangelicals, close to him on many issues but not so keen on his relations with porn stars or his role in the gambling industry.

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If Trump isn’t selling merchandise to spread ideas, perhaps he wants to use his ideas to sell merchandise: not money for politics, but politics for money? In fact, as the list shows, Trump was already selling board games and spring water in 1990, when he was still a real-estate developer, implicated in various bankruptcy proceedings. Trump started selling his image before he became Trump. This tells us something vital about his idea of himself. As someone dear to me used to say: ‘If you don’t believe in yourself, why should others?’ Trump was already cultivating a high opinion of Trump in the late 1980s.

The list also shows that the Trump brand surged with The Apprentice. Although perfume, vodka, tourism and steaks were a failure, their multiplication indicates that the reality TV show – a hit in its first two seasons, whose ratings then sank – functioned to reveal Trump to himself, as if he had found his way at last. The disparity between the boost of the promotional launch and the mediocrity of the product shows that, for Trump, the important thing has always been the packaging, not the object.

In this sense, he was a precursor. Many commentators, Italians in particular, point to Berlusconi as Trump’s forebear. Berlusconi also made his money as a real-estate developer, then built his political career on TV (and on his football club). Berlusconi presented himself as the anti-politician, who brought the know-how that had made him a successful entrepreneur to bear on running the country.  Like Trump, Berlusconi was a standard bearer for misogyny and machismo, surrounding himself with ‘women as objects’.

Trump was also a real-estate developer and he too presented himself as the anti-political saviour of politics. But here the similarities end. Berlusconi made his money himself, and didn’t inherit it from his father. Berlusconi bought a second-division football team and primed to win the European Champions Cup. Trump never managed to buy an American football team, despite his multiple, vain attempts to acquire the Boston Celtics. Berlusconi was the owner of a TV channel, not the presenter of a show. Berlusconi was the thing itself, while Trump always tried to present himself as the image of the thing; that’s why The Apprentice suited him so well.

Berlusconi’s channel put out reality TV shows, though only after he’d clawed his way into power. But he would never have dreamt of being a reality-show host, or appearing on one. This indicates a caesura in the realm of communications: with the reality show, there also appeared what we now call the influencer. While Berlusconi did politics as a tycoon, Trump does politics as an influencer, playing the tycoon. Not by chance did he say that reality shows were ‘for the bottom-feeders of society.’ As our list shows, Trump was already thinking and acting like an influencer in the 1980s, decades before the type appeared. He is the first top-level American politician to have internalised the modalities of social media for political purposes.

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Critics have treated Trump as a calamity to be deplored, rather than a problem to be solved. His unprecedented novelty – no one, as late as 2012, could predict his meteoric rise – still obliges us to explain why we did not foresee what happened. Much treatment of Trump recalls that useless notion, the ‘humanitarian catastrophe’, which tells us that something ugly has happened between the head and the neck of some unfortunate bearer of (only) ‘human’ rights, without saying why or how – with no one guilty, or held responsible.

Or, worse, the blame is put on the (many) voters who backed him, and so are deemed irremediably stupid, perverse, racist or even fascist; the equivalent of saying it would be better if government depended a little less on the voters, if the political system were a little less representative – a return to ‘rule by the best’, perhaps now by a ‘cognitive aristocracy’. If Trump is treated as a problem, rather than a calamity, more discomfiting questions arise.

Meanwhile, it is easier to understand how Trump the influencer is good at selling himself, but not merchandize that doesn’t really correspond to his image. As a celebrated advertising guru explained to me, Trump has little real connection with board games or mineral water: ‘If your products are bad, or blurry, or too expensive, and you can only count on half the potential market, and your celebrity’s image, style and behaviour are a poor match with what you’re selling, well, it’s obvious you’re heading for a fall’.

She added an interesting observation:

‘I’m not sure the metaphor of “selling” is so appropriate, if we’re talking about votes and political support. A vote is something you give to someone, for a thousand reasons: anger, sympathy, interest, identification, lack of alternatives, resentment, convenience… Giving it costs you nothing, and you may get a certain satisfaction from it. If you don’t, it’s simple: you don’t go out and vote. Buying something costs you money, though, and the more expensive it is, the more you have to think. Or at least, the more you need to be able to rationalise your choice and show it’s worth it, even if it was an impulse buy. In this sense, consumers are more rational than voters. It’s not by chance that one of the sharpest political slogans ever – JFK’s poster of Nixon in 1960, asking, ‘Would you buy a used car from this man?’ – tried to persuade voters by turning them into consumers.’

She then produced a long list of reasons to vote for Trump, noting she thought some of them well-founded, despite being ‘not exactly a Trump voter’ herself. Here are some of them:

  • Because MAGA and America First are two big promises (who remembers Biden’s slogans?)
  • Because you can understand what he’s saying
  • Because he seems convinced of what he says, much more than Biden
  • Because this wokeness has gone too far
  • Because ‘let’s just see what happens’, it can’t get any worse
  • Because the newspapers and TV networks tell lies, and I only trust what I read in my internet bubble

At this point it is customary to ask readers how many they agree with.

On the efficacy of the JFK slogan, though, one might object that the Democrats lost the White House to Nixon in 1968 and 1972, even if they wouldn’t buy his used car. Besides, there is not much in this list that would convince the CEO of a large corporation, with billions in sales and hundreds of thousands of employees, to give Trump their financial backing. Yet such CEOs do exist. Here is the head of one of the world’s biggest banks, as reported by the New York Times:

The Davos attendees needed reassurance, and Jamie Dimon, the chairman and chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, had some to offer. In an interview with CNBC that made headlines around the world, Dimon praised Trump’s economic policies as president. ‘Be honest’, Dimon said, sitting against a backdrop of snow-dusted evergreens, dressed casually in a dark blazer and polo shirt. ‘He was kind of right about NATO, kind of right on immigration. He grew the economy quite well. Trade. Tax reform worked. He was right about some of China.’

In other words, classic liberal-capitalist policies, à l’américaine. This is why Trump continues to be a problem and not just a calamity.

Read on: JoAnn Wypijewski, ‘Politics of Insecurity’, NLR 103.